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Abstract 
 
This thesis stems from two related problems within the Internalism-Externalism debate. First 
is the problem of intentionality: how is it that we are able to reach out to the world through 
language. The answer I believe is through use. The second problem relates to the possibility of 
scientific enquiry: whether or not it is possible to scientifically study the object of externalist 
inquiry, the use of language for instance.  The kind of theory I try to point towards, both 
incorporates how we are able to reach out to the world through language; i.e. explains use, and 
also aims to do so scientifically. I arrive at this through various steps, the first of which is an 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘grammar’ as both constitutive of a proposition and 
involving an element of use. Further through an analysis of Horwich, I attempt to see whether 
it is possible to systematize a use theory of meaning. I move on to externalist referential 
semantics, specifically to minimal semantics, as it appears to incorporate both internalist as 
well as externalist elements. For a theory that was able to scientifically explain content 
ascription, I then turn to Davidson. Davidson’s decision theoretic account of what he called 
triangulation presents itself as a candidate to better explain how we ascribe a particular content 
to a particular word or sentence. This framework, I contend is exemplified in Pietroski et al.’s 
“Meaning of ‘Most’” experiments. I argue that Horwich’s use-properties could form the test 
statements for Pietroski-like experiments, which would yield a possible way to relate the use 
of a sentence to meaning and truth. And this result is only achieved with the important 
assumption that we are situated in a world which we share with others much like ourselves.  
 
 
  
3 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 Motivations from Advaita Vedanta ................................................................................ 10 
1.2 Symbols and Signs ......................................................................................................... 12 
1.3 Internalism and Externalism........................................................................................... 14 
1.4 The Chomskian Internalist Framework .......................................................................... 17 
Chapter 2: Wittgensteinian Motivations ............................................................................. 22 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 22 
2.2 Centrality of Internal Structure ...................................................................................... 22 
2.2.1 Determinate Relation and Grammar ........................................................................ 23 
2.2.2 Arguments in Favour of Continuity ......................................................................... 31 
2.3 Wittgensteinian Analogies ............................................................................................. 32 
2.3.1 Facial Expressions ................................................................................................... 32 
2.3.2 Music and Language ................................................................................................ 34 
2.3.3 Recent Accounts of Musical meaning ..................................................................... 38 
2.4 Implications in Terms of Our Original Intuitions .......................................................... 43 
Chapter 3: Systematizing Use: Towards a Use-Theoretic Account of Meaning .............. 45 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 45 
3.2 Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning ................................................................................ 50 
3.2.1 Objections to Horwich’s Theory of Word Meanings as Use Properties ................. 54 
3.3 Deflationism and Horwich ............................................................................................. 57 
3.3.1 Davidson on Deflating Compositionality ................................................................ 62 
3.3.2 Objections to Deflating Compositionality ............................................................... 64 
3.4 A Defence of Horwich ................................................................................................... 66 
3.4.1 Use-Properties: Implicit Definition and Rule following ......................................... 66 
3.4.2 Sentences: Entailment, Compositionality and Truth Theoretic Accounts ............... 69 
3.4.3  Horwich and the Chomskian Programme ............................................................... 71 
3.4.4 Behaviorism ............................................................................................................. 74 
3.5 Formulating a Stronger Objection to Horwich ............................................................... 75 
3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 80 
 4 
3.8 Conclusions Towards Our Original Intuitions ............................................................... 81 
Chapter 4: Reference and Context Dependence in a Minimal Semantic Theory ............ 83 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 83 
4.2 Favouring Formalism over Contextualism ..................................................................... 87 
4.2.1 The Case for Contextualism .................................................................................... 87 
4.2.2 The Minimalist Argument Against Contextualism ................................................. 91 
4.2.3 Empirical Evidence: Questioning the Possibility of Non-Contextual Processing ... 97 
4.2.4 Interim Conclusions ............................................................................................... 100 
4.3 Fodorian Motivations: Modularity, Atomism and Externalism ................................... 100 
4.3.1 Modularity ............................................................................................................. 100 
4.3.2 Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind ............................................................ 106 
4.4 Borg’s Organisational Lexical Semantics .................................................................... 111 
4.5 Extending Fodor’s Commitment Beyond Natural Kind Terms: Defense of a Referential, 
Propositional Account Against Internalism ....................................................................... 115 
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 124 
4.7 Consequences Towards Our Original Intuitions .......................................................... 125 
Chapter 5: A Unified Theory and its Application ............................................................ 126 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 126 
5.2 A Substantive Account of Truth as a Theory of Meaning ........................................... 127 
5.2.1 Davidson on Deflationism and the Nature of Truth .............................................. 129 
5.2.2 Objectivity and Holism .......................................................................................... 131 
5.2.3 Triangulation ......................................................................................................... 134 
5.3 Decision Theory and its Place in Davidson’s Work .................................................... 136 
5.3.1 Critique of Davidson’s Decision-Theoretic Account ............................................ 138 
5.4 Reinterpreting Use........................................................................................................ 140 
5.4.1 Understanding Use ................................................................................................ 140 
5.4.2 Pietroski’s ‘most’ Experiments: A Davidsonian Application of Decision Theory144 
5.4.3 Re-interpreting Use-properties .............................................................................. 146 
5.5 Wittgenstein and Davidson on the Impossibility of Private Language ........................ 148 
5.6 Cartesian and Un-Cartesian Linguistics ....................................................................... 150 
5.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 154 
Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 156 
References ............................................................................................................................. 159 
 
5 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1   Faculty of language, Reproduced from Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002 
 
Figure 2    Model of the Initial State of the Faculty of Language 
 
Figure 3    Horwich’s Use Theory 
 
Figure 4    Muller-Lyre Illusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
Works by Wittgenstein: 
 
TLP    Tractatus Logico Philosophicus [TLP], Tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness.   
International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. 1974 
 
BBB          Blue and Brown Books, Ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1958a   
                             
PI             Philosophical Investigations [PI], Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. G.E.M. 
Anscombe. Second edition. 1958b 
 
Z           Zettel, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, (Eds.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1967 
 
LA        Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief. Ed. Cyril 
Barrett Oxford: Basil Blackwell.1966 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without 
the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am extremely grateful to Wolfram Hinzen, every interaction with whom has been 
intellectually stimulating. His passion for his work was a constant inspiration. I thank him for 
his guidance, understanding, patience and simply for putting up with me.  
I would also like to thank Nirmalangshu Mukherji for all his support, encouragement and 
motivation. Thanks goes to Sophie Gibb for meeting me, and commenting on a part of my 
thesis, to Jonathan Lowe for crucial feedback in the Mind Language Metaphysics meeting, and 
to Nick Zangwill and Ian Kidd for helpful advice during PhD review sessions, and to Mitchelle 
Sheehan for taking the time to read and comment on some of my work. I have also benefitted 
from interaction with Paul Horwich, Emma Borg, Paul Pietroski and John Collins. Each of 
their work has inspired me in various ways and has found a place in my arguments.  
Being a part of the Language and Mind Research Group was an extremely enriching 
experience. Thank you Ulrich Reichard, David Kirkby, Andrew Woodard, Tom Hughes, Alex 
Malt and James Miller, for all the stimulating discussions and feedback.  
I also thank Durham University, and the Department of Philosophy for the Durham 
Doctoral Fellowship and the Overseas Research Student Award, which gave me the 
opportunity to undertake this work. I would also like to thank participants at the MLM meetings 
for feedback at the early stage of this work.   
And, of course, a huge thank you to my family. I am grateful to my parents and in-laws 
for helping with the baby at the final stages of my thesis. Being away from Durham and my 
Research group for an extended period, my husband was, for the most part, the one I went to 
for discussions and bouncing off ideas. He was not just an amazing listener, but also gave me 
a different perspective on this work, which I greatly value. Above all, his love and support is 
what got me through these years.  Lastly, my little boy Taran has been the final motivation for 
me to complete this work. 
 
9 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
An enquiry begins with a conundrum, a problem that seeks a solution or a simplification. The 
problem that puzzled me constantly and which led me to this work is: how do symbols acquire 
meaning. This is a central question in philosophy of language (among other fields of study as 
well) and one which is multifaceted, with many possible directions of inquiry. The intuition 
that has guided my thoughts regarding this broad and general question is that meaning must 
already exist in some form within the symbol itself (with relation to the symbol system) for it 
to mean anything. The idea is that we cannot give something meaning unless it already 
possesses an element of meaning or the possibility of it. There is certainly a sense in which 
everything possesses the possibility of meaning. To put it differently, we can decide to give 
meaning to anything: we can call a rock by a name and worship it and decide that trees 
symbolise growth and prosperity. Similarly the same painting could mean various things, a 
solemn sunset for some, and a furry cat for others. This way of ascribing meaning, as the term 
ascribing itself suggests, involves ascribing to the object or symbol (or even the system of 
symbols, an element (i.e. meaning) which is external to it. So the intuition suggests that we 
could only ascribe such external meaning if the system of symbols was internally significant 
in some way. We are thus seeking a theory of meaning which is capable of accounting for both 
the internal significance of language as well as the aboutness of language, or in other words, 
that language has external significance.  
Why should one believe that the task is an important one to begin with? Isn’t there a 
way to understand language as systematic, in a way that allows for ascription of meaning? A 
sentence is made up of significant parts, nouns, verbs, prepositions and connectives and these 
are combined in definite ways to form noun phrase, verb phrase, determiner phrase etc., and 
then each of these elements can systematically be ascribed a definite meaning. This way of 
understanding language could easily be aligned with Chomskian Biolinguistics (see section 1.4 
below). Further, as Hinzen (2007) argues, we can even articulate the particular structures that 
enable reference. Reference isn’t achieved by words alone1, and we require structures of a 
certain degree of complexity in order to achieve reference. But what we seek is an explanation 
                                                          
1 Contrary to traditional referential theories (e.g. Mill 1973) of meaning which state for instance that proper names 
refer to objects.  
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for these phenomena, although we are not yet certain of the form of this explanation, or whether 
an explanation is even available in this regard.My intuition is that we need to be able to 
reconcile the two aspects of meaning: internal content and external significance.  
As an answer to the question: ‘how does language reach out to the world?’,I would 
intuitively say that this is achieved through the use of language. In Chapter 2, we seek 
motivation from Wittgenstein towards reconciling internal meaning (grammar) and external 
significance (use). In chapter 3, through an analysis of Horwich, we attempt to see whether it 
is possible to systematize a use theory of meaning. Then in chapter 4 we move on to externalist 
referential semantics, specifically to minimal semantics, and focus on Borg, as she appears at 
first glance to have a theory which incorporates both internalist as well as externalist elements. 
Finally, for a theory that is able to scientifically explain content ascription, we turn to Davidson 
in chapter 5. Davidson’s decision theoretic account of what he calls triangulation presents itself 
as a candidate to better explain how we ascribe a particular content to a particular word or 
sentence. In this chapter, below, I hint at my underlying motivations and then clarify some 
terms under discussion: symbols as Chomskian internalism. 
1.1 Motivations from Advaita Vedanta 
‘Tat tvam asi’ or ‘thou are that’ the all-encompassing dictum of the culmination of the Vedas 
refers to the identification of the self with Brahman (or the Ultimate Reality). The idea is that 
there is no Other, there is just the singularity of Brahman, and all perceptible differences and 
differentiations are a part of that singularity. We perceive them as differences, and are able to 
distinguish one thing from another simply because we are unable to perceive that all that there 
is, is a manifestation of that Unity. All dichotomies, including what is internal and what is 
external, i.e. including the separation of the self and not-self is a manifestation of our ignorance 
of (the ultimate) Reality, or Brahman.  
The above was a perspective from Indian Philosophy to suggest that dichotomies, 
especially of the self and that which is beyond the self; or of what is internal and what is external 
to the mind/brain; or what is physical and what is mental; are merely apparent. Chomsky 
(2000)2 argued that the problem of mind-body dualism was no longer one that can be 
formulated, since the concept of the physical is no longer distinguishable from the mental.3 He 
                                                          
2 See also Mukherji 2010 for an overview of this argument.  
3 I am not entirely convinced that because the Cartesian concept of the physical body is no longer one that can be 
upheld, mind body dualism no longer applies. Crudely speaking we can easily distinguish between the physical 
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claimed that Descartes two-substance theory “was put to rest by Newton, who showed that one 
of the two substances does not exist: namely body.” (Chomsky 2000:17) 
The current work partakes of this debate in terms of the dichotomy between externalist 
and internalist approaches to the study of language. The reason we enter this debate is 
essentially in terms of how it informs the problem of intentionality in language. As an aside, 
the reason I became interested in this problem is that the Indian philosophical perspective, 
namely Advaita Vedanta, abolishes dualities and dichotomies, but it appears that language has 
inherent in itself the possibility of a dichotomy between the speaker and the non-speaker or 
that which is talked about. In other words the problem of intentionality in language, the 
aboutness of language, presupposes (though it need not state) the existence of an object or 
person that is talked about, apart from the speaker. It appears that the mind (or the speaker) 
reaches out to the world through language.4 But language, for ancient Indian grammarians like 
Panini (c. 450 BC) and Bhartrhari (c. 450-500 AD) was itself an embodiment of the ultimate 
reality, Brahman. In the Indian philosophical tradition culminating in Vedant (end of the 
Vedas) ‘Word’ (or language) has throughout maintained an important epistemological 
significance. Through the various traditions, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Yoga, Dvaita and 
Advaita Vedanta, the idea remains that knowledge is linguistic in an important sense, and 
whatever is knowable, is linguistic. Anything that is knowable can be described in language. 
For the Indian tradition culminating in the Vedanta school of thought, all that exists, Reality is 
one5. To describe it would be to admit of distinctions and differentiations within the singularity. 
Brahman, which is indescribable. But anything that is describable, is describable through 
words. So at the level of existence where we have not as yet realized Brahman, we can access 
Brahman through words (more specifically through the word ‘Om’). 
To say that we only have language to describe reality with, it may appear that language 
in a sense constitutes reality or our modes of reference to it6. But language could also be 
understood as a way of getting at reality, which is not independently available in descriptive 
                                                          
body and consciousness, which could be equated with the mind, which is non-physical (given that we do not 
subscribe to a reductionist view: that everything can be reduced to the physical.) In other words, while physics 
may not give us a coherent notion of the physical, our intuitive understanding does. But I am not making this point 
or arguing for it here.  
4 Though for Chomsky the most important function of language is the expression of our own thoughts. However, 
even this expression, and language itself presupposes at least another person if not a community of speakers. (Here 
we are following Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in assuming that there is no private language). 
5 Rather, it would be more appropriate to call it singular, as the term ‘one’ admits of a contrast with many; whereas 
Reality (or Brahman) admits of no such contradictions. 
6 This is the Un-Cartesian position discussed in section 5.6. 
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form. We can either experience it (reality or Brahman) as indescribable (i.e. beyond 
descriptions) or through word (Shabda Brahma). In other words, apart from experiencing, or 
realizing reality, the only way that we can access reality or truth is through language. Language 
does not create reality, but gives us a way to refer to it, access it in a sense. But then, how does 
it relate to the external world? How is it that we can refer and reach out to things in the world 
through language? This is the problem of this thesis. We should note here that the fact that we 
do in fact refer to this world through language is one that needs an explanation. And the 
explanation we seek is not just of the mechanisms involved; i.e. our explanation must not be 
limited to the particular sentential structure or formal element that is required in order for us to 
achieve reference, but should attempt to address how it (any structure) can do so.7  
1.2 Symbols and Signs 
Gallistel claims however, that the “essence of a symbol is that it denotes or refers to something 
other than itself.” (Gallistel 1998: 7) We now briefly discuss this claim and the nature of a 
symbol (as opposed to a sign) which it involves.  
This claim is made in the context of his idea that a symbol-processing system has two 
components: a set of symbols, and a set of operations that can be performed on the values of 
the symbols. Each symbol stands for something, “symbols for distance, symbols for positions... 
and so on. The symbols take on different values at different times, depending on the values of 
the variables that they denote.” (1998: 7) We may note here that even in calling ‘d’ the symbol 
for distance for instance, it is we who are defining the usage and restricting the set of possible 
values it can take. Thus even here it appears that symbols do not refer to anything other than 
themselves, in the sense that they have this external meaning attached to them only through 
our ascription. The fact that symbols can be mapped on to a system of meaning or external 
significance is important in that perhaps it indicates that the symbol system must itself be 
(internally) significant in some sense, in order to systematically be given external significance.  
A symbol system according to Harnad (1990) may be understood as a set of ‘physical 
tokens’ (marks on paper, holes on a tape) manipulated on the basis of a set of rules, which are 
also strings of such tokens. The combination of tokens is purely syntactic and based solely on 
                                                          
7 This way of formulating the problem, at least limits the explanatory role that an analysis of the linguistic structure 
of the sentence can provide. Thus we have mentioned the negative, i.e. the kind of explanation that will not be 
enough, but we have not yet mentioned the positive, or the kind of explanation that we do in fact seek. We hope 
that this will become clear as we progress in this work. 
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the shape of the symbol. Further the entire system is ‘semantically interpretable’. It is only 
within the structured framework of these rules that these marks or holes have meaning. 
Symbols also have to be distinguished from a sign or signal (that which indicates 
something other than itself). A large range of research (discussed for instance in Hauser et al 
2002) indicates that non-human animals communicate with each other using signals of a variety 
of sorts, e.g. Vervet monkey alarm calls that indicate the presence of the particular predator. 
Even highly complex bird songs are not a system of musical phrases significant in themselves 
and then mapped compositionally on to some notion of meaning. They convey only such 
information as announcing the presence of a sexual partner or guarding of territory. The 
individual units of birdsongs do not combine to generate more complex meaningful units. (see 
e.g. Fitch 2005, Mukherji 2010). Thus it appears that one feature distinguishing a sign from a 
symbol is the presence of a natural relation between the sign and the meaning given to it, as 
opposed to Saussurean arbitrariness in the case of symbols, where there is no natural relation 
(rather an arbitrary one) between the symbolic object and the meaning given to it. Perhaps the 
way we here understand a symbol, restricts our application of the term to systems similar to 
human language itself – composed of letters and their combinations into words and sentences 
in unlimited ways, which are arbitrarily attached to a system of meanings. 
This line of argument may be considered an assumption by those who believe that 
animal communication systems must also be considered language. The assumption however is 
reasonable considering crucial differences between human language and animal 
communication systems (Hauser et al 2002). For instance, although some animals can be taught 
symbols, their use of these acquired symbols is limited in at least two ways: firstly, they seem 
to lack generative capacity – the ability to combine the limited symbols in order to generate 
unlimited expressions – the property of discrete infinity. Secondly, and perhaps derivatively, 
the usage is limited and more or less directly linked with the world, i.e. they lack something 
like the creation of possible worlds. In other words, animal communication is not stimulus 
independent. 
We thus have, intuitively speaking, the following conception of language as a starting 
point: a language is a symbol system, which consists of a set of physical tokens used and 
understood in accordance with a set of rules. Language is also stimulus independent and has 
infinite generative capacity.  
 14 
A reasonable assumption we could add here is that this symbol system is grounded in 
human biology, and is not merely a social construct, or a kind of conditioned behavior like for 
instance what we find in Skinner (1957). There is a lot of research available to support this 
claim (Chomsky 1959, Goldin-Meadow and Mylander 1998, Crain and Pietroski 2001). But 
even if we do not accept this last assumption, we have a conception of language as a set of 
physical tokens (sounds or marks on paper), which have corresponding to them, some mental 
representations (required for understanding them).8  
1.3 Internalism and Externalism 
Here we are led to the debate between externalists and internalists. The debate between 
internalism and externalism arises with respect to varied domains of inquiry. In the philosophy 
of mind and language, the debate arises with respect to the individuation of linguistic meaning, 
mental content, and propositional attitudes (Goldberg 2007). Thus one could argue that 
linguistic meaning, or the mental content of our thoughts or our propositional attitudes are 
internalistically individuated, i.e. without reference to the environment of the speaker, and 
alternatively, that these are individuated with reference to the external environment of the 
speaker. For example, according to Egan, “Externalism holds that mental states are 
individuated by reference to features of the subject’s environment or social context. Internalism 
denies that external properties have any individuative significance, holding that two subjects 
in the same internal (neural) states are in the same mental states, whatever their contexts” (Egan 
2003: 90) Goldberg (2007) points out that traditionally, “psychological internalism is the thesis 
that psychological properties supervene on the intrinsic, non-relational features of the physical 
body of the subject instantiating those properties;… and… psychological externalism… [is] 
the denial of this supervenience thesis.” And epistemic internalism is the thesis that “epistemic 
justification supervenes on what is reflectively accessible, whereas epistemic externalism 
would be the denial of this” (Goldberg 2007: 2) 
Thus there are various dimensions of the debate between internalists and externalists. 
Simply put, we could understand this debate as follows. The philosophy of language attempts 
to explain the mind-language-world connection. If the course of the explanation focuses on the 
                                                          
8 Note here that we have claimed that the mental representations are associated with sounds and marks on paper 
as opposed to being associated with things (objects, people, places) in the world. And the term ‘mental 
representations’ is used here loosely, simply to mean that in order to understand or make sense of these physical 
tokens, we need some brain-internal processing, and such processing will need to be over mental states which in 
some way represent the physical tokens. 
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language to mind connection, then the explanation could be termed an internalist one, whereas, 
if the explanation focuses on the language-world connection, then it is an externalist 
explanation. Note that we mentioned ‘focus’ as opposed to ‘accept’, leaving room for 
compatibility between externalists and internalists as neither need to deny the other (unlike the 
language used by Goldberg (2007) above. Given the questions raised in the previous section 
concerning intentionality, the aboutness of language, the particular kind of externalism that 
concerns us in this work is content externalism, or “the view that the intentional contents of 
certain of a subject’s thoughts are to be individuated with essential reference to her 
environment” (Majors and Sawyer 2005:257). Framed in this manner, the obvious example 
that comes to mind is the Twin-Earth thought experiment by Putnam (1975). Here, we were 
asked to imagine another planet, Twin Earth, which is exactly like earth, except that the 
substance that is present in its lakes and rivers etc. is not H20 but XYZ. However, XYZ is in 
all other ways indistinguishable from H2O, and is used in all the same ways, and is even called 
water. Earthlings and Twin-Earthlings, when they utter the term water, they think of the 
substance in the oceans and lakes, which quenches thirst etc., and both water and Twin-water 
are identical in that they both have these properties. But Putnam argues that given that the 
substance is not H2O, it is not the same as our water (although it fills the oceans and lakes, 
quenches thirst, freezes into ice and snow etc.). This is because the term ‘water’, the word as 
well as the thought, derives its intentional content from the environment; thus leading to 
semantic or content externalism. So although water and Twin-water may be indistinguishable 
in thought, they are different because the elements that form them are different, i.e. as they are 
found in the natural environment, they occur differently constituted. Thus, given that the 
intentional contents of our thoughts (especially about natural kinds) are individuated with 
reference to the environment, water and Twin-water cannot be the same. Oscar and Twin Oscar 
uttering the term water may be in identical psychological states, but their referents are different. 
Thus referents are not determined by the speakers psychological state, and “‘meanings’ just 
ain’t in the head!” (Putnam 1973: 704). But Millikan argues that this is an oversimplification 
and “Externalism should not be so obviously true”: “If we explain the externalist idea in this 
crude way, however, it becomes hard to see how anyone could deny it. If the question were, 
merely, how are the referents or extensions of thoughts determined, it seems patently obvious 
that nothing inside someone's head could, by itself, determine that anything in particular existed 
outside the head”. (Millikan 2004: 229) If only mind internal states were to determine meaning, 
there would be no objective way of identifying truths from falsehoods. For (the later) Putnam, 
however, this is an important starting point: that an individual in isolation cannot grasp any 
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concept, and needs to interact with other speakers and the world (Putnam 1996). Putnam in a 
recent article explains the development of his externalist position as one starting from an 
‘internalism’, which he later came to believe was false. The internalist position he puts himself 
in opposition to (and which he claimed was one he held in early work) was that “the meaning 
of a word could be given by ‘semantic rules’” (2013: 196) which are “implicitly known by each 
speaker” (2013: 192). Arriving at his version of externalism, Putnam (2013) claims, involved 
the realisation that “what fixes the meanings of a speaker’s words is not just the state of her 
brain; the reference of our terms is generally fixed by two things that classical philosophy of 
language either ignores or mentions only as an afterthought: other people and the world.” 
(2013: 197) There is in fact nothing controversial about this statement. Internalists do not claim 
that the entirety of meaning can be known by implicit semantic rules, or states of the brain. 
Also, fixing reference is a matter of interacting with the world as well as others in the 
community of speakers; not many would deny that. Here Putnam himself notices the shift from 
meaning to reference, but claims that the two are inseparably connected, at least with regard to 
natural kind terms: “For natural kind words, e.g., names of biological species and names of 
substances, difference in reference counts as difference in meaning.” (Putnam 2013: 198 italics 
in original) This identification of meaning and reference is the point of contention. We will 
take this up again in chapter 4 when we discuss Minimal Semantics, an externalist position that 
seeks to identify what is minimally required for semantics.  
The kind of internalism that Putnam seems to be opposing is for instance that described 
by Newman (2005): “Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates 
must be mental duplicates full stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone 
who believes that Arisotle is wise, for instance, must share that same belief.”9 This, however, 
is not the kind of internalism Chomsky holds. As Lohndal and Narita (2009) aptly point out: 
“the core claim of internalists who, like Chomsky, seek a naturalistic theory of language is that 
the proper object of a serious linguistic science should be organism-internal aspects of human 
language (namely I-language). Internalists never deny that there are phenomena broadly related 
to language (in particular to language use) that are beyond the narrow confines of the 
architecture of the human mental grammar (I-language). Such phenomena would surely include 
prescriptive pressures from the linguistic community, speakers’ intentionality for 
                                                          
9 Newman goes on describe externalism as follows: “Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary 
propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, socio-linguistic, or historical context. To have 
a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle 
himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or reading some of his works). (Newman 2005: 153) 
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communicative success, and all sorts of other E-language phenomena […] What internalists 
doubt is rather the feasibility and/or legitimacy of providing a serious science of any mind-
external phenomena such as these.” (Lohndal and Narita 2009: 326)  
Thus the debate between externalists and internalists is a matter of whether it is feasible 
or legitimate to study mind external phenomena in a scientific way. It is not a debate about 
whether or not the external environment plays a role in giving meaning to words, as neither 
externalists nor internalists would deny this. That the external environment is essential, is not 
debated. But rather, what is at issue is whether the role of the external environment is amenable 
to a scientific study and should be a part of semantic theory. (Chomskian) Internalists contend 
that what can be studied in a scientific way is the mind internal mechanism, i.e. the faculty of 
language, whereas externalists argue that a semantic theory must account for mind external 
phenomena like truth and reference. Such phenomena can only be understood if we consider 
mind-external elements like the context of use etc. and internalists claim that such elements 
cannot be studied in a scientific way and therefore must be left out of an exposition of a theory 
of meaning. We will briefly outline the Chomskian internalist framework below, before we 
proceed to our enquiry.  
1.4 The Chomskian Internalist Framework  
Hinzen (2006) defines internalism as “an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure 
and constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function and the 
ways in which it is embedded in an environment.” (Hinzen 2006: 139) The internal structure 
relevant to language is, for Chomsky, the language organ or the faculty of language. According 
to the framework of Hauser et al., 2002 (Shown in Figure 1), the ‘Faculty of Language in the 
broad sense (FLB)’ includes an internal computational system (FLN) specific to language and 
humans; combined with at least two other organism internal systems which Chomsky calls the 
‘sensory motor’ (SM) and the ‘conceptual-intentional’ (CI) system, it yields the basic 
architecture of language. 
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Figure 1: Faculty of language, Reproduced from Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002 
 
 
 What Chomsky calls the ‘language organ’ or the faculty of language is like other organs 
in its basic character; the language ‘organ’ is viewed as an expression of three factors: genes, 
experience, and ‘third factor’ conditions, i.e. principles not specific to the faculty of language 
(Chomsky, 2005). Each language is the result of the environment and the course of experience 
acting on a genetically determined ‘initial state’ of the language faculty or organ. See Figure 2 
below.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of the Initial State of the Faculty of Language 
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19 
 
 
With respect to Figure 2, we can study the input as well as the output, i.e. we can study 
the course of experience and the properties of languages acquired.10 The Chomskian internalist 
approach is essentially concerned with the faculty of language: its initial state and the states it 
assumes. If, say, Peter’s language organ is in state L, then L may be thought of as Peter’s 
language. Here language may be understood as “the way we speak and understand”. The theory 
of the initial state of the Faculty of Language is called ‘universal grammar’. “Peter’s language 
determines an infinite array of expressions, each with its sound and meaning... his language 
“generates” the expressions of his language. The theory of his language is therefore called 
generative grammar.” (Chomsky 2000) Chomsky argues further that a genuine theory of 
language must satisfy at least two conditions:  
1. Descriptive adequacy 
2. Explanatory adequacy 
The former holds for a grammar of a particular language. A grammar satisfies this 
condition if it “gives a full and accurate account of the properties of the language” (Chomsky 
1997/2004: 383) The latter holds for the general theory of language, universal grammar. To 
satisfy this condition, “universal grammar must show that each particular language is a specific 
instantiation of the uniform initial state, derived from it under the ‘boundary conditions’ set by 
experience.” (Chomsky 1997/2004: 383). There appears to be a serious tension between the 
requirements of the two conditions. The search for descriptive adequacy leads to complexity 
and variety of rule systems, while explanatory adequacy requires that language structures be 
largely simple and invariant to enable a human child to acquire any of the thousands of 
languages and dialects rapidly in the impoverished conditions of primary linguistic experience.  
The condition of explanatory adequacy required that the construction of grammars be 
based on the impoverished conditions of language acquisition. Further, it is the burden of 
explanatory adequacy to be able to explain the acquisition of any language by any normal child, 
as children can in fact acquire any language and are not born with a genetic disposition for 
specific languages (an Indian born and brought up in China would easily acquire Chinese and 
may have trouble learning Hindi for instance after the stage of maturation). Thus the core 
                                                          
10 We may note here that the input to the language organ -- what are sometimes called ‘primary linguistic data’ -
- are themselves linguistic experiences and thereby involve the output itself as an input.  
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recursive system, FLN, must be available across the species and it must also be able to account 
for the acquisition of any language. Further, as Chomsky observes, to be usable, the expressions 
of the language faculty (FLN) have to be legible by the outside systems (the sensory-motor and 
the conceptual-intentional systems). 
So the picture (considerably oversimplified) is as follows: the learning of the lexicon 
triggers off the internal computational system which consists of 1) the single operation ‘Merge’ 
which simply puts together two elements α and β form the lexicon to form {α, β}, and 2) certain 
principles of computational efficiency (PCEs)11 , for example, all elements in a structure must 
be interpretable, the shorter of two converging derivations is valid etc. The output is then 
interpreted at the two interfaces: Phonetic Form (PF) and Logical Form (LF) or the phonetic 
and semantic interfaces (corresponding to the ‘sound’ and the ‘meaning’ part respectively).  
 Linguistics for Chomsky, is the study of linguistic competence (Chomsky 1980). The 
latter is to be distinguished from ‘pragmatic competence’ (1980: 59) or performance. Linguistic 
competence refers to the faculty of language described above, whereas performance involves 
all aspects related to the use of language. This distinction between competence and 
performance develops (Chomsky 1986) into the distinction between I-language and E-
language. Chomsky maintains that linguistic theory is a study of “what we may call ‘I-
language’, where ‘I’ is to suggest ‘intentional’ and ‘internalized’. The I-language is what the 
grammar purports to describe: a system represented in the mind/brain… and is in this sense 
internalized; a system that is intentional in that it may be regarded as a specific function 
considered in intension – that is a specific characterization of a function – which assigns a 
status to a vast range of physical events” (Chomsky 1997: 10) E-language on the other hand, 
is what philosophers have traditionally understood ‘language’ to refer to: “’E’ is intended to 
suggest extensional’ and ‘externalized’. The definition is ‘extensional’ in that it takes language 
to be a set of objects of some kind, and it is ‘externalized’ in the sense that language, so defined, 
is external to the mind/brain” (Chomsky 1997: 7))  
Thus we note language is grounded in human biology, it is stimulus independent, and 
a uniquely human element. With such a general conception of language, we will now begin our 
                                                          
11 These PCE’s belong to the ‘third factor’ (Chomsky: 2005) mentioned above. These include “(a) principles of 
data analysis that might be used in language acquisition and other domains; (b) principles of structural architecture 
and developmental constraints that enter into canalization, organic form, and action over a wide range, including 
principles of efficient computation, which would be expected to be of particular significance for computational 
systems such as language.” (Chomsky 2005: 6) 
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inquiry with the question whether it is possible to reconcile internalist and externalist concerns 
within a theory of meaning.  I take up this question with respect to the work of Witgenstein, 
who most notably changed his own position to incorporate a use theory of meaning. 
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Chapter 2: Wittgensteinian Motivations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As noted in the introduction, I began this project with an initial (and long felt) intuition: that 
meaning must already exist within a symbol (with respect to a symbol system) for it to mean 
anything. Within the domain of language (as a symbol system), one way to understand this 
could be simply that there must be a meaningful structure for symbols to be considered a 
language and have meaning. The ‘meaningful structure’ could in turn be understood as a 
(Chomskian) Universal Grammar, that is a part of the biological faculty of language, and that 
which triggered at certain critical periods, enables any child to learn any (and multiple) 
language(s). This, however, would not account for the aboutness inherent in language. For 
Chomsky (as noted in the previous chapter) this aboutness is a product of the use of language, 
as distinguished from the grammar (syntax/semantics, given that he argues against the 
distinction between the two). Wittgenstein on the other hand captures both these aspects, 
although they appear disjointed and the received views of his writings suggest that they form 
parts of different theories12 which he defended at different phases of his philosophical career. 
In what follows, we pick some elements of Wittgenstein’s writings, with the aim to see whether 
an interpretation of them would reveal or lead to a possible connection between these aspects: 
internal significance, and the inherent aboutness of language. Bear in mind that my aim isnot 
to form a coherent and accurate interpretation of his work, but only to see whether an 
interpretation of some elements of his work would help us with our original intuitions pointed 
out in the Introduction. 
2.2 Centrality of Internal Structure 
The idea which I believe is most relevant to this work, is TLP §3.14: “What constitutes a 
propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one 
another.” (Emphasis added)13. So here it is constitutive of the sentence or proposition that the 
words stand in a determinate relation to one another. In other words what makes a sentence a 
                                                          
12 If we can call his writings theories at all. 
13 Compare TLP 2.14: “What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate 
way.” 
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proposition, is that the words stand in such a determinate relation.  What, however, would 
characterize something as a sentence or a proposition rather than an arbitrary set of words? We 
find the following possible answer in the Tractatus: “a proposition is not a blend of words” 
(TLP §3.141) Rather a proposition is articulate. The notion of articulation itself appears to be 
rather ambiguous. Is it merely the pronunciation – the verbal expression? If that were the case, 
then we would be forced to include even word salads (e.g.: Home the Ram get ran book), which 
we can certainly pronounce or verbally articulate as propositions. However, what is meant here 
is that all the elements in a proposition stand in a determinate relation to each other (TLP 
§3.14).  This could be understood simply as that a proposition is necessarily a grammatical 
construction.  
2.2.1 Determinate Relation and Grammar 
The following picture emerges from the TLP. A proposition is a picture of reality as opposed 
to an external description of it. One need not look outside the picture to see the reality that it 
depicts. The picture itself depicts the reality.14 However, he argues that a picture represents 
reality from outside and cannot step beyond representational form.15 To me, this suggests that 
through depiction an external relation is internalized. Let’s see further how he argues for this 
position. 
A picture, for Wittgenstein, has in common with reality its logico-pictorial form (TLP 
§ 2.216), i.e. the possibility that things are related to each other in the same way as the elements 
of the picture (cf TLP §2.20317). In a picture, one can recognize the shapes in themselves, and 
also their representation, without acquaintance with the objects or situation represented. We 
can, for instance, recognize the picture of a human face, without actually knowing the referent 
of the picture. In fact, we do not normally assume that objects in a picture actually represent a 
reality, and we understand what they depict, independently of any claim to correspondence 
with reality. Pictures are in this sense self-contained. They do not require knowledge of 
anything external in order for us to understand them. What they depict, is a possible reality that 
is contained within the structure of the picture itself.   
                                                          
14 “A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. 
And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.”(TLP § 4.021) 
15 “A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is 
why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.” (TLP § 2.173)  
“A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.” (TLP § 2.174) 
16 “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts” (TLP § 2.2) 
17  “ A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.” (TLP §2.203) 
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For the Tractarian Wittgenstein, thought was both, “A logical picture of facts” (TLP 
§3) and “a proposition with a sense” (TLP §4). Thus, for Wittgenstein, a logical picture of facts 
was a thought, or a proposition with a sense. A proposition, which he argued is a picture, 
“determines a place in logical space.” (TLP §3.4), and a place “is a possibility: something can 
exist in it.” (TLP §3.411).. ‘thought’, he had argued, was fundamentally logical, “Thought can 
never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.” (TLP 
§3.03)  And the sense of a proposition was its agreement or disagreement with reality. Given 
all these elements, let’s consider the following nature of thought18: 
Thought is (a proposition) with (a sense). [given TLP §4] 
Thought is (that which determines (a place) in logical space) with (agreement or disagreement 
with reality) [given TLP §3.4 and §4.219] 
Thought is (that which determines (a possibility of existence) in logical space with (agreement 
or disagreement with reality) [given TLP §4, §3.4, §3.411 and §4.2] 
Thus it appears that in ‘thought’ he combined the logical possibility with the real 
possibility (of agreement or disagreement with reality). The logically possible was also, for 
him, the possibly real. If these two possibilities were not interchangeable for him, perhaps we 
would not have a problem accepting this. To understand this, it would require a much more 
detailed treatment than what I can currently offer.  
However, for our present purpose, I would like to point out that the relationship between 
the proposition, i.e. the sensuous expression of thought (TLP §3.1), and reality is established 
through the notion of depiction. This is evident through Wittgenstein’s assertion that “The 
possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is contained in the logic of 
depiction.” (TLP §4.015, Emphasis added.) A proposition provides this depiction through a 
definite relation between its various elements. Through this internal relation between the 
elements of a proposition, it acquires the relation to the world – the sense of the proposition. 
Here the question arises: what is a definite relation? Does it become a definite relation through 
it being a picture or is the relation definite and therefore it is a picture.  
Is the former even possible? Can a string of words be a picture without having a definite 
relation between the elements? Now if we understand this question as asking whether the 
                                                          
18 Here brackets, (), have been added in order to delineate all that is included in ‘thought’. 
19 TLP 4.2: “The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence 
and non-existence of the atomic facts.” 
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particular words and the word order is important, then perhaps this is not strictly so – as we 
can have different words and word order bringing forth the same description. For instance ‘John 
gave the pen to Mary’ and ‘The pen was given to Mary by John’ both appear to be 
interchangeable forms. Interestingly, this is not necessarily the case. It has been argued that 
there is a slight difference in meaning even between the active and passive form of the same 
sentence. Consider for instance the following forms: 
(1) Precisely two arrows hit the target 
(2) The target was hit by precisely two arrows 
Apart from the different subjects in the two sentences, the first sentence claims that among 
many arrows that were shot, only two hit the target. The second, however, suggests that the 
number of arrows that hit the target was two. Thus, the two sentences, apart from having 
different subjects, are saying very different things.20 Similarly, compare ‘John rolled Mary the 
ball’ and ‘John rolled the ball to Mary’: the latter, but not the former, implies that the ball 
arrived at Mary.  
A similar argument can be found in the Investigations (PI §531): “We speak of 
understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the 
same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other... In the one case the 
thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something 
that is expressed only by these words in these positions.” (emphasis added)  But in the second 
case how would one explain the expression? Here Wittgenstein asks, how does one lead 
someone to the comprehension of a poem or a theme? You can tell someone to look at a 
painting like this, or to listen to a piece of music in a particular way.  
                                                          
20 However, we may mention at this point that synonymy is extremely rare in human languages. This, it has been 
argued (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999), may be due to the cognitive principle of ‘synonymy avoidance’, which 
“demands that all contrasts in form imply a contrast in meaning.”(Hinzen 2006: 136). Intuitively we can see the 
need for such a principle, as synonyms would make half of language redundant, and this would be implausible if 
language has an optimal (least costly) design. Thus each linguistic device should be viewed as playing a unique 
role in sound-meaning correlation. However, the idea that language has an optimal design is, of course, yet, itself 
an assumption. Chomsky argues in various places that though language may not be optimally designed for use 
(given ambiguities etc), it may be optimally designed ‘from the perspective of internal structure’ (Chomsky 1999), 
to interact with other mind internal systems, which are external to the language faculty. He argues that ‘To be 
usable at all, a language must be “legible” at the interface: the expressions it generates must consist of properties 
that can be interpreted by these external systems’ (Chomsky 2000.).  
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But there are languages where the word order isn’t important. Mohawk, for instance is a 
language (still spoken by a few Native Americans in Quebec, Ontario and New York) which 
allows completely random word order. Consider the following example, pointed out by Baker 
(2001): 
Sak    ranuhwe’s    ne    atya’tawi  (Mohawk grammatical sentence) 
Sak    likes             the   dress         (literal English translation) 
The following however, are also grammatical formulations in Mohawk: 
Ranuhwe’s    ne    atya’tawi    ne   Sak 
Ranuhwe’s    ne   Sak   ne   atya’tawi     
Sak   atya’tawi   Ranuhwe’s 
Atya’tawi    Sak   Ranuhwe’s 
Atya’tawi   Ranuhwe’s   ne   Sak 
It may therefore be possible to say the same thing in different words21, or with varying 
order of words; however, in the case of any of these particular instances there must nonetheless 
be a definite relation between the different elements of the proposition. Here perhaps our sense 
of a definite relation is merely that it must in fact be a proposition as opposed to a mere string 
of words e.g.: ‘A number of books are lying on the table’ instead of ‘books the of lying table a 
on number are’. But we just saw, in the Mohawk example, that the word order may not be 
important. However, even in Mohawk, each of these formulations are recognized as 
grammatical sentences and the words do of course stand in grammatical relations. More 
importantly, the relation between the particular words in any one of these particular instances 
is, in each case, definite, from a grammatical standpoint. 
We have argued that the ‘definite relation’, or more simply, the syntax, is what makes 
a sentence a sentence. So even within the picture theory, the notion of ‘definite relation’ is in a 
sense prior to that of a picture: the proposition becomes a picture through having a definite 
relation between its elements. Thus, here the possibility of depicting reality, the connection 
between the proposition and the world, is itself parasitic on the notion of a definite relation (or 
grammar).  
                                                          
21 We argued above that this too isn’t obvious, as the active and passive sentences are not identical, by virtue of 
their structure alone. 
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In the Investigations, having given up the picture theory, Wittgenstein argues 
accordingly that “When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.” (PI § 329) And 
how is it that language becomes the vehicle of thought? It is, he answers, through the grammar 
of our language: “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is 
to be found in the grammar of the language” (Z §55). For instance, he asks us to compare the 
following: 
“This sentence makes sense.” – “What sense?” 
“This set of words makes a sentence.” – “What sentence?” (PI §502) 
The argument is the following: when someone utters the statement ‘This sentence 
makes sense’ and as a response to the utterance we ask the question ‘What sense?’, it is 
comparable to a situation where someone utters the statement ‘This set of words makes a 
sentence’, and we ask ‘What sentence?’. The answer to the question ‘What sentence?’ can only 
be the set of words themselves. If the two situations are comparable, then the answer to the 
question ‘What sense?’ should also consist in presenting the particular sentence itself. 
Consistent with his position in the TLP (§3.14), here Wittgenstein claims that the sentence is 
the combination of words in that particular order, and that combination of words itself and 
nothing else, is the sentence. Similarly, the sense of the sentence lies in the sentence itself. We 
find for instance, the following remark in the Blue and Brown Book “the content of the sentence 
is in the sentence” (BBB 167).22 Interpreted in the same vein as above, this statement claims 
that it is the grammar of the sentence itself which provides content to the sentence. Therefore, 
the sentence gets its content from within the sentence itself and there is nothing external to the 
sentence which is content or significance.  
Thus it appears that Wittgenstein is arguing that the sense of the sentence is in the 
sentence itself. So any sentence or grammatical combination of words would be admitted as 
                                                          
22 This relation of content to the sentence is comparable with the Vaisesika category of Samavaaya. It is defined 
as “that relation of things mutually involved or associated in nature and bearing to one another the relation of the 
contained and the container - which is the source of intuition in the form of “(It is) here””(Nandalal Sinha 1911: 
267) e.g. “There is cloth here in the threads”. It is argued by the Vaisesikas that “the non-intermixture” of the 
cloth and the threads “follows from the very rule of the container and the contained” (Nandalal Sinha 1911: 267) 
 This means that the cloth is not the same as any bunch of threads and any bunch of threads do not make a cloth. 
Rather cloth results from a particular combination of threads, and only when the threads combine in such a way 
can we say that ‘there is cloth here in the threads’. Thus cloth and thread are not identical; however, in ‘this cloth 
here’ the threads are inseparably related to the cloth. This inseparable relation (samavaaya) exists in this cloth and 
without this particular relation it would not be a cloth or it would be a different cloth.  
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significant. However, he points out that it appears that language allows for senseless 
combinations of words and one wants to say that a significant sentence is one which one cannot 
merely utter, but also think.  
There can however be sentences that look like sentences that we understand and yet 
they don’t yield any sense, for instance: “The number of pages in my book is equal to a root of 
the equation x2 + 2x – 3 = 0.” He adds that this “throws light on the concepts ‘understanding’ 
and ‘meaning’.” (PI § 513)The above is important as it seems to suggest that for Wittgenstein 
the notion of ‘understanding’ has a wider usage perhaps than meaning (Pietroski 2005). At first 
sight we may think we understand the sentence, but can we be mistaken? What is for instance 
the difference between the above sentence and a sentence like ‘Green ideas sleeping furiously’? 
Initially it seems that we can make sense of the former but not of the latter. But on a closer look 
we may say the former doesn’t mean anything because it is illogical while the latter does mean 
something. The former seems to be devoid of meaning because it is not recognized as possible.  
However we do somehow also recognize what it would be, for it to be possible. We can 
imagine an instance where the apparently nonsensical equation is used. Let’s consider the 
following situation: a child, perhaps 12-13 years old, has just learnt this equation. She, like 
many other children of that age, has a habit of tearing off the pages of her notebook, starting 
from the middle. After many such occasions, the book is now left with only the front and last 
pages. To ensure that both pages don’t come off, she carefully tears off just a little less than 
half a page. Now her father hears the noise and starts screaming at her, and asks how many 
pages are left in her book now – upon which the girl replies with the equation as she doesn’t 
like to lie but wants her father to stop screaming, and knows he’ll be embarrassed asking her 
how to solve it.  
The purpose of the example is to point out that even if a particular formulation appears 
to be impossible (although grammatical), it may well serve a purpose in language. And here 
this purpose is not limited to the sound of the equation: the complicated appearance or sound 
can serve to confuse anyone, and thus may be accepted on face value. But in that case, any 
other equation of the same kind would serve the same purpose in the given situation. Our point 
is however, deeper. The use of this equation was meaningful in this context, not just for its 
phonetic qualities, but for the structure itself, i.e. it did provide an answer to the question posed. 
It may further be noted that even contradictions are used as (valid) lines in a formal proof.  
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So we are here arguing that it is the sentential form, the grammar, that makes something 
a significant proposition – “what will be called (logically) possible and what not”? (PI §520). 
But, Wittgenstein importantly argues that, “It is not every sentence like formation that we know 
how to do something with, not every technique has an application in our life; and when we are 
tempted in philosophy to count some quite useless thing as a proposition, that is often because 
we have not considered its application sufficiently.” (PI §520)  Thus grammar is not the sole 
determiner in what counts as a significant proposition and what does not. Rather, it is that 
which has an application in our life, that which we can use, which counts as significant. Thus 
use is, in a sense, the determiner of what is significant.  
The above line of thought is also important to keep in mind when we attempt to 
understand Wittgenstein’s use of certain terms such as grammar and determinate relation. 
Although Wittgenstein himself argued for the centrality of grammar, the term grammar, as I 
understand it, has been variously used by Wittgenstein23 to refer to the ways in which we use 
a word or sentence, the rules of such use, the entirety of our language, or even particular 
language games. Thus interpreting Wittgenstein’s use of grammar as simply syntax will not be 
accurate, and consequently determinate relation must also not be confined to syntax. It would 
perhaps be more accurate to understand the determinate relation of the Tractatus as a 
grammatical relation, in the broader sense of grammar, denoting the various ways in which 
Wittgenstein uses the term: use, rules of use, language games as well as the entirety of 
language. This notion of grammar, however, already involves an element of use, as noted 
above. 
However, this may be a misrepresentation. As we saw, for the Tractarian Wittgenstein, 
a proposition was a possibility in logical space (from TLP §3.4 and TLP §3.4.11). Thus the 
determinate relation, which Wittgenstein argued was constitutive of a proposition (TLP §3.14), 
could here refer to a logical relation between the various elements of a proposition. What 
combined the logical and the real for the Tractarian Wittgenstein, was a thought, i.e. a 
proposition with a sense (where sense refers to the agreement or disagreement with reality). 
Thus Tractarian thoughts are important for us, as we want to understand what makes significant 
propositions significant; and a significant proposition, within the Tractarian framework, would 
be defined as propositions with a sense.  
                                                          
23 See for instance Baker/Morris (2004:55-59) 
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While thought connected the logical and the real in the Tractatus, in the Investigations, 
this was achieved through the idea of use in accordance with (the broad sense of) grammar. 
Thought however remained in the domain of possibilities, as it connected the logically possible 
with the possibly real. But the idea of grammar (in the broad sense) goes further in terms of 
connecting these possibilities with reality (as opposed to a possible reality). In Zettle (Z §55) 
and then later in the Investigations, grammar, in the broader sense pointed out above, became 
what connected thought and reality. Thus one way to address the disparity between the Early 
and the Later Wittgenstein opens up here. If we understand the determinate relation of the 
Tractatus, that which constitutes a proposition, as the grammar of the later Wittgenstein, a 
notion which already involves an element of use, then we could retain this aspect of 
Wittgenstein while giving up the controversial notion of depiction. In this case we would still 
have a way to connect what is internal to the mind (thoughts) and what is external to it (reality).  
Let’s try to articulate this possibility further.  
(i) Consider the situation where we understand the Tractarian determinate relation as 
the broad sense of grammar.  
(ii) Then grammar in the broad sense already includes an element of use, and  
(iii) The determinate relation is that which constitutes a proposition.  
(iv) The above [(i), (ii) and (iii)] implies that grammar (which already involves an 
element of use) constitutes a proposition. 
Now consider the following: 
(v) A thought for the Tractarian Wittgenstein is a proposition with a sense. 
(vi) And the sense of a proposition is the possibility of agreement or disagreement with 
reality. 
(vii) Thus constitutive and essential elements of thought become grammar (from (iv) 
above) as well as the possibility of agreement or disagreement with reality. 
From the above (re)interpretation of Wittgenstein, thought is no longer a connection 
simply between the logical and the real, but is rather constituted by that which is beyond the 
realm of the logical and includes grammar in the broad sense, along with the sense of a 
proposition, which determines the agreement or disagreement with reality.  
It would be useful here to explore the arguments of some continuity theorists regarding 
the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early and later work, as these views are pertinent to our 
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current discussion. We will especially note where they differ from our interpretation (or rather 
re-interpretation) of Wittgenstein. 
2.2.2 Arguments in Favour of Continuity 
There are various continuity theorists in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. I am neither arguing 
for continuity, nor discontinuity, as to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s works. I do however 
think it useful to mention some views regarding the continuity thesis as it is pertinent to my 
own project, i.e. attempting to capture both the aboutness of language as well as its internal 
significance. 
Koethe (1996) argues that the theme that spanned across Wittgenstein’s works was that 
“the semantic and mentalistic attributes of language and human life are shown or manifested 
by our verbal and non-verbal conduct, but they resist incorporation into the domain of the 
straightforwardly factual.” (1996: ix) More specifically, he argues that “the principle that 
language’s semantic aspects are shown by its use or application is already present in an 
incipient way in the Tractatus and, far from being repudiated, is developed more fully later, 
freed from an entanglement with the earlier doctrines that Wittgenstein did come to reject.” 
(1996:2) Among the doctrines that Wittgenstein later came to reject was the picture theory, 
which according to Koethe “offers a conceptualization of what it is to say that something is the 
case”(Koethe 1996: 43). But, he goes on to argue “if we ask how we determine just what is 
being said to be the case… Wittgenstein’s answer is that this is shown by how the sentence is 
being used” (1996: 43) He cites for example the following passages from the TLP and the 
Notebooks: 
“In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a 
sense.” (TLP §3.326) 
“What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their 
application says clearly. (TLP §3.262) 
“the way in which language signifies is mirrored in its use” (NB 82) 
This continuity thesis however is different from our proposed re-interpretation of 
Wittgenstein in the previous section. We argued for an understanding of the Tractarian 
determinate relation in line with the grammar of the Investigations, so that there is an element 
of use already present within the concept of a determinate relation, which in turn is what makes 
a proposition a proposition. The way the sentence is used gives us the definite relation, which 
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in turn gives us the proposition. The above examples make a claim, on the other hand, regarding 
a further application of use, secondary to the application we have already mentioned. This 
comes at the level of comparing reality to a proposition (what a proposition signifies or applies 
to) as opposed to what constitutes a proposition. If what constitutes a proposition is itself 
dependent upon elements of use, then the later claim about what is involved in comparing 
reality to a proposition will be not be primary, and would only take place post the first 
application of use. If both our claim and Koethe’s (1996) continuity claim are correct, then 
there was already embedded in the Tractatus, a double application of (the concept of) use. But 
even if we just stick to our own interpretation (which may or may not be correct, but is 
interesting with respect to the kind of theory we are seeking), there is an element of use already 
inherent in what constitutes a proposition. If we were able to systematically understand the 
nature and origin of this element, it is plausible that we would then better understand the nature 
of the aboutness inherent in language. In chapter 3, we will make an attempt at such an 
understanding. 
2.3 Wittgensteinian Analogies 
Wittgenstein uses various analogies to illustrate his arguments regarding meaning. A few in 
particular e.g. his analogies of facial expressions and music, could themselves be looked at as 
(subsidiary) arguments in favour of his theory of (or rather views on) meaning. 
2.3.1 Facial Expressions 
Seeing an aspect is, Wittgenstein argues, a voluntary act. He famously gives various examples 
to bring out this point: the drawing that can be viewed either as a duck or as a rabbit; the triangle 
that can be viewed as a mountain or a geometrical figure. This line of argument also gave 
Wittgenstein a way to argue against the picture theory he defended in the TLP. He argued that 
all we have, for instance in the case of the triangle, is three lines connected in a particular way, 
and what I see it as depends on the concepts I apply to it, all of which can be understood as 
coinciding with the triangle. Thus recognizing a tiger in a painting is not really comparing the 
object with the picture but rather the object coinciding with the picture.  
In the Blue and Brown Books and later in the Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that 
we generally understand a picture as an image in the mind – a paradigm to which we compare 
reality. However seeing the drawing   as a face does not involve a comparison between a 
group of dashes and a particular human face. There is nothing besides the group of dashes to 
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compare it with, no paradigm for comparison. However, one may say that there is in fact 
something in our head which we are comparing it with, which makes us say for instance that 
the dashes in the above picture represent a face and those in another, say     □   do not. 
Wittgenstein argues however that there is only an illusion of comparison. What’s involved 
here, are not two distinct processes, one of seeing it as dashes, and the second of seeing it as a 
face; i.e. it is not a ‘composite’ experience in this sense. In seeing a painting three-
dimensionally, we must not ask what is added to the experience of seeing the painting to make 
it a painting experienced three dimensionally. For instance any written word, e.g. ‘read’, is 
experienced as a word and not just a bunch of scribbles, though it would only be a word to 
those who recognize and understand English. 
Facial expressions are a useful analogy for Wittgenstein, not only with respect to word 
meanings, “to study what may be involved in ‘semantic interpretation’” (Mukherji 2010: 206), 
but also to think against the picture theory. Because facial expressions occur naturally, hence 
their significance lies in the expression itself, in some sense (we shall consider this in greater 
detail in the next chapter). For instance, interpreting facial expressions need not be taught, and 
the interpretations are, to a large extent, universally uniform. Further, although a facial 
expression may be viewed as expressing a particular state of mind (e.g. the feeling of joy), the 
attachment itself (of the expression to the state of mind) is external to the expression. In that 
sense, a facial expression is what it is – i.e. it expresses itself. To put it differently, even if some 
other state of mind could be attached to an expression in a different context or culture, the 
expression itself would be invariant with respect to these differential attachments. Therefore, 
shifting to the phenomena of facial expressions provides Wittgenstein with a handy analogy, 
where one can talk of significance of an expression without necessarily bringing in something 
like a picture theory.  
How does Wittgenstein, then extend the effects of this analogy to putatively symbol 
systems such as language (and music, as we shall see in the next section)? This question arises 
because facial expressions are not symbolic at least in the way in which language is.24 In order 
for the preceding non-denotative aspect of facial expressions to extend to symbol systems, we 
ought to be able to say that the configuration of signs in language are also internally significant 
                                                          
24 The analogy is therefore limited, given that, although the significance of a facial expression can be grasped 
without a specific reading of the state of mind involved, there is really nothing else to read in a facial expression 
except someone’s state of mind. 
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in the sense that their significance can be grasped independently of external attachments. We 
can, therefore, see the need for a notion of grammar. 
Before we proceed, it would be useful to briefly note another Wittgensteinian argument 
against the picture theory, which is the received view from the Investigations, i.e.: to 
understand the meaning of a word one has to look at the various uses of that word. Words 
function in various ways, we can do various things with words, and to know how a particular 
word functions, we must look at the various things for which it is in fact used. Meanings of 
words are conventional. Conventions are, simply speaking, arbitrary actions, reproduced 
through weight of precedence (Millikan 1998). They do not require that people must follow 
them, but people do so simply by weight of precedence. Now what would this signify for 
language? I cannot, for instance, decide that I will henceforward use the word ‘cold’ to mean 
what we normally use the word ‘chair’ to mean, and expect that others will understand what I 
say. So there appears to be a certain sense of normativity involved in our use of words. But this 
sense of normativity is not prescriptive but rather involves meeting a standard (arbitrarily set) 
in order to achieve, for instance, successful communication (Hattiangadi 2006). Association of 
a sound with its meaning is arbitrary just like the association of agreement with a certain neck 
movement or association of wink with mischief (I could have used a wink to mean dinner is 
ready) But the arbitrariness does not make it prescriptive or social in the sense of taking an 
oath to use the word ‘chair’ to mean what it is normally used to mean, or something of the like, 
as perhaps part of an initiation into the English linguistic community. 
2.3.2 Music and Language 
Another recurring analogy, along with facial expressions, which we find in Wittgenstein is the 
analogy of language and music. Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1922: 
4.014) that: “A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, 
all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language 
and the world. They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern. (…They are all 
in a certain sense one.)” (Emphasis added)  
It is interesting to note that in the instance of comparing language and music it is easier 
to understand the relation between the various elements at the musical end of the comparison. 
The musical idea is captured by the written notes, and it is on the pattern of the written notes 
that the gramophone record is constructed (though the medium and the language differ). The 
sound waves again will follow the same pattern (though in a different dimension). 
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We may note here that each of these elements has a certain pattern, a symbolic quality 
attached to it. There appears to be a mapping in place: systems (of patterns or symbols) appear 
to be mapped on to one another, translated in a different medium. “There is a general rule by 
means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score… It is the rule for 
translating this language into the language of gramophone records.” And “That is what 
constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such 
entirely different ways.” (Wittgenstein 1922: 4.0141) He thus recognizes that each of the 
elements in the comparison are themselves different kinds of languages (or perhaps different 
forms of symbol systems – in different mediums). There appears to be nothing problematic 
about the translation of a sentence in one language to another language. The problem rather 
arises with the notion of depiction: language depicts the world, an idea that Wittgenstein 
himself gave up later in the Investigations. 
Let’s now look at the language end of this comparison. The elements include – a 
linguistic thought (as opposed to a musical idea), which is expressed by written sentences in a 
language. The spoken sentences and the sound waves share the linguistic thought in some 
physical sense. The spoken sentence expresses the thought and is in a sense contained in the 
sound waves.  It is interesting that here the world and depiction have not entered our description 
yet at all. In the TLP the depiction relation was captured at the first of these stages: the thought. 
However, the depiction relation was not central to the analogy noted above in the first place 
(and was given up by the later Wittgenstein). This is because there is, as we noted, no depiction 
involved in the music case at all. There is, in the case of music, only translation from one 
language to another. Translation, we may note, is a lexical and grammatical notion, and 
involves no non-linguistic component. To put it differently: the factuality of the world does not 
enter into translation; it involves only linguistic items (words) and grammar. Thus the internal 
relation that allows for the translation is a grammatical rather than a depiction relation. The 
internal grammatical relation retained its position as the central point of the analogy. The 
centrality of the notion in both language and music appears to be fully appreciated in the remark 
in the Investigations “understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in 
music than one may think.” (PI § 527)   
The direction of the analogy suggests that if we understand what ‘understanding music’ 
is all about, then we would be able to understand language along the same lines. Towards this 
end of trying to understand music, Wittgenstein points out that “it has sometimes been said that 
what music conveys to us are feelings of joyfulness, melancholy, triumph etc.” This seems to 
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suggest that music is an instrument for producing these feelings and that any other way of 
producing these feelings would also do instead. However, he argues, this appears to be a 
misconception and rather “music conveys to us itself” (BBB 178). 
“There is a tendency to talk about the ‘effect of a work of art’ – feelings, images etc.” 
(LA 29) If these effects could be produced by something else, could that replace the work of 
art?25 “doesn’t the minuet itself matter? – hearing this: would another have done as well?” (LA 
29) As Wittgenstein argues, “reporting a tune to ourselves and letting it make its full impression 
on us, we say ‘This tune says something’ and it is as though I had to find what it says. And yet 
I know that it doesn’t say anything such that I might express in words or pictures what it says.”26  
Now, to say that it expresses a musical thought would be saying just that – it expresses itself. 
The following points can be noticed here: 
(1) We understand a tune as significant 
(2) This significance, however, cannot be expressed in words or pictures.  
So how do we understand it as significant?  As a possible reply, Wittgenstein argues 
further that you can’t just play a piece of music anyhow – it must be played in a particular way. 
We may say: this isn’t how it is supposed to be played; and here it appears that there “must be 
a paradigm somewhere in our mind,... But in most cases if someone asked me “How do you 
think this melody should be played?”, I will, as an answer, just whistle it in a particular way, 
and nothing will have been present to my mind but the tune actually whistled (not an image of 
that)” (PI §163).  
This suggests firstly, that there is a notion of ‘correctness’ involved, in the performance 
of a piece of music. Secondly, however, the correctness involved cannot be defined or 
explained in any other way except by demonstration. If someone sings a particular piece of 
music, we sometimes have the inclination to say, for instance, the pitch is not right, or this 
                                                          
25 We may note that though he uses the generic term ‘art’ Wittgenstein focuses his discussion on music. The 
reason for this can also be seen immediately, as other forms of art, such as painting, may have representational 
features that music lacks. In any case, a general conception of the arts is not the topic here. 
 
26 Compare Wittgenstein’s discussion of the natural color pattern of the pansies in the Brown Book. Wittgenstein 
points out that one can be so impressed by the patterns so as to say for instance that ‘each pattern says something’. 
He argues that though we are ‘trying to distinguish between meaningless patterns and patterns which have 
meaning;’ however ‘there is no such expression in our game as “This pattern has the meaning so and so”’ (Brown 
Book, page 179) In the case of the pansies, however, we can also replace the statement with say ‘each pattern 
impresses me’. This is because, there is not here, a recognized need to seek ‘the something that they express’. 
Thus the intransitive form would also work.  
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theme must be repeated etc. Wittgenstein observes that “Yet there just is no paradigm apart 
from the theme itself. And yet again there is a paradigm apart from the theme: namely, the 
rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling. And the theme, moreover, is a new part of 
our language; it becomes incorporated into it; we learn a new gesture.”  
Comparing music with facial expressions, Wittgenstein remarks that when we say  
“This face says something” and follow this remark with say “The whole face expresses 
bewilderment”, then, “here we have used ‘expressing’ transitively.” Similarly, in the case of 
music, we do feel the need to find what it expresses. But, as the above discussion suggests, for 
Wittgenstein, music expresses itself. This however does not mean that there is nothing that it 
expresses, but rather there is nothing apart from itself that a piece of music expresses, thus 
expresses is used reflexively.27 Therefore, what happens in the case of music is that  
1. it is similar to facial expressions in the sense that the states of mind, like the feelings, 
emotions etc. that can be read in a musical expression are also external to it in the same 
way as in the case of facial expressions, but 
2. there is a stronger notion of internal significance to musical expressions even when we 
set aside all possible emotional content from it. This is because in the case of music the 
internal significance of musical expressions can be traced exclusively to the 
configuration of the signs. 
In a sense, therefore, the ‘itself’ in Wittgenstein’s claim that music expresses itself is 
profoundly non-trivial in the case of music. Now if language is like music then it too must 
convey itself in a(n) (internally) significant sense. It was perhaps this realization that led 
Wittgenstein to abandon the picture theoretic notion of depiction and thereby the picture theory 
itself. Language was to be understood on the model of music, and not vice-versa. So if we 
cannot make sense of depiction in the musical case, then even in language, the notion of 
depiction must not be theoretically salient. 
                                                          
27 Roger Scruton (2004) argues that Wittgenstein’s comparison of musical understanding and the understanding 
of facial expressions does not have the implication that he seems to draw from it, that musical expression is 
confined to the intransitive idea. We argue however, that Wittgenstein was not claiming that musical expression 
is intransitive, but rather that it is a reflexive relation. Here we may define the terms in use as follows. A verb is 
intransitive if it has a subject but not an object. In the sentence ‘Music conveys to us itself’ the verb ‘convey’ is 
used, and it is a transitive verb. A transitive verb requires both a subject and one or more objects; the meaning of 
a transitive verb is incomplete without a direct object. Here the direct object, however, is the subject itself. Thus 
in this use, the transitive verb is used reflexively. A reflexive verb is one whose semantic subject and direct object 
are the same. In a wider sense, it refers to any verb form whose grammatical object is a reflexive pronoun (himself, 
itself etc). Thus Wittgenstein, as is evident from his use of terms, was not confining music to the intransitive idea, 
but pointed out rather, that the musical expression has an object, and this object is, non-trivially, itself. 
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2.3.3 Recent Accounts of Musical meaning 
Levinson (2003) argues that music is a form of thought: musical passages bear the appearance 
of thoughtful acts. He supports the thoughtful nature of music with a range of musical 
examples. Thus, we can think of music as drawing a conclusion (Beethoven's Piano Sonata op. 
110, Dvorak's 7th Symphony), coming to a close (minuet movements from Mozart's 40th or 
41st), asserting (the opening of Schubert's Piano Trio No. 2, Op. 100), questioning (the opening 
phrases of Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 18, op. 31 no. 3), imploring (the flute introduction to 
Bellini's aria 'Casta Diva'), defying (the opening of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony), disapproving 
(the orchestral interjections in the first part of the finale of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), etc.  
Further, he argues that musical passages give evidence of thought processes in their 
creator, e.g. “the assessment we infer Bach must have made in devising a fugue theme 
combinable with itself in counterpoint, or the judgment we suppose Mozart to have exercised, 
in composing a piano sonata, in designing a second theme whose character would contrast 
suitably with that of the first theme”(Levinson 2003: 63) and so on. He argues further that the 
“mere succession from chord to chord, motive to motive, or phrase to phrase at every point in 
any intelligible piece of music” gives evidence of ”inherent musical thinking”(italics in the 
original) as “it is a purposive-seeming, goal-directed temporal process, an intelligent form of 
continuation in time” (Levinson 2003: 64) 
Thus it appears that Levinson does emphasize the structural element. However, he 
proceeds to claim that understanding music, like understanding language is a matter of use, “of 
knowing how to operate with the medium in question… in particular contexts.” (2003:68) We 
come to understand music as well as language “by learning how to respond to it appropriately, 
how to connect various bits of it to one another, and how to ground it in our lives.”(Levinson 
2003:68). I think the way we have interpreted Wittgenstein in this chapter may even be useful 
for buttressing Levinson’s discussion. The idea is that if use becomes constitutive of 
propositions then understanding the way language is used, the way it is grounded in our lives, 
is also involved in, and involves, understanding language as such.  
Kaduri, however, accounts for the idea of structural relation in Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on music, through his study of the general pause – silent figure (aposiopesis) – in Haydn's 
instrumental music. He notes that Haydn’s music ‘contains so many general pauses that it 
seems they form an intrinsic component of his musical language.’ (Kaduri 2006: section 3) The 
pauses seem to fall under definite ‘style’-specific categories, differing as styles differ: string 
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quartets, symphonies, movements in sonata form, rondo movements and minuets. According 
to Kaduri, thus, the ‘different ways in which Haydn employs the general pause and the logical 
links between them constitute a "grammar" of the general pause, which provide its meaning.’ 
(2006: section 3) This suggests how musical understanding can be explained in part from 
structural conditions alone. Thus Kaduri’s analysis comes closest to that which we have so far 
attributed to Wittgenstein. 
Jakob Christensen-Dalsgaard (2004) argues that “the true musical universals – that 
slow, low-pitched sounds are ‘sad’ and fast, higher pitched sounds joyful (or aggressive) – 
would also be prosodic universals.” (2004: section 2.6) 
As Mukherji (2010) points out, three main points emerge: Firstly, the same piece of 
music is not always viewed to have the same affect: the first movement of Mozart's G minor 
symphony, now considered tragic, was viewed by 19th century critics as cheerful. Secondly,  
“two very different pieces of music, from the same or different genres can both be viewed as 
cheerful: Mozart’s Ein Kleine Nachtmusik and the medium-tempo parts of performances of, 
say, raagas Jayjawanti or Bilaval. If the ‘cheerfulness’ is traced to the tempi, then the tonal 
structure of music becomes irrelevant, apart from the implausible consequence that all music 
in a certain tempo would have to be viewed as cheerful.” (Mukherji 2010: 204)  Suppose, for 
instance, we think of the Beatle’s song Michelle as generally sad. Ignoring the words, could 
the ‘sadness’ be traced to the fact that much of the melody in Michelle ‘moves in a relatively 
small range in the mid-to-low vocal range, with a generally descending contour,’ as Jackendoff 
and Lerdahl (2005: 63) seem to suggest? Unless ‘sadness’ is associated with this range by 
definition, one can easily cite sad music that ‘wails’ as the notes ascend in the mid-to-high 
range. On the other hand, (the early part of) the slow movement ‘in a relatively small range in 
the mid-to-low vocal range’ of the so-called ‘morning’ raaga aahir bhairav is meant to evoke 
not sadness, but spirituality tinged with joy as the ‘dawn breaks.’  
Thirdly, Mukherji raises the question whether this [that slow, low-pitched sounds are 
‘sad’ and fast, higher pitched sounds joyful (or aggressive)] is a musical universal. It may be 
argued that this universal applies to our appreciation of music, rather than music itself. Can we 
say, for instance, that in our appreciation of music, we tend to superimpose on the formal 
features of music, the emotional significance we attach to the prosodic features of speech? If 
this is the case, then it would also counter the idea that music imitates certain (prosodic) 
features of speech. If the features are attached or superimposed on the musical composition, 
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then they are not a part of the structure of the music itself. Thus, if this is the case, then it makes 
no sense to argue that music imitates the features of speech; these are, rather, externally 
attached in the appreciation of music.  
Here it is interesting to note that Langer (1942) argues that “there are certain aspects of 
the so-called “inner life” – physical or mental – which have formal properties similar to those 
of music – patterns of motion and rest, of tension and release, of agreement and disagreement, 
preparation, fulfillment, excitation, sudden change etc.” (Langer 1942: 46) To say this however 
doesn’t amount to an explanation, as it is possible to find similarity between most things. Each 
of these, we may note, however, are structural qualities. Thus perhaps, due to the structural 
similarities between aspects of the inner life and music, people tend to attach an affective 
element to music. Along similar lines, one may argue that Mukherji (2010) is missing the point 
entirely, i.e. perhaps the point is rather that our understanding of music imitates our 
understanding of certain features of speech/language. For instance, we find the following 
passage in the Zettle: “Doesn’t the theme point to anything outside itself? Yes it does!” (Z  
§175) Wittgenstein goes on to explain what he means as follows: “it (the theme) makes an 
impression on me which is connected with things in its surroundings – e.g. with our language 
and its intonations; and hence with the whole field of our language games.” (Z §175) As was 
pointed out earlier, there is perhaps an element of prosodic universals in the experience of a 
piece of music. And this is again due to the fact (as opposed to the necessity) that we do have 
such a language – with such prosodic features.28 Lewis (1977)  in fact mentions the above 
passage as falling in line with the rest of Wittgenstein’s writings: "The sense in Zettle could be 
captured, I think, by saying that understanding a musical theme overlaps with or is not isolated 
from other aspects of human life" (Lewis 1977: 120). 
Given these arguments, it appears that the focus for Wittgenstein, is not language as 
such or music as such but rather how these are incorporated in human life, how they are used 
and understood. The above discussion suggests that though music indeed does express itself, it 
also points to something else outside it, i.e. the contours of our language and its use. To put it 
differently and perhaps more appropriately, the only external significance that can be attributed 
to music is that which it achieves simply by being a part of human life, a life which is distinct 
from other life forms mainly by being linguistic. That is, being a language user influences all 
                                                          
28 For instance – there appear to be fine distinctions in the music and the interpretation of music, corresponding 
in some way to the particular language. 
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aspects of human life and music is no exception. In understanding and appreciating music, we 
do so importantly as a language user, i.e. language use serves as the background of our 
understanding music (and as the background of our understanding as such). 
Almost by contrast, understanding language is for Wittgenstein (PI §527) like 
understanding music (and not the other way around as suggested above). And, as we just saw, 
language use serves as the background of understanding music. Therefore, language use must 
also serve as the background of understanding language. So, although language is internally 
significant and “the content of the sentence is in the sentence” (BBB167), this internal 
significance can only be understood within the confines of language use. In other words, the 
way we use language and all the various language games, form the background for 
understanding. This is because (a) language must be understood the way we understand music, 
and (b) music in turn is understood within the background of language. Thus language must 
‘convey itself’ the way that music does, but music conveys itself so within the context of 
language use. And language is used essentially within a community of language users. 
Therefore, language must be internally significant but only as a part of the life of language 
users. 
Let us compare this understanding of a background (of language use) with Searle’s 
(technical) usage of Background. Searle talks about “a network of representations” and a 
“Background of nonrepresentational mental capacities” and insists that “in general, 
representations only function, they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against 
this nonrepresentational Background” (Searle 1983: 21) Regarding the former, he explains that 
to have any single intentional state, involves having a series of other intentional states 
(comparable to Quine’s network of beliefs). For instance, if I intend to go to a convention: 
“One finds that any such intention is embedded in a network of intentional states and that it 
can have the conditions of satisfaction that it has only in virtue of its position in the network. 
In order that I should have specifically that intention, with the content that it has, I must believe 
and desire a whole lot of other things which go far beyond the logical consequences of the 
corresponding statement. I have for example a whole series of beliefs about airlines, and 
geographical locations, and hotels, and professional associations. And these beliefs in turn are 
connected to a series of desires about tickets, reservations and travel arrangements.” (Searle 
981: 731) To put it differently, “in any real life situation, the beliefs and desires are only part 
of a larger complex of still other psychological states; there will be subsidiary intentions as 
well as hopes and fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and satisfaction. For 
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short, I have been calling this entire holistic network, simply, the ‘Network’” (Searle 
1983:141).  
This network of beliefs and desires functions within a “background of mental capacities 
that are not and could not be representations.” (Searle 1981: 731) Searle argues that “intentional 
contents are not self-interpreting. One has to know how to apply them, but the know-how in 
question cannot consist entirely in further intentional contents, without an infinite regress… 
Suppose, for example, I now intend to drink a glass of water. That very token intention will not 
be satisfied if I ‘drink’ the water through my ear, if the ‘water’ is in gaseous or frozen form, or 
if the ‘glass’ is a ten-thousand gallon glass. But none of these conditions are represented in the 
original intention; it contains no representation of any of these requirements.”  (1981: 732) In 
other words, these conditions are not a part of the network of intentions, but are rather 
nonrepresentational mental capacities or know-how that are needed to interpret the intentional 
content. “The Background, therefore, is not a set of things nor a set of mysterious relations 
between ourselves and things, rather it is simply a set of skills, stances, preintentional 
assumptions and presuppositions, practices and habits” (Searle 1983: 154) 
Now let’s try to use these tools towards our interpretation of Wittgenstein. We argued 
earlier that for Wittgenstein language use must serve as a background for understanding 
language. Searle’s account of Background as applied here would mean that language use 
involves nonrepresentational mental capacities or know-how needed to interpret intentional 
content of language. In other words, it is through knowing the rules of language use (although 
one may not be able to specify or identify them per say) that we are able to interpret the 
language used by others, in terms of its intentional content, and thereby communicate 
successfully. For instance, taking the above example from Searle, to interpret correctly a 
statement of the form: ‘I intend to drink a glass of water’ the interpreter needs to be aware of 
the Background within which this statement can be satisfied. This Background, as Searle points 
out, involves the knowledge of how these terms are used: i.e. one cannot drink through the ear 
but only through the mouth; to drink water, the water must be in liquid and not gaseous form; 
and to be able to drink a glass of water, the glass must not be so huge as say containing ten-
thoudsand gallons of water. There could however be other contexts of use, for example a story 
(like say Alice in Wonderland) within which these very forms of use, which we suggested fall 
beyond the scope of normal language use (drinking through the ears, drinking gas, and drinking 
ten-thousand gallons in a glass) would make sense. But, given the rules of use of this new 
context, it would only involve understanding these rules, for us to interpret these statements 
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correctly. Thus the nonrepresentational mental capacities (or Searle’s Background) involved in 
interpretation could be the capacity to understand the rules of language use, given a context. 
Alternatively, the mental capacities could be understood as the know-how needed to interpret 
intentional content. This know-how would involve the capacity to comprehend (or even 
internalize) the rules of use in a context (without necessarily being able to identify which rules 
are being used), and interpret content accordingly.29  
2.4 Implications in Terms of Our Original Intuitions 
We saw in this chapter that for the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, thought was a 
proposition with a sense. A proposition was the picture of reality, and a picture shares with 
reality a logico-pictorial form: the possibility that things in the world are connected with each 
other the same way that elements of a picture are connected. The domains of language and 
reality are thus distinct and self-contained, but they mirror each other. Language or pictures 
have their own internal connections, following an internal logic. What makes a sentence a 
sentence is that the words stand in a determinate relation to one another (TLP §3.14) 30.  In the 
Philosophical investigations (PI § 502)31 and the Blue and Brown Books (BBB 167)32 we find 
a similar line of thought, but here, as in Zettle (Z §55), the determinate relation of the Tractatus 
has been replaced by a broad sense of grammar as explained in section 2.2. 
Returning to the Tractatus, a proposition with a sense constituted a thought, and the 
sense of a proposition was its agreement or disagreement with reality. Unless you believe in 
the possibility of perfect knowledge, there is always the possibility of error in assessing the 
said agreement or disagreement. In order to reduce the chances of error, we need, at least 
another mind. But thoughts in other minds are not available to us, we cannot access the 
propositions entertained by other minds: all we can observe, what is available to us is behavior, 
                                                          
29 We will attempt in chapter 5 to use a Davidsonian decision theoretic framework to individuate this intentional 
content, given the use of language. 
30 “What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one 
another.” (TLP § 3.14, Emphasis added). So here it is constitutive of the sentence or proposition that the words 
stand in a determinate relation to one another.  
31 Here Wittgenstein argues that the following are comparable: 
“This sentence makes sense.” – “What sense?” 
“This set of words makes a sentence.” – “What sentence?” (PI § 502) 
The claim is that a sentence is a combination of words in that particular order, where the words have specific 
grammatical relations between them, and that combination of words itself and nothing else, is the sentence. 
Similarly, the sense of the sentence lies in the sentence itself. See section  for details. 
32 “[T]he content of the sentence is in the sentence” (BBB167) 
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the actual uses of words. This was perhaps among the reasons (along with others mentioned in 
this chapter), that drove the later Wittgenstein to claim that meaning is use - as all we have by 
way of evidence for meaning is the use of words in contexts. From the above33 it appears that 
the notion of Thought involved a connection of internal content (the proposition with its 
internal logic or determinate relation) and external significance (agreement or disagreement 
with reality in the TLP and later the use theory in the Investigations). The later Wittgenstein 
also retained both these elements: internal content (PI § 502) and external significance (use 
theory). For the later Wittgenstein, the connection between language (or thought) and reality 
was achieved through the notion of grammar (where grammar was to be understood in the 
broad sense). While the sense of a sentence is to be found in the sentence itself, the meaning 
of a sentence is nothing but the use of that sentence. We noted a possible way to connect these 
disparate claims through re-interpreting the determinate relation of the Tractatus as the 
grammar of the later Wittgenstein. This would entail that an element of use is already a part of 
what constitutes a proposition. This may or may not be Wittgenstein’s intention (most likely, 
it was not), but it does provide a useful way in which we could possibly connect the aboutness 
of language to the idea of an internal significance (that meaning must already exist within a 
symbol, for it to have meaning). In what follows, we shall explore this connection further, to 
see whether there is a systematic way in which we can understand the idea of use being 
constitutive of a sentence. Thus our study of Wittgenstein has led to a possible way in which 
we could satisfy our intuition that meaning must already exist within a symbol for it to have 
meaning, while also provide a way to account for the inherent aboutness of language. Whether 
this alternative is feasible or not forms the matter of the rest of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
33 See section 2.2.1 for details. 
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Chapter 3: Systematizing Use: Towards a Use-
Theoretic Account of Meaning 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we identified a possible way to reinterpret Wittgenstein in order to 
retain both an internal significance and the aboutness of language. The way forward, we found, 
was to reinterpret the determinate relation of the Tractatus as the grammar of the later 
Wittgenstein. Among the various uses of the term grammar in the later Wittgenstein, we also 
find the use of a word/sentence as well as the rules of use. Moreover, determinate relation was 
that which constituted a proposition. Therefore, the use of a word/sentence could potentially 
already be an element of that which constitutes a proposition. If use is constitutive of a 
proposition in this way, then use and meaning become intertwined. In other words, it would 
not be possible to know the complete meaning of a word/ sentence without knowing its use. 
Consequently, use which accounts for aboutness is incorporated within internal significance or 
meaning.  However, given the various uses of grammar in Wittgenstein, it remains to be seen 
how we may best interpret the notion of use, to serve our purposes. 
Shifting from our interpretation of Wittgenstein in the previous chapter, to the accepted 
interpretation, one that maintains a fundamental discontinuity between Wittgenstein’s earlier 
and later work, we find what has traditionally been associated to the later Wittgenstein: the use 
theory of meaning. The use theory of meaning, as it appears in Wittgenstein’s later writings, 
leaves us with a notion of use that is both obvious and vague at the same time. The legacy tells 
us that the meaning of a word is its use in language, and you can’t really say anything about 
the meaning of a word except to show it through the use of that word in a context. So what is 
‘use’? We are told that it has to do with following rules, however, rules which are not set in 
stone. Meanings, thus, form a complicated network of what Wittgenstein terms ‘family 
resemblances’, as opposed to the direct word-object relationship of simpler times. The picture 
practically precluded a deeper understanding of what ‘use’ is by virtue of the saying/showing 
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distinction.34 To explain what the meaning of a word is, the best you can do is to in fact just 
use it in a context.35 
Even at first glance, the idea that meaning is use inherently involves a tension: given 
that use refers to particular instantiations, and meaning requires us to abstract from particular 
instantiations and arrive at what is common among them. Further, we need to distinguish 
between the meaning/use of a word as opposed to that of a sentence, to see whether both can 
be arrived at in a similar way. The use or instantiation of a word involves the utterance of the 
word within a sentence, in a particular context. Here the sentence within which the word occurs 
may differ, along with the context of use, while the meaning of the word may remain the same. 
Thus for instance two instantiations of ‘dog’ would be ‘Reena took her dog for a walk’ and 
‘Diya’s dog was barking loudly in the park’ Here the sentence and the context is different, 
though the meaning of the word ‘dog’ remains the same in both instances. In the case of the 
meaning of a sentence however, the use or instantiation of a sentence involves simply the 
utterance of the sentence, and the variable is the context of utterance (as opposed to the use of 
a word where both the sentence and context are variable).  
Getting back to the original problem (that use requires specifying particular 
instantiations, while meaning requires abstracting from particularities), Gupta (2003) mentions 
that a “natural way of dealing with the problem is to appeal only to structural aspects of use in 
the account of meaning”36 However, if we appeal only to structural aspects in the account of 
meaning, what would this involve for both word and sentence meaning? In the case of word 
meaning, the occurrence of the word within a sentence could give us various structural 
properties of the word itself (e.g. that it is a plural, noun etc), through the position it occupies 
within the sentence. The structural aspects of the use of a sentence, however, would involve 
structurally analyzing the sentence itself, essentially devoid of the context of occurrence, and 
therefore would amount to the same as what would be involved in understanding the meaning 
of the sentence. It appears that words and sentences require different treatment. This is 
                                                          
34 In this chapter (as well as in this thesis) we will be sticking to our interpretation of Wittgenstein, and therefore, 
we will not be elaborating on the received view of the use theory of meaning, as it appears in his later writings.  
35 Here the question arises: is it in the nature of the concept ‘use’ that there is no more systematic way of analyzing 
it than just ‘showing’ what the use is through a particular use. See section 5.4.1 for further discussion. 
36 Gupta continues, however, that “it is completely mysterious how the relevant structural aspects can be specified 
without any appeal to meanings.” (2003: 663) 
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precisely what we get in Horwich (1997, 1998, 2004), who has differing accounts of word and 
of sentence meaning. Horwich’s theory is particularly interesting with respect to the direction 
of our own inquiry, as we shall see below, given that within Horwich’s approach, use becomes 
constitutive of propositions though it does not constitute the entirety of meaning. Among other 
theories stemming from the Wittgensteinian maxim ‘meaning is use’ (e.g. Dummett’s 
justificationist semantics 1959,1991, 2002, 2006 and Brandom’s inferential role semantics 
1994, 2000, 2007), Horwich is unique in that he attempts to systematize use (whether he 
succeeds in his attempt, and whether this is at all possible or not, are points we will be 
considering later). Though both Dummett and Brandom subscribe to the above maxim, they do 
so in different ways, understanding use in terms of other concepts.  
Following elements of the early Wittgenstein and logical positivists, Dummett argues 
that the meaning of a statement should be specified in terms of the grounds of asserting the 
statement. Thus in his early paper ‘Truth’ he argued that we should “no longer explain the 
sense of a statement by stipulating its truth-value in terms of the truth-values of its constituents, 
but by stipulating when it may be asserted in terms of the conditions under which its 
constituents may be asserted’ (Dummett 1959:17-18). For a justificationist, understanding the 
content of a statement consists in “an ability to recognize evidence for [the statement] when 
presented with it, and to judge correctly whether or not it is outweighed by any given piece of 
counter-evidence’ (Dummett 2006: 59) Central to his position is his argument for Anti-realism, 
through a rejection of the principle of bivalence, along the lines of the mathematical 
intuitionists. “If a mathematical statement is true only if we are able to prove it, then there is 
no ground to assume every statement to be either true or false… once we have lost any reason 
to assume every statement to be either true or false, we have no reason, either to maintain the 
law of excluded middle” (Dummett 1991: 9). It follows, for example, he argues, that “no one 
taking an anti-realist view of the past could suppose every past-tense statement to be true or 
false, for there might exist no evidence either for its truth or for its falsity” (1991:10). Drawing 
inferences, giving arguments in support of some conclusion, is, he claims, an essential part of 
using language. “Hence a theory of meaning ought, as one of its tasks, to give an account of 
the procedure of deductive inference, and supply a criterion for the validity of such an 
inference… a semantic theory… explains how the fundamental semantic property of any 
statement is determined in accordance with its composition in order to characterize valid 
deductive inferences by reference to this.” (Dummett 2004:31-32)  Further, “What a deductive 
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argument, to be valid, must preserve from premises to conclusion is justifiability, where a 
statement is justifiable if it is possible to justify it.” (Dummett 2006 :64) 
Brandom in turn contends that “concepts are essentially inferentially articulated. 
Grasping them in practice is knowing one’s way around the properties of inference and 
incompatibility they are caught up in.” (Brandom 1994: 89) He argues further that “Inferring 
is a kind of doing”  (1994: 91), however we do not need to be able to explicitly formulate the 
rules of inference that we are following. “The idea is to understand propositional contents as 
what can both serve as and stand in need of reasons, where the notion of a reason is understood 
in terms of inference. So propositional contentfulness is taken to be a matter of being able to 
play the role both of premise and of conclusion in inferences.” (Brandom 2007: 654)37  
Thus, while for Brandom, it is through a network of inferential connections that we 
understand concepts (resonating both Quine and the later Wittgenstein), Dummett maintains 
the salience of justifiability (and even truth) in significant uses of expressions. Both, however, 
subscribe to the idea that the meaning of an expression is its use in language, though use in one 
case is determined through inferential connections and in the other through justifiability.  Here 
‘use’ is not analyzed in and of itself, but is rather understood in terms of other, perhaps even 
more complex concepts, such as inference and justification. There are indeed many arguments 
for and against these theories, but we need not get into these details. In an attempt to see 
whether it is possible to systematize use, it would prove unhelpful to focus on theories which 
do not deal directly, as it were, with the concept of use. 
It may be argued however that these theories do go some way towards systematizing 
use through considering a single property of uses, for instance, that they are justified under 
certain conditions. So we have a certain sentence x containing the word U. An utterance of Ux 
is an instance of use (of the word U). There are various ways to systematically understand Ux. 
      A1 We could analyse and understand Ux in itself: the particular instance of use. 
A2 We could understand Ux in terms of other instances of use: Uy, Uz etc. 
                                                          
37 Clearly connected to this is Quine’s web of belief argument. “The totality of our so called knowledge or beliefs, 
from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or to change 
the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience.” (Quine 1951: 42)  
Horwich wants to accept this picture, while also advocating non-holistic meanings of words which are specified 
through specific regularities of use.  
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A3 We could also understand Ux in terms of the conditions that justify this use: C1, 
C2 etc.; inferential relations with other sentences and so on. 
In order to fully understand the meaning of U, it appears, we need each of A1-A3, and 
in that order. The claim here is that understanding the meaning of the word is dependent upon 
a) understanding the relation of the word to others in the use-sentence; b) understanding the 
relation of the particular use sentence, Ux, with other use-sentences, Uy, Uz etc.; c) 
understanding the relation of Ux to external justifiability conditions or inferential relations etc. 
As we move from a to b to c, we are increasing the level of complexity and dependence. So, in 
claiming that the only way to specify meaning is in terms of conditions of justification, is also 
to claim that the simpler elements are not analyzable in themselves or that the meaning we get 
from them is incomplete. So before one goes on to A3, we should have at least considered the 
possibility of A1 and A2. Horwich appears to be dealing with use itself, in advocating a use 
theory of meaning (though we shall see that he is dealing more with A2 than A1, or rather 
merging A1 and A2). We shall therefore proceed to elaborate Horwich’s picture given its 
priority (over explanations dealing with say A3 above) with respect to our present endeavor: 
systematizing use.  
For a use theory to qualify as systematic, it should at least explain what the use of a 
word is, and tell us how to arrive at meaning through use. A highly systematic use theory would 
also be able to systematically derive the various uses of a word. Horwich tries to systematize a 
use theory of meaning through a set of claims regarding what the use of a word amounts to and 
how this contributes to the meaning of a sentence. In this chapter, we will see whether it is 
possible to systematize a use theory of meaning, focusing on Horwich’s attempt, and how much 
of this approach we can use for our own enquiry.  
Horwich argues for the following:  
B1  Word meanings are use properties (or ‘implicit definitions’). 
B2 Sentence meanings are derived from combining word meanings and assuming 
compositionality. 
B3 Compositionality is not a substantive concept, but has rather a deflationary 
interpretation: compositionality does not constrain the content of word meanings in any 
way; meanings of words could be use properties, truth conditions or whatever else.  
We shall consider each of these steps to see whether they are internally consistent as 
well as coherent as a whole. In case the theory does not stand against criticism, we shall try to 
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come up with an alternative, or an addition that could potentially strengthen the theory. Now 
we will proceed to elaborate on B1-B3 above, as well as note some objections to these points 
available in literature.  
In Section 3.2 we will discuss Horwich’s position that meanings of words are their use 
properties and point out various objections to this position. Then in section 3.3 we consider his 
claim that sentence meanings are arrived at trivially from word meanings when we assume 
compositionality, and objections to this. In section 3.4, we shall try to build a defense for 
Horwich by first taking a closer look at what he means by use-properties, and revisiting the 
objections raised in section 3.2.1 Then we will consider his claims regarding sentence meaning 
and see whether we can strengthen the response to objections raised in section 3.3.2. Then in 
3.5 we proceed to point out our final objection. We shall conclude by relating what we learn 
from this chapter to the goals of our thesis: tracking our Wittgensteinian intuitions. 
3.2 Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning 
For Horwich: “The meaning of a word, w, is engendered by the non-semantic property of w 
that explains w’s overall use.-And this will be a property of the following form: that such-and-
such sentences containing w are the ones that are accepted underived (by the relevant ‘experts’, 
given certain meanings attached to various other words)” (2004: 352) 
Since what is important here is what is considered to be true, and not ‘truth’ itself, how 
is it that Horwich can talk of regularities of use at all, as what one person considers to be true 
may differ greatly from another. In this regard Horwich resorts to ‘the relevant experts’. This 
does not pose a major hurdle to his story, as he claims that whatever the implicit definition, it 
is a matter of empirical inquiry and may be changed over time.  
But here we may ask, what experts are we to consult in determining these implicit 
definitions? The definitions are vague enough for ordinary speech, so perhaps the ‘relevant’ 
expert here are any competent speakers of English. In case of technical terms in any field, we 
may need to consult an ‘expert’ in that field, or someone who understands that language. As I 
understand his argument, the inclusion of the term ‘expert’ does not add much, as an ‘expert’ 
is just someone who understands the language (English, mathematics, science, etc).  
Michael Devitt (2011) argues, however, that Horwich’s appeal to experts (“deference” 
for Devitt) is in fact what proves irreconcilable within his use theory of meaning. The main 
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reason he gives for this is that an expert’s use/acceptance property is greatly different from a 
non-expert’s. So deference may explain why we change our use property in cases of ignorance 
or error, but not the meaning it now has. As far as I understand it, once we change our use 
property, the new use-sentence is again basic and in fact constitutes the meaning, and so the 
question of being able to explain the new meaning does not arise. However, Devitt may have 
a point when it comes to the difference in the acceptance properties of experts and non-experts. 
Experts can change the use properties based on empirical evidence, which may be causal in 
nature, and thus we need, he claims, a causal theory to explain expert meaning, and a use theory 
to explain non-expert meaning. However, though experts may change meaning based on 
empirical observations, which Horwich would admit to, their understanding of the meaning of 
the word may still be its use property (which is empirically determined). To put it differently, 
there may in fact be a difference in the way the expert and the non-expert arrives at the 
particular use property: the expert’s beliefs are empirically determined while the non-expert 
can simply defer. But Horwich may well accept that and still claim that the two share the same 
use-property: the expert determines which is to be the basic use property, and the non-expert 
accepts such a determination, thereby sharing the belief. Once a particular use-property is 
accepted as basic, how it came to be regarded as such is no longer the issue.  
Devitt could be making a different point: an expert may accept many sentences 
regarding A, most of which a non-expert may be unaware of; therefore, the expert and non-
expert meaning are different. However, somewhere within the claims the expert accepts will 
also be the basic use property, which he will also accept as such (perhaps with the qualification 
of acceptance within say non-technical usage). And in all such usage, the expert may also share 
the use property of a non-expert. Thus deference does not prove fatal to Horwich’s account. 
Devitt also argues, however, that Horwich fails to explain what he means by deference and 
does not give any theory as to how it works,38 whereas Devitt himself can offer such an 
alternative (his causal theory of reference). I agree that Horwich has not attempted to explain 
or give a theory of the phenomenon of deference. Rather he claims that for most common 
words, almost everyone will count as an expert, thereby making the underived acceptance of a 
sentence by a community of speakers including the speaker himself relevant. I tend to 
                                                          
38 He gives five reasons why Horwich’s account isn’t sufficient to explain deference: “(i) People will often not 
defer where they should. (ii) They will often try to defer but fail to identify an expert. (iii) They will often defer 
to a nonexpert. (iv) When the bearer of a name has been long-dead – for example, Aristotle - there will be no 
experts around to defer to. (v) Where there are surviving experts about a dead person, there seems to be no 
change that a deferrer could be disposed to make to conform to the experts’ basic acceptance properties.” 
(Devitt 2011: 209) 
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sympathise with Horwich here. Though he has not explained the phenomena, deference isn’t 
at issue in most cases of use. It comes into play when we need to change our basic acceptance 
property, in case of ignorance or error. Horwich notes that there may be whole communities 
who live in ignorance of the correct meaning of a term (based on basic acceptance property of 
an expert).  
Let’s consider further the nature of these statements which Horwich calls use properties. 
Meaning-entities are, for Horwich, use properties, and are universals; and to have a certain 
meaning is to exemplify a certain use-property. These meaning entities, or use properties are 
exemplified as follows: 
‘true’ means what it does to us in virtue of our provisional underived acceptance of 
instances of the schema, ‘<p> is true ↔ p’; ‘bache1or’’s meaning is engendered by our 
underived acceptance of the sentence, ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’. 
‘red’’s meaning stems from our underived propensity to accept ‘That is red’ in response 
to the sort of visual experience normally provoked by observing a clearly red surface. 
The meaning of ‘water’ is constituted by the fact that we accept, as basic, ‘x is water 
↔ x has the underlying nature of the stuff in our seas, rivers, lakes and rain’” 
(Horwich 2004:351) 
It may be argued, however, following Hinzen (2007), that the meaning of the Equivalence 
Schema certainly does not arise simply from regarding its instances as true. On the contrary, it 
is our knowledge of grammar that entails that we will regard these instances as true. This seems 
to be a problem for the use theory, since it shows that there is an explanation that goes deeper 
than simply appealing to a brute decision to regard something as true. Horwich may reply that 
in stating that ‘regarding the truth schema as true constitutes the meaning of truth’, he is not 
claiming that truth itself is so constituted. It is only the meaning of the term that is constituted 
by the decision. So he may be willing to accept that our knowledge of grammar entails that, for 
instance, we can only apply truth to sentences at a specific level of grammatical complexity, 
but that is a grammatical issue. Horwich agrees that syntax or the combinatorial principles are 
a constraint on the meaning, but he may still argue that the meaning of individual words, or 
what notions we attach to which words, is a matter of what we are disposed to accept. To 
elaborate, we may distinguish between logical notions and the terms used for them, and the 
assignment of those particular logical relations to that particular term would still be a matter of 
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a brute decision. We could, for instance, have associated the equivalence schema (“<p> is true 
↔ p”), which we now associate with ‘truth’, with say ‘table’ instead. But the brute decision to 
attach the equivalence schema to ‘truth’ (as opposed to ‘table’) gives it the meaning it now has. 
What is not a matter of a brute decision but rather a disposition is which particular meaning, 
from all the various uses of the term, we consider to be constitutive. 
Further Schiffer (2000) notes that while it may be easier to see how Horwich’s thesis 
regarding meaning-constituting properties applies to ‘truth’ or ‘red’, Horwich does not explain 
how it applies to words like ‘dog’: “‘Dog’ may mean DOG for someone who is blind or who 
does not know what a dog looks like, so it cannot be required that anyone who understands 
‘dog’ must be disposed to accept ‘That’s a dog’ when confronted with a paradigm dog” 
(Schiffer 2000: 534). For Gupta (2003) “an identification of principles that are fundamental to 
an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning”, 
which forms the basis of Horwich’s use theory of meaning, is “an unacceptable identification” 
(2003:654). He argues that the two are entirely different things, and that which is fundamental 
to meaning need not be fundamental to the acceptance of a particular sentence (2003: 664-65). 
“For, plainly, the acceptance of sentences depends not just on the meanings of words but also 
on the methods of obtaining information (and misinformation) about the world. Explanatorily 
basic patterns [of sentence acceptance] will, thus, typically reflect not just meanings but also 
methods of obtaining information.” (Gupta 2003: 666) 
Fodor and Lepore (2001)39 point out that it is not the implicit nature of these use-
properties, but rather their dispositional character, which precludes questions regarding how 
they are derived. They argue that whether a definition is accepted implicitly or explicitly, it 
would still be open to the same objections. What is important is that these definitions are the 
ones which we are disposed to accept. To claim that we have such a disposition automatically 
precludes questions regarding how these statements are derived. But this leaves out any 
interesting discussion regarding why it is that we are disposed to accepting these as opposed to 
any other statement containing the word. 
                                                          
39 Fodor and Lepore (2001) argue that, although both distinctions apply to mental states, there is a difference 
between the explicit/implicit distinction and the distinction between occurrent/dispositional. “The former is 
epistemological; it’s a matter of whether the creature that’s in a state has (non-inferential) access to it’s being 
there. In the simplest examples, implicit/explicit is about whether a creature is able to report being in the state 
that it’s in. Whereas the second distinction is ontological; we suppose that occurrents, but not dispositions, are 
species of events.”(2001: 357-358) 
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By way of a possible defense, Horwich (1998) argues that an implicit definition is far 
from an analytic truth. So saying that we are disposed to accept certain statements doesn’t 
imply that these are necessarily true. It is consistent with a sentence being taken to be true, that 
it is in fact false, and that it is so regarded for empirical reasons. One may for example be wrong 
or ignorant about the meaning of a word, and what we consider to be true may thus be revealed 
as false at a later time. Further, not only are implicit definitions not all apriori, but it is likely 
that none are a priori, if we consider for instance Quine’s ‘web of belief’. (Horwich 1998: 143) 
Another important element in the above description, which Horwich gives of his use 
theory (2004: 352), is the idea that these use-properties are ‘non-semantic’. This term opens up 
the theory to the charge of behaviorism. We shall take this up again in section 3.4.4, where we 
will be in a better position to deal with this aspect of his theory. For now, let us point out 
objections to Horwich’s use theory, based simply on his notion of word meanings noted above. 
Later, particularly in section 3.4, we will consider whether any of these objections can be 
neutralized through a consideration of other aspects of Horwich’s theory. Horwich is a 
deflationist concerning both compositionality and truth. It should be useful to discuss 
deflationism here in order to better understand Horwich’s use theory. 
3.2.1 Objections to Horwich’s Theory of Word Meanings as Use Properties 
This account faces various problems: 
F1. It is not clear how one could systematically arrive at such paradigm uses; i.e. the 
non-semantic property mentioned in the beginning of section 3, which are accepted 
underived. It is not clear, in particular, whether these acceptance regularities indicate 
merely regularities in use or also concept regularities, i.e. whether the ‘acceptance’ 
indicates or is due to adhering to conventions or usage within shared conceptual 
specifications. For example, when a person uses a word, she may do so according to 
conventional usage, but she may have a completely different concept in mind, showing 
that merely accepting a certain usage shows little about what one understands a word 
to mean, and what the basis of the use is. This is particularly important when it comes 
to language acquisition in children. A child may for instance acquire the concept: 
APPLE = all red, round objects; though he continues to use it correctly in all instances 
(in this case, the only red and round objects he encounters are in fact only apples). The 
point is, in other words, Quinian: from the mere use of a word (‘rabbit’, for example) 
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we cannot know what concept is in the mind of the speaker (it could be a part of a 
rabbit, the whole rabbit, a state of the rabbit, etc.). Thus it needs to be made clear what 
these acceptance regularities refer to. 
F2. What does the expression ‘underived propensity to accept’ really signify? Does 
‘underived’ here mean innate?40 Perhaps what is rather meant is that all our uses of the 
term are derived from this particular use, and thus it has the character of a definition. 
So we accept these sentences as implicit definitions of the terms. But why do we do so? 
Such a theory would inherit all the problems of a theory of description.41  
F3. How are we to know that the meaning refers in one case to a law of logic (e.g. in 
the case of truth, the logical predicate is literally defined by the given sentence, or 
sentence-schema), and in another to a visual property (red), and in yet another to a 
constitutive natural property of an element (water). It seems that we need an 
independent account of how to sort which word into which kind of meaning property. 
Alternatively, it appears that in order to be able to formulate such meaning properties 
(as the paradigm use properties) we already need to know what the words mean, at least 
in a primitive sense.  
F4. How could one account for non-paradigmatic uses of words at all within this theory? 
A use may differ from the paradigmatic one. So would a case of non-conformity to 
established paradigms of use simply be rejected? If that were the case, we would never 
be able to change or add to existing meanings of words at all. Further, even in cases 
where a person uses the term to mean what it is normally used to mean, this usage may 
not be captured by what Horwich defines as the use/meaning property of the term. The 
knowledge that the speaker possesses while using the term may not be of the basic use 
                                                          
40 Horwich suggests in personal communication that there may be at least some element of innateness in meaning 
(of certain kinds of terms). However, for most part, at the time of learning a language, a child is exposed to various 
different uses of a term, and then at a certain later stage, decides or comes to recognize one of these several uses 
as basic, or the implicit definition of the word. So perhaps an interesting question to ask, if we are to accept this 
claim, would be: what is it that makes the child accept that particular use-sentence as the basic underived use-
property of the term as opposed to other use-sentences. Horwich claims that it is empirically determined. And in 
making this decision, the speaker may rely on the relevant experts as well, as discussed in the previous section 
(see section 3.1 above). 
41 Russell (1918/1956) argued that our ordinary proper names are not really names, but rather abbreviated 
descriptions. To this Searle(1958) argued that a name, under Russell’s theory, must be equivalent to a particular 
description; but a speaker does not have any single determinate description in mind while using a name. Searle 
argues rather for a cluster (vague and unspecified number) of descriptions. Kripke (1972/1980) argues that it is 
possible that all the descriptions associated with a name may be false, but the name doesn’t lose its reference, 
even if all the descriptions turn out to be false.  
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property, and remain more ‘superficial’, while at the same time using the term correctly 
in every case. For instance, a speaker may not know that water, which he drinks from 
taps, comes from and has the ‘underlying nature’ of the stuff in seas, rivers etc. (for he 
doesn’t know that there are rivers etc. for instance). Moreover, Collins (2001) raises the 
concern that “while the meaning of nurse might well be some set of paradigm nurse 
features (including, presumably, being female), the meaning of male nurse need not be 
a paradigm at all.” What do paradigm nurses have to do with the meaning of male 
nurse? “It seems that Horwich is saying that one could understand ‘male nurse’ without 
having a clue about paradigm nurses, for what constitutes the meaning of the complex 
does not express what constitutes the meaning of its parts, the parts just need to have 
some meaning or other.” (Collins 2001:58-59) Collins goes on to argue that it is 
precisely compositionality which we want to explain, as we want to know what a 
sentence means in terms of its parts. We shall see in the next section whether this 
objection holds, given the different accounts of word and sentence meaning in 
Horwich’s theory. At this point we may note, however, that Horwich himself 
distinguishes his use theory from, and points out its advantages over, ‘The Prototype 
Theory’: “that the meaning property of a word consists in there being certain paradigm 
cases of its applicability and there being a ‘similarity metric’ which determines how 
close other things are to these exemplars.” (Horwich 1998: 52) The two main 
advantages of the use theory, he notes, are its generality and its explanatory power. 
Prototype theory cannot deal with meanings of all words, “Exemplars and similarity 
metrics seem out of place in connection with the theoretical vocabulary of science.” 
(Horwich 1998: 53)  
We have seen in this section that Horwich has to deal with various issues within his 
conception of word meanings. We shall return to these problems in section 3.4, after 
considering other aspects of his theory in the next section, in particular his account of sentence 
meaning, with which his account of word meanings is combined. Our contention, thus far, is 
that his notion of word meanings cannot withstand criticism on its own. It needs bolstering 
from external sources, which should differ, at least, in some manner of explanation, from that 
accounting for word use. In the next section we will see whether his explanation for sentence 
meaning proves to be a solution.  
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3.3 Deflationism and Horwich 
Deflationism about truth refers to “a family of theories about the meaning or expressive role of 
the locution ‘is true’, often attended by effacing metaphysical claims about the nature of truth 
itself” (Burgess 2012: 397). Deflationism contends in general that there is nothing mysterious 
about the notion of truth; it is much simpler than most philosophers believe. Within this 
purview there are those that regard this simplicity as a semantic fact: that, for example, the 
meaning of ‘truth’ can be captured by for example, Tarski’s T-schema. And there are those that 
go further to claim that the meaning of truth so defined captures all that there is to capture about 
truth; there is nothing more to the notion of truth than what can be so defined.  
Burgess (2012), for instance, notes that there are two main strands of Deflationism, 
semantic and metaphysical. The former “begins with an account of the meaning of ‘true’ and 
cognate expressions – and then goes on to explain why we would have such a ‘transparent’ 
word in our vocabulary.” And “The secondary metaphysical strand of deflationism is roughly 
that, once we have explained what ‘true’ means, there is little more to say about what truth is. 
Unlike being a sample of water or having commercial value, truth is not a ‘substantive’ 
property susceptible to illuminating, naturalistic reduction. Differences in detail between 
competing versions of the view are overshadowed by a common commitment to the idea that 
the metaphysics and semantics of truth are exceedingly simple.” (Burgess 2012: 398) 
Gupta however focuses on the latter of these two strands and argues that deflationism 
“maintains that truth is a simple and clear concept and has no substantive role to play in 
philosophy.” (Gupta 1993; 58) He contends that deflationism “holds that once we understand 
the meaning and function of ‘true’ – and this understanding, according to deflationism, is not 
hard to achieve – we shall see that truth has no substantial role to play in philosophy.” (Gupta 
1993: 59) 
This is in direct contrast to the philosophical tradition that contends that truth-
conditions play a central role in the theory of meaning. In the next chapter, we will take a look 
at a recent advocate of this tradition to see whether it can provide answers to the questions we 
began with. For now, we will try to see what deflationism means for Horwich. His deflationism 
is not limited to truth; he also deflates compositionality. 
The Compositionality Constraint, Horwich points out, may be formulated as follows. 
“An adequate theory of meaning must enable us to see how the meanings of complex terms 
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may be determined, and thereby explained, by the meanings of their parts.” (Horwich 1998:33) 
Horwich however provides a deflationary account of the above general constraint, which 
amounts to the following: “Understanding one of one's own complex expressions (non-
idiomatically) is, by definition, nothing over and above understanding its parts and knowing 
how they are combined. In other words, once one has worked out how a certain sentence is 
constructed from primitive syntactic elements, and provided one knows the meanings of those 
elements, then, automatically and without further ado, one qualifies as understanding the 
sentence. No further work is required; no further process needs to be involved, leading from 
those initial conditions to the state of understanding the sentence.” (1997: 504) 
Thus the meaning of the sentence does not have to be worked out on the basis of what 
is known about how it is constructed; for that knowledge by itself constitutes the sentence's 
meaning. If this is so, then compositionality is a trivial consequence of what we mean by 
“understanding” in connection with complex expressions. It can put no constraint whatsoever 
upon how our words come to mean what they do—allowing, in particular, that the meaning of 
a word derives from its use. (Horwich 1997: 504) 
The following claims are argued for here, beyond the compositionality constraint itself: 
D1. Knowledge about how a sentence is constructed itself constitutes knowledge of the 
sentence’s meaning. Compositionality (or how the sentence is constructed in terms of 
its parts) is a trivial consequence of what we mean by ‘understanding’ sentences (or 
knowing the meaning of a sentence). This is so because Horwich claims that knowing 
the meaning of a sentence (as opposed to that of a word) is nothing over and above 
knowing how the sentence is constructed and what the individual words mean. In other 
words, the construction property itself constitutes the meaning of a sentence, along with 
word meanings. 
D2. Compositionality, or how a sentence is constructed, does not put any constraint on 
what constitutes word meanings, or how these primitives come to mean what they do. 
 
It appears from this description that what is central to his project is an account of how 
a sentence is constructed. However, it is precisely regarding this that Horwich has no 
significant explanations. This gap not only prevents the theory from being explanatorily 
complete, but also from being anything close to a systematic scientific analysis, as opposed to 
philosophical speculation. But this is not necessarily a drawback, considering the philosophical 
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aims of the theory. As we will notice later, Horwich is not aiming for a rigorous scientific 
theory at all, but the ordinary non-scientific understanding: “the aim of the present use theory 
is to give an account of meaning in the ordinary, non-scientific sense of the word… The 
purpose of the account is not scientific explanation, but rather a demystification of the ordinary 
concept of meaning, followed by the philosophically beneficial consequences of that 
demystification: namely, solutions to the numerous problems… that are produced, …, by 
confusion about that concept. (Horwich 1998: 87) Horwich also points out that although his 
theory may not be rigorous enough to be termed scientific, it may nonetheless serve to “provide 
a helpful clue” regarding the kind of meaning needed for a scientific theory. Such a scientific 
theory, for him, is Chomskian linguistics, and he believes that his regularities-of-use 
conception of meaning can inform this theory by essentially replacing I-meanings.  We will 
return to this point in section 3.4.3. To elaborate on points D1 and D2 above, we will first 
consider the nature of sentence meaning and then go on to his deflation of compositionality, 
before we proceed to discuss further objections and counters. 
Using his convention of capitalising words when using them to refer to meanings, he 
argues: the meaning property ‘x means DOGS BARK’ consists in the construction property: 
‘x results from putting terms whose meanings are DOG and BARK, in that order, into a schema 
whose meaning is Ns V’. So a complex like ‘dogs bark’ gets its meaning from the following: 
E1. The meanings of the two words ‘dog’ and ‘bark’ 
E2. The meaning of the generalization schema ‘ns v’  
E3. The fact that the sentence results from placing those words in that schema in a 
certain order. 
Thus ‘dogs bark’ would result from putting words meaning what ‘dog’ and ‘bark’ mean 
into a schema meaning what ‘ns v’ means. See Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Horwich’s Use theory 
 
Schema     →→→→→    Word Meaning      →→→→→      Sentence Meaning 
 
E.g.       NsV     →  Add →       Use-property       → Result → 
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We may here immediately notice that he draws a parallel between the distinction of 
words and word-meanings on the one hand and schemas and schema-meaning on the other. It 
is however not immediately obvious how the similarity is to be understood. What is the 
meaning of a schema? How are we to distinguish it from the schema itself? If the parallel with 
word meanings follows then the meaning-property of a schema must be arrived at in a similar 
way as the meaning property of words. I don’t think this can be, since the construction accounts 
for the meaning in the one case, but not the other. But how are we to come up with acceptance 
conditions or paradigmatic uses in the case of schemas? Perhaps it is not his intention to draw 
such a parallel at all. Thus alternatively, he could be interpreted as simply suggesting that 
schema meanings are the way that words are put together in a particular schema. The schema 
could be determining what is the function and what is the argument, and that the former is to 
be applied to the latter. So in the case of ‘dogs bark’, for instance, a schema meaning Ns V, 
when applied to an ordered pair of word meanings (<DOG, BARK>) gives the meaning of the 
complex. However, Horwich does not provide any principle for the generation of schemata, 
nor a way of identifying the primitives which may constitute them. The only cue we have is 
the ‘ns v’ structure he provides. We may note here nonetheless that this need not adversely 
affect his position, as he does not claim to be providing details in any case. His position is a 
philosophical one, and he is happy to leave the scientific particulars for the linguists for 
instance.  
We can see how generic his theory is through the following.. He argues that: for any 
complex expression e constructed by combining certain primitive terms <w1,…,wn>, e is the 
result of applying combinatorial procedure P to the primitives <w1,…,wn>, the meaning 
property of e: ‘x means E’ is constituted by the construction property: ‘x results from applying 
combinatorial procedure P to primitives whose meanings are <W1,…,Wn> (Horwich 1997: 
507) 
We can notice that he does not specify any of the constituents here: for instance, what 
kinds of things constitute the primitives, or what is the combinatorial procedure. This strategy, 
he points out, is deflationary: “since our explanation did not involve any assumptions about 
how the meaning properties of the primitives are constituted, it would seem that 
compositionality per se provides absolutely no constraint upon, or insight into, the underlying 
nature of meaning.” (Horwich 1997:507)  
61 
 
Fodor and Lepore (2001) argue that although it may be possible to abstract from a thick 
substantive account of compositionality, which comes with further assumptions about reverse 
compositionality, systematicity etc., in a way that puts no constraint on the nature of word 
meanings, doing so would only leave a trivial notion of compositionality. “But it’s also true 
that it doesn’t matter much that compositionality doesn’t matter much lacking such further 
assumptions. What matters is that there appears to be a plethora of truths about the semantics 
of complex expressions that the assumption of compositionality, together with a good theory 
of the lexicon, explains; and that, as far as anybody knows, can’t be explained if the assumption 
of compositionality is left out.” (Fodor and Lepore, 2001: 367) they argue that compositionality 
comes with assumptions like for instance that language is systematic, and if we can get a 
meaningful sentence from combining words together in accordance with some principle, we 
must also be able to systematically and meaningfully break apart a sentence into its 
constituents. So, “The meanings of ‘dogs’ and ‘bark’ must be contained in the meaning of ‘dogs 
bark’ because people who understand the sentence likewise understand the words.” (Fodor and 
Lepore 2001: 366). Reverse compositionality, or the theory that the meaning of a complex 
expression determines the structure of the expression and the meaning of its constituents, may 
in itself be too strong, but intuitively there must be at least some meaning that is preserved. For 
instance, we may not know the meaning of a particular word in a sentence, but given that we 
know the language and the other words, we would be able to say something about the meaning 
of that word. Take the sentence: ‘She sat on the togo’. Now we can tell, given the structure, 
that ‘togo’ should be a noun and given the meanings of the other words, that it is something 
that it is possible for someone to sit on. Even if we don’t know the meanings of all the other 
words, the structure itself is capable of providing us with at least some formal elements of the 
meaning of the word. The idea is essentially that, although it is possible to deflate 
compositionality, in doing so we lose a lot more, including explanatory capacity, systematicity 
and richness of language. 
It may be useful here, in order to understand Horwich’s deflationary stance, to contrast 
it with truth conditional theories such as Davidson’s, for which compositionality is not non-
substantive in the above sense.  
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3.3.1 Davidson on Deflating Compositionality 
Davidson’s programme appears to be in direct conflict with what we have discussed so far 
regarding Horwich’s theory. For Davidson, “knowledge of the structural characteristics that 
make for meaningfulness (=syntax) in a sentence, plus knowledge of the meanings of the 
ultimate parts, does not add up to knowledge of what a sentence means” (Davidson 1967: 307) 
This, he argues, is because such knowledge cannot account for propositional attitudes, e.g. 
belief sentences. This leads Davidson to conceive a theory of meaning as a theory of truth: “a 
theory of meaning for a language L shows "how the meanings of sentences depend upon the 
meanings of words" if it contains a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L… To know the semantic 
concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence - any sentence - to be true, 
and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to understanding the language.” 
(1967: 310) Thus he imposes the Tarskian “s is true iff p” (where s is the sentence and p the 
proposition, for instance, ‘“Snow is white” is true iff snow is white’) as a fundamental 
constraint on a systematic theory of meaning.  
Horwich considers two problems faced by Davidson’s approach. The first of these 
relates to how his account could be applied to all sentences (for example those containing 
adverbs, that-clauses, attributive adjectives). The other problem relates to whether the truth 
condition of a sentence does in fact suffice to determine its meaning. He certainly does see 
other problems, e.g. that a naturalistic semantics cannot be based on truth, and that meaning is 
prior to truth. Horwich argues that these problems all have a trivial solution based on the 
principle of compositionality (that the meaning of a complex is determined by the meaning of 
its elements and by its syntactic structure) but the solution involves no explication of meaning 
(e.g. in terms of truth conditions, or use properties, etc.) and hence offers no explanation of 
why the principle of compositionality holds. He argues that we reach an interpretation of ‘Gira 
marte’ through the following steps: 
‘Marte’ in Italian means the same as our ‘Mars’ 
‘gira_’ in Italian means the same as our ‘_rotates’ 
 
Then, from the principle of compositionality, we can infer: 
The result of applying ‘gira_’ to ‘Marte’ in Italian means the same as  
The result of our applying ‘_rotates’ to ‘Mars’ 
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And finally, given the syntactic facts, 
The result of applying ‘gira_’ to ‘Marte’ = ‘Gira marte’ 
The result of applying ‘_rotates’ to ‘Mars’ = ‘Mars rotates’ 
 
we can deduce the interpretation: 
‘Gira marte’ in Italian means the same as our ‘Mars rotates’ 
(Horwich 2001: 370-71) 
 
Davidson had argued against such a deflationary account on the grounds that such a 
manual of translation does not convey meanings, and thus cannot amount to an interpretation.  
One can be told that two expressions have the same meaning, and thus are inter-translatable, 
without having any understanding of the sentences. Davidson was seeking to address the 
problems faced by a radical interpreter, one without any prior knowledge of a speakers belief 
or meanings of his utterances. Thus for him, interpretation requires an account of both belief 
and meaning, and he argues that the way to achieve this is through the principle of charity, by 
interpreting the speakers, wherever possible, as holding true beliefs. So the elements to be 
accounted for within this wholistic interpretation, as consistent with one another, include at 
least the speaker’s beliefs and meanings, his behavior and his environment.  
  Horwich, however, sets himself a much more restricted task. He is not seeking to give 
a holistic account of meaning faced with the problem of the radical interpreter. Rather, he 
admits that “a translation manual can supply interpretations only relative to our understanding 
of our own language”, but he argues further that “the same can be said of any alternative view 
one might have of which explicit assumptions would work.” (Horwich 2001:374) So he is not 
trying to account for interpretation, but rather confines himself to explaining the meaning of a 
sentence given our shared beliefs, knowledge and environment. 
Within this restricted context, Horwich argues that sentence meaning is compositional: 
so the meanings of constituents along with the combinatorial principle do add up to the meaning 
of the whole sentence. But the reason why this avoids the problems raised by Davidson is that 
on Horwich’s account compositionality is deflated, i.e. it puts no constraint on the nature of 
meanings of constituents; and meaning is not truth-theoretic. Given his account of sentence 
meaning and compositionality considered above, Horwich argues that the problem that led 
Davidson into characterizing meaning in terms of truth would not arise. However, as we just 
noted, Davidson and Horwich are trying to address different problems to begin with. Thus 
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Davidson’s objections to a Horwich-like account may not directly address the context of his 
theory. We will now go on to consider other objections to this view.  
3.3.2 Objections to Deflating Compositionality 
Pietroski (2005), on the other hand, argues that we should place the following substantive 
constraints on a theory of meaning: (i) a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding, (ii) 
which may be of the form of an algorithm associating signals with interpretations, (iii) and 
which should explain how a speaker of a language L associates signals of L with interpretations. 
He claims that if phenomena like ambiguity, entailment, indexicality etc. bear on (iii), then 
they also bear on theories of meaning. (2005:255-256) Such phenomena, however, remain 
unexplained within Horwich’s proposal. Pietroski points out that Horwich cannot explain the 
various entailment relationships that exist between natural language sentences. For instance, 
‘If every dog barked, and Fido is a dog, then Fido barked’ or ‘If Pat boiled the soup, the soup 
boiled’. He also cannot explain why, for instance, we can infer (ii) from (i), 
i. John ate an apple 
ii. John ate 
Unless the meaning is compositionally determined, and compositionality is non-trivial (i.e. 
compositionality is understood in a non-deflationary sense), how can the truth of (i) guarantee 
the truth of (ii)? Further, if speakers don’t understand 1 and 2 compositionally, how do they 
know that we can infer from (i) to (ii)? (Pietroski 2000)  
Collins (2003:415) equally points out that even if a Horwich-style schema does capture 
the meaning relevant structures of a sentence, it does not tell us how the sentence relates to 
another that means the same. To take a simple example, the relation between the active/passive 
forms in (iii) and (iv) remains unexplained. 
iii. Bob kicked the ball 
iv. The ball was kicked by Bob 
It can of course be argued that the two expressions here are not necessarily synonymous, as 
may be understood by the different questions that they may answer to. For instance one may 
utter (iii) or (iv) in response to ‘Who kicked the ball?’, but in response to for instance, ‘What 
happened to the ball?’ it seems that (iv) would be more appropriate than (iii). This is because 
the subject position is occupied by ‘Bob’ in (iii) but in (iv) ‘the ball’ is the subject. Other cases 
of synonymy also appear to be subject to a similar argument. Synonymy appears to be rare in 
human languages. This, it has been argued (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999), may be due to the 
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cognitive principle of “synonymy avoidance”, which “demands that all contrasts in form imply 
a contrast in meaning.”(Hinzen 2006: 136).  Thus we can argue in favour of Horwich that it is 
difficult to find sentences that in fact mean the same, and the meanings of the sentences (iii) 
and (iv) can be explained by their respective construction properties. It is indeed true that 
anyone who understands the two sentences would in fact also recognize that these are closely 
related, and there is a thematic core of meaning of these two sentences which is uniform. 
However, the way that Horwich can account for this is to say that it is a matter of how the 
schemata works in each case. 
Pietroski further points out that it also needs to be explained, for example, why we 
cannot infer from (v) to (vi): 
v. John is too clever to catch a fish 
vi. John is too clever to catch 
although we can infer from (vii) to (viii) 
       vii.      John ate an apple. 
      viii.      John ate. 
We know that (v) means that John is too clever for him to catch a fish, while (vi) means that 
John is too clever for anyone to catch him. Why is it that we don’t interpret (vi) on analogy 
with (viii): assuming that since (viii) means that John ate something, (vi) could mean that John 
is too clever to catch something? He points out that non-ambiguity also needs to be explained; 
we need to explain the negative fact of why, for instance, ‘John is easy to please’ can’t mean 
that ‘It is easy for John to please us’ or ‘The millionaire called the senator from Texas’ mean  
that ‘The millionaire called the senator, and the millionaire is from Texas’.  
We may again note here, however, that Horwich’s position is not necessarily affected 
by examples such as (iii)-(vi). The reason for this is essentially the lack of detail provided in 
Horwich’s argument. There is nothing in his writings that precludes a more detailed account 
of sentence construction. In fact he leaves the details to be worked out by linguists. His point 
is a philosophical one: that we get sentence meaning through word meanings (whatever we 
take word meanings to be) and syntax (or schemata, or combinatorial procedure P: whatever 
such a procedure happens to be). As we saw earlier, he does specify what he takes to be word 
meanings (though his theory of sentence meaning is consistent with anything else we may 
understand by word meanings) but he doesn’t specify the kind of schemata or the details of the 
combinatorial procedure. 
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Thus, consider the contrast between (ix) and (x). Pietroski points out that ‘eager’ and 
‘easy’ differ semantically in an important sense, which cannot be explained simply by saying 
that ‘eager’ means EAGER and easy means EASY. This, however, may be a criticism too harsh 
for the view Horwich is advocating. For Horwich, the meaning properties of ‘eager’ and ‘easy’, 
i.e. EAGER and EASY, would be the use properties of these terms. This plus the construction 
properties of the sentences into which these words enter would perhaps explain the semantic 
difference between the two, notwithstanding all other problems with this theory. 
 (ix)  John is eager to please. 
 (x)   John is easy to please. 
We will consider other criticisms of Horwich again in the next section. At this point we 
may conclude provisionally that Horwich’s account may not be affected by the arguments 
levelled against it, simply by virtue of the lack of details provided in it and his actual goals. His 
position can be strengthened by just filling in the required details and there is nothing in his 
account that prevents such strengthening. His focus has been mainly to make a philosophical 
point and not to provide detailed grammatical explanations. 
3.4 A Defence of Horwich 
So far, we have acquired the general picture of Horwich’s theory. In Section 3.2 we discussed 
Horwich’s position that meanings of words are their use properties. We noted the kind of 
entities Horwich calls use properties, and pointed out various objections to his position. Then 
in section 3.3 we considered his claim that sentence meanings are arrived at trivially from word 
meanings when we assume compositionality. Again we pointed out objections to this claim 
and tried to respond on Horwich’s behalf. In this section, we shall try to build a defense for 
Horwich by first taking a closer look at what he means by use-properties, and revisiting the 
objections raised in section 3.2.1 Then we will consider his claims regarding sentence meaning 
and see whether we can strengthen the response to objections raised in section 3.3.2. 
3.4.1 Use-Properties: Implicit Definition and Rule following 
As we noted in section 3.2, Horwich argues that word meanings are use properties. By use 
properties he means law-like regularities of use. These law-like regularities are not explicit 
rules we are aware of, but rather implicit ones, as noted in section 3.2. To call them implicit 
doesn’t amount to saying that we unconsciously follow them either (as we could be 
unconsciously following explicit rules): rather “no formulation of the rule is directly 
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operative.” (Horwich 2010b: 115) So here the following problem arises: since there is no 
formulation of the rule, it is difficult to see what the facts might be in virtue of which someone 
would be implicitly following a given rule. We don’t see what would count as a violation of 
the rule. This problem is not specific to language: there are rules that have nothing to do with 
word meanings (e.g. the amount of distance to maintain while talking to someone). Even within 
language – there are various kinds of rules: meaning determining rules of use, those instructing 
us to conform our meanings with the community, rules of epistemic justification, rules dictating 
that we try to accept only those sentences that are true. (Horwich 2010b) 
Horwich suggests that a person S implicitly follows a rule R if and only if 
G1. S’s activity is governed by the ideal law R 
G2. There is some tendency for S to correct instances of non-conformity (i.e. to react 
against his initial inclinations) 
He notes (Horwich 2010a) that it’s far from obvious that each of us knows, independently of 
any sophisticated empirical research, which rules we are implicitly following. The most we can 
be expected to detect through introspection are occasional inclinations and disinclinations to 
do this or that particular thing. The underlying rule is available to us only via objective methods 
of inquiry that are equally open to everyone else. Thus the isolation of the explanatorily basic 
rule of use is a matter of empirical enquiry. So objection F1 and F4 above are taken care of: as 
he argues that the meaning constituting property is one which explains these acceptance 
phenomena – the words’ basic rule of use.  But it is an empirical discovery, often quite hard to 
make, which particular rule is the explanatorily basic one for the use of any given word. The 
second part of objection 1 is directly answered as he claims that 
‘meanings=concepts=properties’ (Horwich 1998:4). 
The question raised in F2 (what does ‘underived propensity to accept’ mean, or what 
does Horwich mean when he says that these use-properties are accepted underived) is diluted 
when we take into account his distinction between explicit and implicit definitions as noted 
above. So these use-properties do have the nature of a definition, but they are implicit 
definitions rather than explicit ones. In case of explicit definitions, we can raise the question, 
how do we come to acquire or accept that particular definition, but in the case of implicit 
definitions, this question does not arise, as it is a matter of empirical inquiry which sentence 
(or rule) we accept as the implicit definition. It may be argued that empirical inquiry will then 
ask how we acquire this sort of behaviour, so that the question seems to arise all over again. In 
other words, we may ask: how is it that we come to accept an implicit definition? How far can 
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this question be answered by claiming that it is a matter of empirical inquiry? It may be a matter 
of empirical inquiry which particular sentence we come to accept as the implicit definition, but 
saying that still does not explain why we come to accept it at all. As we will note later, saying 
that we do in fact accept certain sentences underived does not explain why we do so; and it is 
such behavior that we need to explain in case we want an explanatorily adequate theory. 
Further, he notes that if rule following is involved in the constitution of meaning, then it is 
plausibly always a matter of implicit rule following. This avoids the regress that would result 
if we accept that some terms are a case of explicit rule following: we would not know how to 
account for which are basic. Regarding objection F3, he argues that “one should not expect to 
be able to derive a word’s extension directly from its meaning constituting property… Because 
of the plausibility of the deflationary view of the truth theoretic notions, ‘true’, ‘refers’ and 
‘true of’.” (Horwich 2010: 131) Horwich does not deny that a word’s meaning constituting 
property fixes its extension but argues that it does so only because it first fixes the word’s 
meaning. In F3, we had raised the point that we need an account of how to sort which word 
into which kind of meaning property, in order to fix its reference or extension. Here, however, 
we are pointing out with Horwich, that the way the use property fixes a word’s extension is by 
first fixing its meaning. Whatever the kind of extension a word has, whether it is a law of logic, 
a visual property etc., we obtain such information through the word’s meaning. Meaning, thus, 
comes before reference. It may be argued however, that for Horwich meaning is inherently 
dependent upon what uses of expressions people accept and what they regard as true. So if we 
do not have a notion of meaning independently of this, then isn’t truth or extension fixing the 
meaning? But as Horwich points out, the difference between what people accept as true and 
truth itself is important to note here. We need to distinguish a disposition (to accept a certain 
statement) from an occurrence (Fodor and Lepore 2001) or acceptance from truth. To say for 
instance that we have a disposition to accept the equivalence schema is not to say that the 
equivalence schema is true. However, simply to stop at the claim that we have a certain 
disposition is to ignore interesting and perhaps significant questions as to why that is so.  
Another objection we mentioned in F4 raised by Collins (2001), regarding examples 
such as male nurse, can now be analyzed in light of Horwich’s whole theory. If we keep in 
mind the difference in the way in which we arrive at word meanings and sentence meanings, 
examples like this would not be a problem. This is because male nurse is a compositional 
structure, the meaning of which would be determined according to the particular schemata as 
well as the meaning of the individual words. The problem with male nurse was that it does not 
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fall within the paradigm associated with either ‘nurse’ or ‘male’, but as we already noted, 
Horwich distances himself from the prototype theory. Further, in light of how Horwich explains 
sentence meaning, it is clear that the meaning of the compound would be determined in 
accordance with the relevant schema, and the meanings of the words (whether use properties, 
paradigms, referents or whatever else) can then be inserted. There would, in this case, be no 
problem as ‘male nurse’ need not have a paradigm, and the meaning of the compound would 
simply be compositionally determined. But the problem for Collins was that here (and in 
Horwich’s theory in general) what constitutes the meaning of the complex does not express 
what constitutes the meaning of its parts, and thus we do not get the meaning of the sentence 
in terms of its parts. For Collins, it is compositionality that needs explanation. In the next sub-
section, 5.2, we will consider in greater detail Horwich’s stance on compositionality. 
3.4.2 Sentences: Entailment, Compositionality and Truth Theoretic Accounts 
Now we may look at the objections mentioned in section 3.3.2. Horwich (2008) argues against 
the idea that semantics needs to account for the following: 
H1. Conceptual relations among sentences (such as entailment. For instance that we 
need to know how examples (iii) and (iv) above are related, and also how (v) and (vi) 
are not.) 
H2. That the meanings of sentences (as characterized theoretically) is explained on the 
basis of the theoretically-characterized meanings of their parts and how those parts are 
combined (i.e. Collins and Pietroski’s claim that compositionality needs to be 
explained.) 
H3. The fact that a sentence means what it does is identified with a truth-theoretic fact 
of some kind. 
Regarding (H1) he argues that “we cannot account for facts of entailment by reference 
to truth-theoretic properties of the expressions involved. For the explanatory level of these 
semantically characterized properties is no deeper (but is in fact somewhat more superficial) 
than the level of the phenomena they are being invoked to explain.” (Horwich 2010: 147) 
Secondly, “it’s highly questionable whether the determinants of what our logical terms mean 
coincide (even remotely) with the logical facts that they enable us to articulate. Our meaning 
what we do by ‘‘neutrino’’ is no guarantee of the truth of neutrino theory...And similarly our 
meaning what we do by ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, etc. does not fix what the logical facts are” (Horwich 
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2010: 148). So it is also questionable whether and how the formalization in truth-theoretic 
terms is related to our natural language sentences. 
Regarding (H2) he argues that compositionality is not so difficult to accommodate: by 
identifying the meaning-constitutive property of a compositional sentence with its construction 
property. The consequence of this view is that: (a) compositionality would not require a 
substantive explanation as it will be trivially easy to deduce sentence meaning from its structure 
and the particular word meanings; (b) compositionality won’t constrain the nature of word 
meanings. Further, Horwich’s account can be strengthened by adding a detailed account of how 
the syntax determines meaning, when we already possess a lexicon (word meaning). We shall 
consider such a position in the next section. 
Regarding (H3) above: that semantics must be truth theoretic, Horwich argues, in line 
with other deflationary accounts, that meaning is more fundamental than truth: “the basic rule 
we follow in our use of “true” is to apply it to a statement, s, when we take s to have the same 
content (i.e. meaning) as something we are already disposed to assert… But it presupposes that 
we be able to recognize ‘sameness of meaning’. Thus the concept, MEANING, is more 
fundamental that the concept, TRUTH. We must therefore renounce the orthodox assumption 
that sentence meanings are to be analyzed in terms of truth conditions.” (Horwich 2010: 17) 
Rather for Horwich, the facts that semantics is meant to explain are facts concerning 
circumstances in which sentences are accepted. Facts concerning inferences are included in 
such acceptance facts. And it is not clear how truth theoretic semantics could account for them: 
how do you move from “the fact that S1’s truth conditions are amongst S2’s to the fact that 
someone is disposed to infer S2 from S1?”(Horwich 2010: 153) unless you add the thesis that 
any speaker of the language knows these facts. But this would involve infinite regress as the 
explanatory inferences will have to be explained in terms of knowledge of the meanings of the 
language in which they are conducted (Mentalese42). 
A move to avoid the regress is to claim that our knowledge of referents and truth 
conditions is implicit. But then how would we account for such knowledge? He argues that the 
central truth theoretic properties and relations - truth, being true of, reference – are reducible 
to acceptance phenomena at the non-semantic level. We could for instance suppose, he argues, 
“roughly speaking—that the correlation between English and Mentalese terms becomes 
                                                          
42 The term Mentalese refers to the mental language in which we think, or in which thought is represented, and 
processed, in the brain, i.e. Fodor’s Language of Thought (1975). 
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hardwired and feeds into an automatic translation procedure—a mechanism whereby, when a 
Mentalese sentence is in the belief box, then an English sentence (one possessing the same 
structure, but imposed instead on the correlated English terms) is caused to go into the ‘‘To 
say’’ box?”(Horwich 2010: 157) 
In fact he explicitly mentions (1998: 86-87) that he regards Chomsky’s contention that 
meaning may have to do with internal states of the brain as ‘quite plausible’.43 However, the 
internal states he suggests meanings are related to, are dispositions. He argues that given that 
what are to be explained are phenomena of sentence-acceptance, the primary explaining facts 
(namely, the meanings of words) should also be facts of acceptance. For we have a model—
namely, inference—of how a person’s acceptance of some sentences can cause his acceptance 
of others. Thus what needs to be explained on this view is not that certain inferences are valid 
or rational, but rather that certain inferences are made (or would be made). 
We may here briefly consider Horwich’s disagreement with Chomsky’s picture. If 
Horwich’s account can be made to reconcile with Chomsky, it would certainly gain explanatory 
power, but would it still remain a use theory of meaning in any technical sense? 
3.4.3  Horwich and the Chomskian Programme 
Horwich makes a claim that sets his enterprise apart from Chomsky’s. To understand this, we 
need to elaborate on the outline of Chomsky’s picture provided in section 1.4. Horwich (2003) 
argues for what he calls a ‘very simple picture’ of the language faculty’, one which he claims 
is a simpler, more minimalist account than Chomsky’s picture. He claims that he shares the 
following assumptions with Chomsky: (a) that each human being has a faculty of language FL 
as a component of his mind/brain; (b) the possible states of FL, L1, L2, L3… are possible I-
languages; (c) each state L is a computational procedure that generates infinitely many 
expressions E1, E2…; (d) each expression E is a pairing of a phonetic and a semantic object 
<PHON(E), SEM(E)> which through their respective interaction with the 
perceptual/articulatory (P/A) and the conceptual intentional system (C/I) determine an 
association of a sound with a thought; (e) these PHON-SEM pairs are constructed from lexical 
items, LI1, LI2,.., and (f) these lexical items are stored in a lexicon which is accessed by the 
computational procedures that form I-expressions. (Horwich 2003: 165) 
                                                          
43 In the next section we consider Horwich’s disagreement with Chomsky. 
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He suggests that lexical items should be understood as pairings of I-sounds and formal 
properties which indicate the ‘functional type’ to which the lexical item belongs. So in his 
picture, there are such lexical items,<I-sound, formal properties>. These are combined 
according to certain schemata, combinatorial procedures that specify the type and order of 
constructions. The expressions so computed is a pairing of a phonetic and a semantic object 
<PHON(E), SEM(E)> , which through their respective interaction with the 
perceptual/articulatory (P/A) and the conceptual intentional system (C/I) determine an 
association of a sound with a thought. 
This is his major distinction from Chomsky’s picture, as for Chomsky, “lexical items 
consist not merely of I-sounds (and their formal properties), but of I-sounds paired with I-
meanings (and their formal properties); and (b) that the input to and output of the C/I system –
namely SEM(E) is constructed not from I-sounds but from I-meanings” (Ibid, 170) 
So what Horwich appears to be changing about Chomsky’s picture is the I-meanings, 
which he claims are inessential, ‘an extra layer of complexity’ (Ibid, 172). He understands I-
meanings to be ‘conceptual roles’ which are explicitly represented in FL. He argues however, 
that all that is required is that “when the sound appears C/I is already in the state required to 
understand it.”(Ibid, 173) We may ask: what would facilitate C/I’s being in such a state? 
Horwich suggests that C/I would be in such a state if the I-meanings were composed of their 
(implicit) definitions: where “I-meanings take the relatively liberal, flexible form of the 
specification of a regularity of use, rather than the relatively constrained form of an orthodox 
explicit definition.” (Ibid, 171), for instance, if “the conceptual role of a mental tem “f” consists 
in the underived acceptance within C/I of certain sentences, “#f” containing it.” (Ibid, 172). As 
he clarifies, “the idea is that the meanings of I-sounds are constituted by such regularities, 
which are exemplified in C/I.” (Ibid, 177)  
Here Horwich appears to be modifying the nature of I-meanings, in line with his 
understanding of word meanings which we discussed earlier, rather than getting rid of I-
meanings completely. As Chomsky points out in his reply to Horwich (2003), and I tend to 
agree, it is a matter of choosing ‘regularity of use’ as opposed to semantically interpretable 
formal features, as constituting I-meanings. Chomsky points out two problems with the idea of 
regularity of use: firstly that I-sound to which regularities are paired, and PHON(E) are distinct, 
with a one-many or many to many relation. “Thus, semantic properties of persuade appear in 
“persuasive” and “persuasion,” though I-sound has different images in PHON(E)… In so far 
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as we speak of “regularity of use,” it has to be assigned to the underlying element that has these 
manifestations in PHON(E): its lexical item.” (Chomsky, 2003: 300)  
A further and greater problem is that “regularity” cannot explain or contribute to 
“acquisition of semantic or other aspects of language”. As poverty of stimulus arguments 
suggest, the acquisition of word meanings is very rapid and proceeds under highly ambiguous 
conditions. In other words, children are able to develop their language skills almost 
automatically, with very little exposure to language. In fact, children exposed solely to pidgin 
or deficient grammatical forms of language are able to develop a full grammatically rich 
language, creole, within a single generation (Pinker 1994). Further, experience is shaped by 
internal aspects specific to the organism. To put it differently, our biology constrains our 
various capacities: human beings normally can, for instance, hear sounds only between 16 
Hertz to 20,000 Hertz, though dogs would have different experience of sounds as their range 
of hearing is normally 40 hertz to 60,000 hertz. Similarly, in the case of other capacities, our 
experience is constrained by our specific organic makeup as human beings. It would thus 
follow that the regularities we perceive are also determined by our inner aspects. In fact, often, 
we choose properties that lack regularities, even with overwhelming regularities in experience, 
such as in the case of children exposed to pidgin developing creole for instance. So a single 
experience of a bicycle being ridden, for example, may lead us to conclude that bicycles are 
for riding, though we may have mostly seen the bicycle being used as an umbrella holder on 
multiple prior occasions. And we choose to ignore all other factors common to that experience: 
the person, the place, the weather etc. (Chomsky 2003: 300-301)  
Aside from problems with the notion of regularities of use, I-meanings, or rather 
semantically interpretable formal features, are salient. It is these features which determine the 
syntactic frames in which a lexical item can appear, and help distinguish between lexical items 
that appear in similar frames, for example that ‘persuade’ has a causative feature . It is these 
features that help us for instance to distinguish between ‘persuade’ and ‘expect’. 
Thus Horwich’s argument, that we can give up I-meanings in favour of regularities of 
use, does not seem to hold its ground. Horwich accepts the rest of the Chomskian picture, apart 
from the introduction of regularities of use. ‘Regularities of use’ is a notion central to his use 
theory. If we give it up, then what is left of his picture can easily be reconciled with Chomsky, 
and in fact would not be very different from Chomsky’s position. As the above discussion 
suggests, Horwich only added regularities of use to the existing Chomskian framework of I-
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sounds and (semantically interpretable) formal features (or I-meanings). So, if we abandon the 
addition of regularities of use, the theory that remains is identical to that of Chomsky’s and is 
no longer a ‘use theory of meaning’. Chomsky, however, regards himself as a general use 
theorist, so what is left of Horwich’s theory may be a use theory in the general sense in which 
biolinguistics is also a use theory of meaning: through shedding light on what the ability to use 
language is. But what remains is no longer a ‘use theory’ in the sense of explaining meaning 
through systematizing use. Here the distinction to note is that between the ability to use 
language, i.e. our language faculty, and the use of that faculty, i.e. language use itself. This is 
on the lines of the competence-performance distinction that Chomsky stresses. And there is a 
further distinction between the general use of language and the specific use itself which goes 
towards explaining the meaning, within a use theory of meaning. This distinction is one akin 
to that between performance and what the performance signifies. Here following Wittgenstein, 
we may claim that you cannot say anything about the meaning of a word except to show it 
through use: in other words, Wittgenstein went back to performance in order to explain its 
significance. For Chomsky the answers lie in the ability to use language, in the study of the 
faculty of language itself. We thought, to begin with, that Horwich was adding to this picture 
by systematizing use, or the actual performance itself. However, we now find that what can be 
saved from his theory, while avoiding contradictions, is Chomskian and not use-theoretic. This 
suggests that Horwich’s additions to the standard Minimalist picture are vacuous, and the use 
theory doesn’t add anything. We shall revisit this problem in section 6 below.44  
3.4.4 Behaviorism 
Let us now come back to the charge of behaviorism, an additional objection to his theory 
(mentioned earlier at the end of section 3.2): whether considering the meaning/use property as 
a ‘non-semantic property’, commits him to a kind of behaviourism. Horwich has been accused, 
for instance by Boghossian (1993), of behaviorism, by being attributed with the following 
premise: ‘the meanings attributed in folk psychology are purely behaviorally constituted 
properties, properties whose attribution presupposes nothing about the character and nature of 
the mind/brain that underlies linguistic activity.’ (1993:140) 
                                                          
44 We may note however, that the problem of systematizing use or focusing on the actual performance in the above 
competence/performance/significance distinction may lie within this characterization of use as performance, i.e. 
within the fleeting nature of use itself. The use aspect only lasts as long as utterance, the moment we start to 
analyze the sentence or how we understand it, we move towards either significance or competence. We shall take 
this argument up again in a different chapter. 
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Boghossian gives two main arguments against behaviorism: 
I1. We could construe meaning properties mentalistically and still give a 
satisfactory account of the epistemology of other minds. 
I2. there is no way to reconstruct what I now mean by an expression from my actual 
behavior with it right now – that behavior is consistent with my following an infinite 
number of rules. 
However, the attribution of behaviourism to Horwich seems rather inaccurate. As we noted 
briefly above, Horwich would not object to a Chomsky-like internalism, and the only reason 
why he does not talk in these terms is that he wants to confine himself to ‘ordinary’ speech. 
Infact, Horwich sees a way of simply introducing or adding use properties to the Chomskian 
picture, notwithstanding the various problems with such a move, also noted above. But, given 
the various problems with combining Chomskian internalism with Horwich, we need not even 
invoke Chomskian internalism here. Meaning properties are for Horwich, accepted underived, 
although they are in no way a priori. As noted in section 3.2, Horwich (1998) gives a 
dispositional account of these properties. Thus the acceptance is not simply a behavior, but is 
rooted in a disposition for such acceptance. Regarding objection (I2), as we noted above, he 
argues that isolating the meaning constituting property of the expression is a matter of empirical 
enquiry. In any case, within Horwich’s theory, it is not the actual behavior with an expression 
at any point in time, but rather an ‘underived acceptance’ of a certain use property which 
constitutes the meaning of the term. So while the use properties are not simply a matter of 
behavior and are rooted in deeper dispositions, they are at the same time empirically 
determined. 
We saw in this section that once we consider all the aspects of Horwich’s theory, we 
can overcome many of the objections raised in previous sections. Moreover, supplementing 
Horwich’s account with biolinguistics can help his theory sidestep objections as well as make 
it stronger and more explanatory. However, it compromises his use-theoretic stance. Thus far, 
we have tried to present the strongest version of Horwich’s theory, which can withstand many 
objections. In the next section we will attempt to put forth an objection to his theory. 
3.5 Formulating a Stronger Objection to Horwich 
We have noticed that Horwich overcomes many of the objections to his theory through his 
account of the distinct ways in which we arrive at word meanings and sentence meanings. So 
for him, word meanings are arrived at through use conditions, and to arrive at sentence 
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meanings all we need are word meanings and the principle of compositionality. He argues, as 
we saw, that this is compatible with any particular kinds of meanings we give to words: whether 
we take word meanings to be concepts, referents, use properties, or whatever else. Thus from 
word meanings, assuming a combinatorial principle, we can trivially deduce sentence 
meanings.  
Further the kind of meanings that words have amounts to use properties of the following 
kind:  
The word ““bache1or”’s meaning is engendered by our underived acceptance of the sentence: 
“The bachelors are the unmarried men”” (Horwich 2004:351). Now let’s try and understand 
this a bit further. The meaning of “bachelor” comes from our acceptance of a particular 
sentence. The definition is special for the following reasons:  
J1. It is in some sense generally accepted. 
J2. It is accepted underived.  
So this is an improvement from the traditional definitional accounts as it deals with a 
phenomena of acceptance, thereby averting many traditional problems. This is what Horwich 
calls an implicit definition. It avoids the flaws of any explicit definitional account of meaning, 
as we are not equating the meaning of x with the definition y; rather we claim that it is through 
accepting #x (where #x stands for the implicit definition or sentence containing x, as was our 
convention earlier) that we get the meaning of x. 
This seems perfectly acceptable so far. However, if we add to this the way in which we 
get the meaning of a sentence, we again run into inconsistency. To get the meaning of the 
sentence we need: 
K1. the meanings of words and, 
K2. the combinatorial principle that combines them into a sentence.  
So the meaning of #x would depend on the principle P1 and the meanings of terms including 
x. Now perhaps we can see that the acceptance fact of accepting #x is not that simple. The 
problem isn’t simply that we need to accept some sentences underived, or that we already need 
to know the meaning of x in order to accept #x for instance. These are problems he deals with 
and accepts to some extent (see for instance Horwich 1998: 61-62). He argues that the use 
theory requires a certain degree of meaning interdependence, but this is to be distinguished 
from Quinian indeterminacy: that there can be no objective fact of the matter whether a given 
property is or is not what constitutes the meaning of the word. I believe the problem is rather 
deeper. 
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In order to accept the sentence #x, which gives us the implicit definition or the use 
property, we need  
L1. to at least understand the meaning of #x; and  
L2. in order to achieve (L1) according to Horwich’s theory, we need to already know 
the meaning of the terms including x, as well as the combinatorial principle.  
This is fine so far, but then what use is the use property #x in providing us the meaning 
of the term x? We could have just said for instance that in order to use the term x, in any 
particular instance, we already need to (implicitly) know the meaning of the term. So 
Horwich’s use properties would not have a superior status over any other use we make of the 
term.  
Alternatively, if we argue, as Horwich does, that the use properties are accepted 
underived, and must not be analyzed further, how is it that we get the meaning of a word from 
the underived sentence? In order to get the meaning of the word, the sentence must be 
understood compositionally, in a non-trivial sense. With a deflationary account, we would not 
be able to arrive at the meaning of the term at all. And if the use-property sentence is understood 
compositionally, then there appears to be no reason for claiming that in the case of all other 
sentences, compositionality is trivial. 
Thus we can either give a substantive account of compositionality and explain both the 
‘derived’ and the ‘underived’ sentences, thereby removing such a classification. Use properties 
would then be redundant. Alternatively, the underived sentences would not be able to give us 
the meaning of the term they are supposed to implicitly define, and if they are ‘accepted 
underived’ then why that is so or what use they have in a theory remains to be explained. 
To say that certain use properties can be raised to the level of implicit definitions simply 
because they are for instance ‘generally accepted underived’ doesn’t do any more than name a 
phenomenon that seeks explanation. One way to explain this ‘acceptance phenomena’ would 
be to say that in these particular cases, we seem to be deriving45 the meaning of the word from 
its position in the sentence. So here compositionality is no longer trivial. But, if this is the case, 
then there seems to be no reason for assuming that compositionality is sometimes a trivial 
principle and at other times it is not. In other words, we should admit that from any and all uses 
                                                          
45 Horwich (1998) argues rather that the particular use property sentence constitutes the meaning of the word, and 
no further step of derivation is required. But this, as we just pointed out, is precisely what we need to explain. 
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of the term x, it may be possible for us to derive the meaning of the term. Therefore, if 
compositionality is not trivial, then we need not have special use properties at all in order to 
derive the meaning of terms. 
Thus, the problem arises in the following steps: 
I. For Horwich the meaning of  the word x is constituted by the implicit definition #x 
(a particular sentence which contains x) which he claims is accepted underived. 
II. The meaning of a sentence, for Horwich is derived from the meanings of the words 
along with the combinatorial principle P. 
III. So to understand the meaning of the sentence #x, we must also understand the 
meanings of the words in the sentence as well as the combinatorial principle P. 
IV. This would amount to saying that we already need to know the meaning of a word 
in order to understand the implicit definition (or any sentence containing that word). 
V. But Horwich would argue that the implicit definition is accepted underived and 
cannot be analyzed further. 
VI. If this is so, the question arises: how do we get the meaning of the word x from the 
sentence #x? 
VII. To get the meaning of the word from the sentence, the sentence #x (or the implicit 
definition) must be understood compositionally in a non-trivial sense, which makes 
it possible for us to derive the meaning of the word from its position in the sentence. 
VIII. But Horwich gives a deflationary account of compositionality, where there is no 
connection between sentence construction (dependent on the construction property 
or combinatorial principle) and word meanings (derived from use properties). 
IX. Thus, from (VII) and (VIII) above, it appears that in the case of implicit definitions 
we understand the sentence compositionally in a non-trivial sense, but in all other 
cases compositionality is trivial. 
To avoid falling into such inconsistency, we could say either (I) that compositionality 
is always trivial or (II) that it is not in any case. 
M1.  If compositionality is in every case non-trivial, then we can in general derive the 
meanings of words (at least partially in every case) from their position in any sentence. 
So in this case implicit definitions are no longer special. 
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M2. If compositionality is always trivial, including the case of implicit definitions, then 
we have no way of getting the meaning of the words from the implicit definition 
sentences. 
Horwich appears to be defending his theory from a similar objection raised by Fodor 
and Lepore (in Horwich 2001: 379): 
(1) A complex’s meaning what it does is determined by its structure and the meanings 
of its words. 
(2) A complex’s G-property46 is not determined by its structure and the G-properties of 
its words. (This is supported by examples: – e.g. the stereotype associated with ‘pet 
fish’ is 
not determined by the stereotypical pet and the stereotypical fish). 
(3) Therefore, the meaning of an expression is not engendered by its G-property. 
But there is a hole in this line of thought. No matter what is substituted for ‘G’, the argument 
is valid only in the presence of a further premise: the following Uniformity Assumption 
If the meanings of words are engendered by their G-properties, then so are the meanings 
of complexes. (Horwich 2001: 379) 
Without that assumption the most one can conclude from (1) and (2) is that either the meanings 
of words aren’t engendered by their G-properties, or the meanings of complexes aren’t. Thus 
it would be perfectly coherent for someone to deny the Uniformity Assumption and maintain 
that whereas the meanings of words are engendered by their inferential roles (say), the 
meanings of complexes are constituted in some other way. (Horwich 2001:379-80) 
But we can see that this response does not apply to our current argument. We do not 
assume any uniformity thesis. Our claim is rather that a substantive account of compositionality 
is needed in order to derive meanings of words from use properties, or rather for explaining 
acceptance properties. Either we need such an account, or use properties are rendered useless 
within the theory as all we need to say is that in using terms, we already need to have an implicit 
knowledge of their meaning (as we noted earlier in this section, Horwich does admit to a degree 
of meaning interdependence, and so he may not see this as an objection: but again this points 
to the need of a substantive account for his theory). In fact, even in case we admit a substantive 
                                                          
46 Here a G-property refers to that property which engenders the meaning of a word: it could be its inferential role, 
associated stereotype, recognitional capacity, etc. 
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account of compositionality, such an account could be given in each particular use of the term, 
again rendering use-properties useless. There would, as noted above, be no difference between 
a ‘derived’ and ‘underived’ sentence in this case. In other words, we would be able to arrive at 
the meaning of the term compositionally in any instance of use. Thus it appears that the only 
claim that Horwich should be making, even from his modest non-scientific, philosophical 
position is that we already (implicitly) need to know the meaning (which for Horwich consists 
in the acceptance of the relevant use property sentence) of a word in order to understand a 
sentence, and the meaning of a sentence is derived compositionally from the meaning of words 
and the combinatorial principle. 
3.6 Conclusion 
We started out hoping that Horwich’s account would provide us with a way of systematizing a 
use theory. However, now that we have analysed his account, in its weaknesses and strengths, 
we note that to strengthen the account in the ways suggested, would render the use-theoretic 
aspect useless. Given the objection noted in the previous section, even at the end of our analyses 
of his theory, we seem to be in need of a way of systematically identifying the 
semantically/syntactically relevant use properties. If this is the case, then why do we need to 
invoke use properties at all if everything that the use theory actually does can be done without 
such properties? We seem to need, minimally, the semantically/syntactically relevant features, 
which may be directly available from the lexicon. In this case, we could simply abandon 
Horwich’s account to adopt a more explanatory account, such as Chomsky’s for instance, and 
still not lose the philosophical position that Horwich wants to advocate (though all that would 
be left of this position would be that which was already a part of the Chomskian enterprise to 
begin with, as suggested in section 3.4.3). In the next chapter, we will look at Borg’s approach 
towards exploring this route further. 
 Thus it appears that we have the option of adopting a stronger theory, with the same 
philosophical import, but here ‘use’ remains as much in need of explanation as when we started 
our analysis. Is this a problem with the concept itself, or only with the way we have so far 
approached it? Before we return to this problem, in the next chapter, we will carry forward the 
above argument, abandoning use theory in favour of a more Chomskian approach.  
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3.8 Conclusions Towards Our Original Intuitions 
Before we move ahead in our work, we need to consider here how the above discussion on 
Horwich contributes towards our original intuitions. We set out on this project in search of a 
theory that is both internally significant and can account for the aboutness inherent in language. 
In other words, we started out seeking a theory that would answer to both internalist as well as 
externalist intuitions. We then took up a study of Wittgenstein’s writings towards this end, and 
a reinterpretation of a crucial element of his work (the concept of determinate relation) led us 
to a possible way in which these two aspects can be connected within a theory: if there is an 
element of use already present in what constitutes a proposition.47  From our discussion in this 
chapter, we can see that Horwich informs this reinterpretation: use-properties as word 
meanings provide a possible way for use to be incorporated into what constitutes a proposition. 
As the thesis progresses, we will see whether we can build a consistent position which 
incorporates use properties as a ‘content internal’ understanding of meaning. In the next 
chapter, we pursue an opposite, externalist position: we try to see whether such a position, 
which argues against contextual access, is consistent and explanatory and whether we can gain 
something from it.  
Again, to review the insights we have so far: with Wittgenstein, we saw that there is a 
way to understand use as constitutive of meaning. The determinate relation or grammar which 
constitutes a proposition can (as with later Wittgenstein) include use of a word, or rules of use, 
thereby making use constitutive of meaning, at least in terms of serving as a background for 
understanding language48. With Horwich’s claims of systematizing use, we started out 
expecting a systematic way of arriving at and explaining use-properties, which are constitutive 
of the meaning of a word. However, by the end of our discussion of Horwich, we could see 
that Horwich was not able to fulfil our aim within the confines of his theory. We noted various 
problems with his theory, especially problems related to consistency of the theory as a whole. 
Although use-properties can’t be consistently explained within the parameters of 
Horwich’s theory, I would like to retain this element of his work to be revisited later. This is 
because Horwich’s use-properties could potentially be useful for us in our quest to see how use 
can be constitutive of meaning. It was important for us to consider not just Horwich’s use 
properties in isolation, but within the context of the rest of his theory, including deflated 
                                                          
47 See section 2.2 for details. 
48 See discussion of background in section 2.3 above 
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compositionality – to see whether they form a consistent whole. Having now considered the 
theory in all its aspects, we can just pick what we wish to retain (i.e. use-properties) while 
discarding the rest. 
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Chapter 4: Reference and Context Dependence in a 
Minimal Semantic Theory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
We claimed with Wittgenstein that elements of use (use in a context, rules of use etc.) creep in 
to what constitutes a proposition. Now we try to see whether there is a minimal level of 
significance devoid of intrusions from use. Semantic Minimalism (Borg 2004, 2012; Cappelen 
and Lepore 2005a, b) claims to offer such a theory. Borg (2004, 2012) in particular, defends 
an externalist referential account of minimal propositions against both internalism and 
contextualism.  
Why this is interesting for us at this point in the development of our thesis is because it 
will enable us to see whether an externalist referential account, involving minimal propositions, 
could answer to our original intuitions requiring both an internalist and externalist explanation. 
In other words, if, apart from experiencing Reality, all that we have to access Reality is 
language, then how is it that we are able to reach out to the world, while being confined to the 
domain of language. A referential account of minimal propositions might serve our purpose 
here. Contextualism poses a special challenge to such an account arguing for instance that there 
is no minimal semantic level devoid of contextual input. Borg’s argument against 
contextualism is also her argument in defence of her minimalist position, and for 
propositionalism. She understands the latter as posing the biggest challenge for her position. In 
order for all well-formed declarative sentences to express a complete (although minimal) 
proposition, there must be no such sentences that fail to express complete propositions prior to 
contextual input. To understand her position better, we need to understand what she is pitting 
herself against, and therefore we discuss Contextualism as well as arguments against 
Contextualism.  
As noted above, in chapter 2 we saw, with Wittgenstein, or rather with our interpretation 
of Wittgenstein, that elements of use already creep into what constitutes a proposition. Our task 
in what follows is therefore to see whether there is, consequently, no minimal level of 
significance devoid of intrusions from use. In other words, if we were to understand a sentence 
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(or a proposition) as constituted by a structural element (syntax), and an element of meaning 
(semantics), could these stand alone or constitute a complete proposition (one that can then be 
compared with reality to determine its truth value), without accounting for any elements of use 
(pragmatics) or the context of utterance (contextualists)? We also saw, particularly with 
Wittgenstein’s analogy with music (which is that we must understand language the way we 
understand music and not the other way round), that there must be significant sense in which 
language (or a sentence) ‘conveys itself’. We saw that there is a way of understanding language 
which is internal to the domain of language.  We considered use theory in chapter 3. The 
position we now consider, in order to test the validity of our intuitions, is an externalist theory 
that argues against contextualist intrusions to a minimal semantic level of interpretation. A 
good candidate for such a theory is Borg’s Semantic Minimalism (2004,2012). 
When I utter the sentence, ‘I am extremely hungry’ to a friend, I expect her to 
understand that here ‘I’ refers to me, and by this utterance I mean that I am hungry right now, 
and even perhaps intend for her to infer that we should go get something to eat. So the meaning 
of the utterance (in a broad sense) would be different depending on the person who uttered the 
sentence and the time of the utterance and the occasion of utterance. In fact radical 
contextualists49 (e.g. Travis 1975, 2008), argue that there is no (semantic) content available 
prior to contextual access.50 
In this chapter we will, firstly, attempt to see whether there is a minimal semantic level 
of explanation possible in such cases, or even at all. It will be our task here to see how much 
of the context can or even should be removed from an understanding of minimal semantic 
content, and what features a minimal semantic theory, if possible at all, should have. Secondly, 
we will try to see whether minimal semantics can (or even should) include a referential 
                                                          
49 Radical contextualism, as the formulation here suggests, is the theory that there is no context free level of 
understanding an utterance. To claim this however is not to say for instance that for Radical Contextualists, 
statements with indexicals and without are treated at par (as Bezuidenhout (2006) clarifies, contrary to what 
Cappelan and Lepore 2005a seem to suggest) 
50 Consider a classic example from Travis (1975): “Fred is walking with his young nephew beside a pond where 
a decoy duck is floating. Pointing to the decoy, he says, ‘That’s a duck’. Again we might ask whether what he 
said is true or false. But again, the above description is not enough for us to tell. If Fred has just finished laughing 
at a sportsman who blasted a decoy out of the pond, and if he has been trying to show his nephew how to avoid 
similar mistakes, then what he said is false. But suppose that Fred and his nephew are attending the annual national 
decoy exhibition, and the boy has been having trouble distinguishing ducks from geese. Then what Fred said may 
well be true. It would also be true had Fred said what he did in pointing out the fact that all the other ducks were 
poor copies (perhaps on the order of Donald Duck).” (Travis 1975: 51) The same sentence is judged to be true in 
one case and false in another, depending on the context (or rather for Travis, the occasion) of utterance. We will 
consider the various implications of radical contextualism in section 2.1 and then in section 5. 
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component, which is suggested by Borg (2004), and which gives the theory its externalist 
character. 
To begin, we first need to clarify the terms under discussion. What is ‘Minimal 
Semantics’? Intuitively, it must be a theory which specifies what is minimally required to have 
(semantic) meaning. Borg (2004) interprets the minimal requirements to be that of a formal 
semantic theory, claiming specifically that “it is possible to deliver an account of the 
propositional or truth conditional content of a sentence in natural language simply via formal 
operations over the syntactic features of that sentence, that is, over the lexical items it contains 
and their mode of composition.” (2004: 3) She adds to this a modularity of the mind claim: 
“the mind is composed (at least in part) of discrete, relatively autonomous modules” such that 
these modules “have access to something less than the full range of information which the 
cogniser as a whole possesses.” (2004:7) Given these two claims, she maintains that there is a 
distinct module for semantic processing, governed purely by formally triggered syntactic 
operations, which does not require access to all the (contextual) information regarding the 
utterance which the speaker possesses, and which is able to deliver the literal meaning of (the 
utterance of) a sentence. In other words, all we require is the formal features of a sentence, and 
then the modular mind is able to compute the literal meaning of an utterance, hence giving us 
minimal semantic content. For Borg, even overtly context sensitive terms, like the indexical in 
the example we began with, can be understood as relativized to a context of utterance, but we 
do not need to know the context in order to understand them. For this reason, they can be 
included within the scope of a minimal semantics. We will discuss this further in the next 
section. 
Related to this point, Cappelen and Lepore, henceforth C&L (2005a, b) recognize that 
some terms are inherently context sensitive. For C&L semantic minimalism has the following 
features: 
a) The most salient feature of Semantic Minimalism is that it recognizes few context 
sensitive expressions, and hence, acknowledges a very limited effect of the context of 
utterance on the semantic content of an utterance. The only context sensitive 
expressions are the completely obvious ones (‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘that’, etc., (essentially 
those Kaplan lists in ‘Demonstratives’, (1989, p. 489). These are not only obvious, they 
also pass certain tests for context sensitivity we spell out below.  
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b) It follows that all semantic context sensitivity, insofar as it exists, is grammatically 
(i.e., syntactically or morphemically) triggered. c) Beyond fixing the semantic value of 
these obviously context sensitive expressions, the context of utterance has no effect on 
the proposition semantically expressed. In this sense, the semantic content of a sentence 
S is that proposition that all utterances of S express (when we adjust for or keep stable 
the semantic values of the obvious context sensitive expressions in S).  (C&L 2005b: 
197-98) 
C&L add to this a Speech Act Pluralism to explain the relationship between semantic 
content and speech act content (Cappelen 2005a: 15). Speech Act Pluralism is the belief that 
“No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed or…) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many 
propositions are said, asserted, claimed, or stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, etc.) depends 
on a wide range of factors other than the proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a 
potential infinitude of features of the context of utterance and of the context of those who report 
on (or think about) what was said by the utterance.” (C&L 2005b: 199) 
Thus for C&L it is possible to hold both a story about minimal content (which includes 
some context sensitive terms) and also grant that that content is not the same as what is said, 
rather what is said by an utterance depends hugely on the context of the utterance. This claim 
however, does not undermine their claim that there is minimal semantic content - which is the 
proposition that all utterances of a sentence express. 
In order to hold either of the above claims about minimal semantics (Borg 2004, C&L 
2005a,b) the advocates of these theories must at least do the following: 
A. Defend their minimalist claims against contextualist arguments. 
B.  Defend a propositional account of semantic content. 
C. Specify why their minimal semantic content is referential, i.e., why it involves a 
referential component. 
We shall discuss how far these approaches succeed in these tasks. Beyond the statement 
of the minimal semantic position, Borg (2004, 2007, 2009) goes further to distance herself from 
internalism, which, she claims, advocates that, following Chomsky, “semantic content should 
be specified in entirely internal non-referential terms.” (Borg 2012:148) 
Thus in addition to 1 and 2, Borg must also undertake to: 
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D. Defend an externalist, referential account of semantic content from internalist 
criticisms. 
We will now begin with (A), the defence of formalism over contextualism as offered by these 
versions of minimal semantics. 
4.2 Favouring Formalism over Contextualism 
Formalism concentrates on the formal features of words and sentences whereas Contextualism 
places greater value on the input from context. We can not wish away either element if the 
proposition uttered is to have a truth value. For instance, to know whether “It is raining” is true 
we need to know the place where the utterance takes place. Thus formalism must also allow 
for contextual influences. But the question that arises for formal semanticists is: how much 
intrusion from context should be permissible? A formalist would reply that only those 
contextual intrusions which are triggered by the formal elements of a sentence are semantically 
relevant. Again, however, various formalists differ regarding the kind of syntactically triggered 
contextual elements. C&L for instance allow for a small list of contextually sensitive 
expressions, as noted above. Borg on the other hand claims that even these obviously context 
dependent terms can be interpreted syntactically, in a context neutral way (i.e., they have a kind 
of meaning that is context-independent), and insists that the process of saturation from context 
need not be a part of semantics as such. In making these exclusions from semantics, Borg 
severely restricts its scope. We will, in what follows, try to understand whether Borg’s 
formalism (semantic minimalism) is warranted, even within its modest claims. For this, we 
first note the traditional case for contextualism, then we look at Borg’s arguments against it. 
We then move on to evidence from linguistic processing in favour of contextualism and see 
whether this is able to counter Borg’s argument. 
4.2.1 The Case for Contextualism 
Traditionally, the case for contextualism involves arguments from context shifting, 
incompleteness and inappropriateness. The problem of incompleteness comes across in 
examples such as: ‘Steel isn’t strong enough’ or ‘Jill is ready’. Here a complete proposition 
emerges only when we find out from the context what it is that steel isn’t strong enough for or 
what Jill is ready for. Thus incompleteness arguments “draw on the intuitions that context must 
contribute something to what is said, since the sentence itself does not have a content that is 
truth evaluable.” (Pagin and Pietelli 2005: 34) Relatedly, the problem of inappropriateness 
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emerges in examples like ‘It is raining’. When someone in London utters ‘It’s raining’ it means 
that ‘It’s raining in London’51. When you say ‘There is nothing to eat’ you mean there is nothing 
to eat in the house. Thus, “sentences express complete propositions without contextual 
enrichment, but these propositions are not the ones speakers express by uttering those 
sentences.”  (Borg 2006: 4). Hence the inappropriateness. The problem of context shifting 
arises when for instance a relative term is used without specifying the relation to a class. When 
you say ‘Murali is tall’ it may mean for instance that Murali is tall for a five year old, though 
he may be short for a basketball player. As Pagin and Pietelli paraphrase: “If a semantic feature 
of utterances of sentences containing e, and associated with e changes from context to context, 
then e is context sensitive.” (Pagin and Pietelli 2005:31, here ‘e’ stands for an expression). 
C&L argue that context shifting arguments can be provided for any sentence. For 
instance in the sentence ‘That is a dangerous dog’ the relation of the particular animal to the 
class of dangerous dogs would depend on the context, i.e. the dog could be aggressive, or he 
could carry a viral disease etc. Similarly, C&L argue regarding incompleteness arguments that 
in case we allow for incompleteness in one sentence, we must admit it for any sentence, and 
you can always add factors that require explanation: e.g. for the (more complete) sentence: 
“Steel isn’t strong enough to support the roof” you can always ask for how long the support 
would last, etc.  
The problems become clearer if we look at another way of classifying them. There is 
traditionally thought to be a distinction between literal meaning of an utterance, and the speaker 
meaning or what the speaker wishes to convey. Within the literal meaning, there is, it has been 
argued, a distinction between the unchanging sentence meaning and what is said. There may 
be a syntactically triggered need for contextual interpretation, for instance in case of indexicals 
and demonstratives. As Recanati points out, according to Minimalism, “‘what is said’ departs 
from the meaning of the sentence (and incorporates contextual elements) only when the 
sentence itself sets up a slot to be contextually filled.” (Recanati 2001: 77) For instance 
sentences with indexicals such as “He is angry” need contextual fillers for the pronoun “he” 
before the sentence becomes a complete proposition. This, for Recanati, involves saturation: 
“the contextual process whereby the meaning of such a sentence is completed and made 
                                                          
51 A Radical Contextualist would deny such claims, and argue rather that ‘it’s raining’ could mean a lot of different 
things depending on the context: e.g. when your task is to watch a lamp that flashes whenever it rains in Dubai, 
and to shout ‘it’s raining’ when you see the light, then ‘it’s raining’ is not short for ‘it’s raining in London’. We 
will deal consider this view later in this section. 
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propositional.” (2001: 77) There are however other contextual processes which have to do with 
speaker meaning. These involve for instance what Recanati calls modulation (which are also 
primary, though optional, processes) along with saturation (which both Recanati and C&L 
agree is a mandatory process, though Borg disagrees, as we shall see later). Modulation 
includes free enrichment, loosening and predicate transfer or semantic transfer as shown 
respectively in the following examples: 
(1) The table (of our living room) is covered with books. 
(2) The ATM swallowed my credit card. 
(3) The ham sandwich left without paying. 
In (1) the bracketed part is not mandatory for a complete proposition, and is not 
articulated, but is tacitly added through free enrichment (Recanati 2004: 10). This makes the 
truth condition more precise, i.e. free enrichment is “the process responsible for making the 
interpretation of an utterance more specific than its literal interpretation” (Recanati 2005: 177). 
The word ‘swallowed’ in (2) is used loosely with extended meaning, to include application 
over credit cards and being undertaken by machines.  The phrase ‘The ham sandwich’ in (3) is 
used to refer to the person who ordered it instead of reference to the sandwich. Thus predicate 
transfer “takes us from a certain property, conventionally expressed by some predicative 
expression, to a distinct property bearing a systematic relation to it.” (Recanati 2005: 177) 
Apart from primary pragmatic processes, Recanati argues for secondary pragmatic processes 
involving Gricean implicature, as for instance in our initial example ‘I am extremely hungry’ 
as said to a friend. What is implied is that they should get something to eat, though this is not 
what is expressed by the proposition. Let’s consider the following example from Recanati 
(2004: 8) uttered in reply to the question: ‘Do you want something to eat?’ 
(4) I’ve had breakfast. 
The indexical here requires saturation from context. Further, the sentence has the added 
sense (through free enrichment) that ‘I’ve had breakfast today’, though it would be strictly 
speaking true even if the speaker had breakfast a week or even years ago. Also, as uttered in 
reply to the above question, (4) may imply that the speaker is not hungry at the time of 
utterance, since she had breakfast earlier, although it need not imply that.52  
                                                          
52 The utterance of 4 may imply that the speaker does want something to eat, though not breakfast, or she wants 
to eat despite having had breakfast. 
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Thus the argument for contextualism is that many sentences need saturation, 
modulation, as well as involve implicatures, in order to be truth evaluable and have meaning. 
These processes necessarily involve inputs from context. Therefore context is an essential 
(minimal) element of meaning. In other words, there is no minimal truth conditional content 
which is devoid of contextual inputs. In the next subsection we will take a closer look at the 
minimalist retort to this argument. Radical contextualists, however, do not resort to either 
incompleteness or context shifting arguments explained above. The Travis (1975) example 
stated in the introduction is a case in point. It has the following implications: firstly, as we 
already noted, the same sentence, and this can apply to any (closed) sentence, can be judged to 
be true in one case and false in another, depending on the context (or rather for Travis, the 
occasion) of utterance. Second, this severely undermines the idea that sentences have 
straightforward disquotational truth-conditions, since here, to say that ‘That is a duck’ means 
that that is a duck53 does not serve us in any way towards determining the truth of the sentence, 
or providing a substantial condition for truth. Thirdly and derivatively, it suggests that truth 
conditions are not a property that utterances of sentences inherit from the sentences instanced54. 
In other words, there are no determinate truth-conditions which we can recover from the 
utterance of a sentence, Consider the utterance ‘Pia dances’. Travis (2006) argues that 
understanding the truth conditions of this sentence requires much more information than is 
provided by the proposition that Pia dances. “If Pia is a trained, skilled, dancer but refuses now 
to do it, is that proposition true then? If she eagerly takes the floor at every opportunity, but is 
so clumsy that one might refuse to call it dancing, is it true then? If she dances, but only when 
you heat the floor enough, is it true then? And so on.” The argument is that if the truth or 
falsehood of ‘Pia dances’ depends on any of these stated scenarios, or if the minimalist answers 
yes to the first scenario, “then that proposition cannot be the one the English sentence ‘Pia 
dances’ expresses. For it does not, as such, speak of dancing on that understanding of engaging 
in it. If they systematically say ‘Don’t know’, or steadfastly maintain silence, then (unless they 
are hiding something) there simply is no answer to the question when that would-be proposition 
would be true in which case it is no proposition at all.”55 
                                                          
53 We may note here that this is not a typical disquotational statement of truth conditions: indeed, it is a statement 
of meaning, not of truth conditions. 
54 Occasion sensitivity is for Travis (2008) distinguished from context sensitivity in that it is not just the idea that 
every sentence can depending on the context be understood as either true or false, as in the case of the example 
above. It is rather the idea that this is so because truth-conditions are not a property that instances of sentences 
inherit from the sentences instanced. 
55 A possible answer could be to state this proposition in a deflationist or disquotational way,i.e. not informatively. 
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So the Radical Contextualist’s argument is that it is not the case that truth conditions of 
various sentences require inputs (through modulation, saturation and implication) from context, 
but rather that there is no determinate proposition which can be recovered from the utterance 
at all, even with appeal to contextual features of the sentence (for instance in the ‘That is a 
duck’ example.). However, there are many assumptions which are a part of this view: for 
instance a proposition is something which can be true or false, and knowing a proposition 
involves knowing what makes it true or false, not simply the disquotational truth condition. 
One can argue that the kind of answers on which the truth of ‘Pia dances’ in the above, is 
dependent, are themselves a matter a judgement and not of meaning. For Travis however, that 
is not a criticism. His argument is rather that these matters of judgement affect our ability to 
pick out the proposition expressed by the sentence. In this section, we also noted the 
contextualist arguments from incompleteness and context shifting. The challenge that 
contextualism offers to minimalism is the claim that either there is no determinate proposition 
or a proposition, in order to be complete, requires appeal to contextual elements. Thus to meet 
the challenge, it would appear, Minimalism needs to show that there is in fact a determinate 
proposition (the minimal proposition) which does not require appeal to contextual elements. In 
section 2.2 and 2.3 we will see how far minimalism is able to meet this challenge. 
4.2.2 The Minimalist Argument Against Contextualism 
We have seen that there are many elements of meaning56 which are in fact contextually 
determined. In an attempt to exclude these elements from ‘meaning’, a minimalist could, in 
scenario one, limit the scope of what we can strictly call (semantic) meaning (Borg 2004; C&L 
2005a,b). This would require defending a sharp distinction between meaning and use, 
semantics and pragmatics. In scenario two, the minimalist could claim that there is an 
explanation for these elements from context which lies within syntax. So the two strategies 
involve either excluding or subsuming context. The latter (as for instance in Stanley 2000), 
according to Recanati, requires one to “re-analyse the example so as to show that the pragmatic 
                                                          
56 Though it remains to be seen whether this ‘meaning’ is to be understood as semantic meaning or deferred to 
pragmatics. Thus perhaps ‘understanding’ would be the appropriate usage here, though this would in a sense 
preclude semantic meaning, since understanding, with all its psychological implications steps beyond pure 
semantics.  
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process at issue… is a bottom–up process triggered by some expression in the sentence”57 
(Recanati 2005: 176), for instance a free location variable. 
Stanley (2000) argues that context dependence of expressions is restricted to the 
occurrence of indexicals (I, here, you, now), demonstratives (this, that) and pronouns (he, she) 
within the expression, and “any contextual effect on truth-conditions that is not traceable to an 
indexical, pronoun, or demonstrative in the narrow sense must be traceable to a structural 
position occupied by a variable.” (Stanley 2000: 401) So for Stanley the contextual dependence 
of “It is raining” is due to the hidden variables related to time and place, and that of “Sherman 
is small” is due to the hidden variable related to the comparison class of ‘small’. Stanley 
importantly distinguishes his account from an unarticulated constituent account (Perry 1986). 
The latter allows the context to directly supply the location in, for instance,  
(5) ‘It is raining’.  
So the sentence is rather to be understood as: It is raining (here)here the bracketed term is the 
unarticulated constituent supplied directly from the context. Other examples would be:  
(6) You are not going to die (from that cut), 
(7) She has had enough (of the lunch)58  
Stanley argues instead that rain in (5) “occurs with two open positions. Each open 
position is filled by a term of the form ’f (x)’.59 The first function maps entities to times, and 
the second function maps entities to locations. Context supplies the value of the function 
variables ‘f’ and ’g’.” (Stanley 2000:416) Stanley (2000) argues that there are no unarticulated 
constituents, and all truth conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form. The 
problem for hidden variable accounts is determining which of the unarticulated constituent 
cases (for instance (5)-(8)) require variables within the syntax or the logical form of the 
sentence, and which of these are not cases where the alleged unarticulated constituent is a part 
of the truth condition of the sentence. In other words, the question is how much of the context 
should be formalized, or rather, formally represented in the syntax, and what should not be. 
For Stanley, the answer becomes: that part of the context which affects the truth condition of 
                                                          
57 Bottom-up processes, as mentioned in the quote, are those that are triggered from within the (syntax of the) 
sentence. By contrast top-down processes are those that have their trigger outside the (syntax of the) sentence, for 
instance elements from the context of utterance or discourse. 
58 See Stanley (2005: 223-224) for more such examples. 
59 Omitted footnote from the original quote. 
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the sentence, can be traced back to logical form, or in our terms, should be formally represented 
in syntax. So Stanley (2000) argues that there are no unarticulated constituents, and that any 
contextual elements which affect the truth condition of the sentence can be traced back to 
syntax, as a hidden variable. Stanley (2005) argues that the bracketed element in (8)  is no part 
of its truth condition. 
 (8) John had breakfast this morning (in the normal way, through his mouth). 
So it is no part of the truth conditions of an utterance of this sentence that John ingested his 
breakfast through his mouth.  
For our purposes, the more pertinent minimalist view would involve excluding the 
context, since the exclusion would make the account more minimal. So going back to scenario 
one, that of excluding the context: Borg (2004) agrees that overtly context sensitive terms like 
indexicals and demonstratives are special, but she argues that “what is special about 
demonstrative and indexical content resides not with the kind of epistemic contact between 
speaker and referent, but simply with the mode of expression of our thoughts. Fundamentally 
demonstratives and indexicals differ in meaning from quantified noun phrases because they 
express a different kind of concept – singular concepts in the former case, general concepts in 
the latter.” (Borg 2004: 186-87) Thus in the case of indexicals, in for example an utterance of  
(9)  You were born in the capital of Nebraska. 
a competent hearer is able to pick out that ‘you’ can be understood as ‘the addressee of (9)’, 
even if she is not able to pick out the object of reference. This is what Borg means by picking 
out a general concept. The meaning of the term ‘you’ itself leads to this interpretation (or picks 
out this general concept ‘the addressee of (9)’), without any knowledge of the context of 
utterance. Thus the pragmatic processes of saturation and modulation discussed above are not 
primary as Recanati suggested, as they are not involved in this literal meaning.  
In the case of demonstratives, for example in (10): 
(10) That is red  
Borg (2004) argues that, from an utterance of (10) a competent language user is “capable of 
recovering the semantic content that α is red (via the conditionalized T-sentence: [If the speaker 
of ‘this is red’ refers with the utterance of ‘this’ therein to α and to nothing else, then that 
utterance is true if and only if α is red]). Here α is a syntactically generated singular concept, 
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the content of which is exhausted by the object referred to by the speaker in this context” (Borg 
2004:192) However, “Possessing a singular concept does not,” for Borg, “entail that an agent 
is able to (non-descriptively) identify the object being thought about from all other things” 
(2004:193).  
There are a couple of things we may note from the above exegesis. Firstly, what one 
refers to with indexicals are general concepts, which refer (to an object) through a general 
description (of the form “the addresse of an utterance u”) while demonstratives are special in 
that they are singular terms, which involves, Borg maintains, entertaining a singular concept, 
which is a ‘genuinely referential thought’. Secondly, though both the descriptive and the 
singular terms serve to pick out objects of reference (the latter more directly than the former), 
the competent hearer needs only to recognize this fact; she need not be able to identify which 
particular object is referred to. In other words in order to understand a sentence with indexicals 
or demonstratives, one need only recognize that there is (potentially, that is without 
commitment to it’s existence) an object of reference, and need not be able to identify what (or 
where) the object is.  
Identifying the object of reference or the content of these singular or general concepts 
is, according to Borg, not a job for semantics. But even her minimal account of ‘you’ as ‘the 
addressee’ and ‘that’ as a singular concept, involves, it may be argued, more than what can be 
recovered by mere linguistic meaning. And here comes in the notion of character: “It is 
character which is responsible for connecting linguistic content with non-linguistic 
information, combining purely linguistic understanding with the rich vein of information we 
have from perceptual, memorial and other processes.” (Borg 2004: 197) Borg’s use of the term 
character is different from Kaplan’s. Borg sees this difference as that of domains of application: 
according to Borg, Kaplan’s character links language and the world, while her use of the term 
provides a “bridge between the language faculty and the rest of the cognitive domain” 
(2004:197) 
The ‘character’ Kaplan argued for is a function from the context to the content; “I call 
that component of the sense of an expression which determines how the content is determined 
by the context, the ‘character’ of an expression.” (Kaplan 1978: 84) The content on the other 
hand is always taken with respect to a given context of use. So the utterance of ‘I am here now’ 
would have different content depending on the person, place and time of the utterance. Kaplan 
argued that “demonstrative free expressions have a constant character, i.e. they express the 
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same content in every context.” (Kaplan 1978: 85) In changing the domain of application of 
‘character’ from linking language to the world, to linking language to other cognitive domains, 
Borg appears to be changing the application of ‘context’ from the world to mind-internal 
cognitive domains – a prima facie internalist move. However, it may be noted that the content 
of a concept is, even for Borg, exhausted by the object referred to (whether or not it is possible 
to identify the object), as suggested by her analysis of (6) above. Thereby arises Borg’s 
externalism and the need to defend it against internalism.  
A further question arises here: how does this process, of linking the various cognitive 
domains, take place within Borg’s modular theory of mind? The following provides an answer: 
“A concept generated on the basis of a token linguistic expression of ‘you’ will only merge 
with a perceptual concept of an addressee in the context in question, ‘yesterday’ requires the 
concept brought out from the agent’s memory store to be that of the day before the day of 
utterance, while ‘that’ requires a perceptual concept of an object at some proximal distance 
from the speaker, and so on and so forth.” So for linguistically generated concepts, their syntax 
“dictates the kinds of mergers they will allow with concepts emerging from other modules. 
(2004: 199) 
Here we may note that Borg follows Fodor (1983) in the claim that the mind is at least 
in part modular. For Borg, a module is “a probably innate, encapsulated body of information, 
together with processes operating only over that information, which is responsible for realizing 
a given cognitive function.” (Borg 2004: 80)60 Fodor identified modular systems as, “domain 
specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled” with “informational 
encapsulation” being “perhaps the most important aspect of modularity.” (Fodor 1983: 37). 
Importantly, Borg follows Fodor in his claim that “the notion of modularity ought to admit of 
degrees… When I speak of a cognitive system as modular, I shall therefore always mean, “to 
some interesting extent”. (Fodor 1983: 37). Thus the kind of modularity Borg supports is not a 
strong or massive modularity61 but rather a weak form of modularity, which can admit of 
relatively non modular systems (e.g ‘character’ for Borg is either a- modular or is capable of 
                                                          
60 As Prinz (2006) points out, modularity needs to be distinguished from functional decomposition, where the 
mind/brain is a network of interconnected systems which are functionally distinct. 
61 The thesis that the mind is massively or entirely modular, as the term itself suggests. See for instance Sperber 
(2001) for a defense of this thesis. 
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application across modules), along with (more) modular ones.62 In section 3 we consider Borg’s 
argument from modularity and her commitment to Fodor in greater detail. 
Thus, as we noted in this section, Borg (2004) solves the problems raised by 
Contextualists by shifting the burden towards the other side of the semantics/pragmatics divide. 
The purpose of a semantic theory is restricted to the ‘literal’ as opposed to the ‘communicated’ 
meaning: 
“To understand what is literally meant by ‘It’s raining’ all we need to know, the 
(minimal) formal theorist claims, is the meaning of the syntactic parts of the sentence 
and their mode of combination, however to know what is communicated by an utterance 
of this sentence we need to know so much more.” (Borg 2004: 257) 
Contextualists thus address questions of communication while formal semantic theory 
addresses questions of meaning. The two apply to different domains. Further, she gives three 
reasons for preferring a formal theory over contextualism or dual pragmatics. First, there is the 
fact that we can create and understand new sentences. Language is productive and systematic. 
Compositionality – that the meaning of a complex whole is determined by the meanings of its 
parts and their mode of composition – appears to be the best explanation for the generative 
nature of language and the fact that it exhibits these three properties: creativity, productivity 
and systematicity. Only a formal theory can accommodate compositionality, as according to 
dual pragmatists / contextualists, a part of the literal meaning is determined by the context and 
is not contained in the formal constituents. Secondly, she claims, it is always possible to 
distinguish between the literal and the contextually implied meaning. Literal sentence meaning 
acts as a ‘non-cancellable level of content in a linguistic exchange.’ Finally, modularity is, 
according to Borg, independently desirable. A formal theory allows linguistic meaning to count 
as part of a modular language faculty, and therefore it should be preferred to theories that do 
not.  
These claims leave room open for many kinds of theories, which admit of a 
distinguishable level of literal meaning, and accept a modular theory of mind. The key to 
evaluating whether Borg’s arguments for formalism, and against contextualism work, lies, 
                                                          
62 Robbins(2007) notes that Borg’s argument against contextualism, from modularity is as follows: the mind is 
modular, and in particular, the semantic component of the language faculty is modular. But Contextualism is 
inconsistent with modularity. Therefore, contextualism is false. Robbins (2007) claims further that Borg can use 
same argument for weak minimalism of the kind advocated by C&L. However Robbins claims that semantics is 
not modular, and therefore the argument does not hold. 
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therefore in understanding the particular kind of modularity and of minimalism she advocates. 
Even Contextualists such as Sperber advocate a (massively) modular theory of mind, and 
though C&L admit of a distinguishable level of literal meaning, they do allow for a restricted 
set of inherently context sensitive terms 
To summarise, minimalists argue that the truth-conditionally relevant contextual 
elements find their source in syntax (hidden variables for Stanley 2000 or the class of 
demonstratives for C&L 2005a,b) or can be interpreted in syntactic terms (Borg 2004). For 
instance, for Borg, ‘you’ is understood as the contextually invariant form: ‘the addressee of the 
sentence’. So even if context is involved in the minimal content of the sentence, as it is for 
C&L, it is limited to syntactically triggered elements, and even these syntactically triggered 
contextual elements must, for Borg, find a context invariant interpretation. Borg argues that 
there is a minimal semantic level of interpretation prior to contextual interference. At this 
minimal level, we may not be able to identify the object of reference, though through the notion 
of character, we have a bridge between the linguistic and other cognitive domains which help 
attach a concept to the descriptive understanding of for instance ‘addressee of the sentence’.  
And the content of a concept is, for Borg, the object itself. Hence, through the interaction of 
cognitive domains we are able to pick out the object of reference, and the theory retains its 
externalist character. In the next subsection we shall see whether the claim that there is a 
minimal semantic level of interpretation, holds in the face of neurological evidence (presented 
by Hagoort et al (2004) and Nieuwland & Van Berkum (2006)).  
4.2.3 Empirical Evidence: Questioning the Possibility of Non-Contextual Processing 
Hagoort et al. (2004) argue that processing the expressions (7) and (8) yields very similar brain 
signatures in a context where it is well known to the experimental subjects that Dutch trains 
are in fact yellow: 
 
(11)  Dutch trains are sour.  
(12)  Dutch trains are white. 
They argue that (11) is a prima facie ‘semantic violation’, much like the sentence ‘the 
favorite palace of the present queen of England is divorced’ which “has no coherent 
semantic interpretation, because the predicate is-divorced requires an animate argument.” 
(Hagoort et al 2004: 438) (12), in contrast, is a prima facie ‘world-knowledge’ violation, since 
it “has a coherent semantic interpretation, but it contains a proposition that is false in the 
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light of our knowledge”. Now, if checking against world knowledge comes after a stage of 
processing based on syntactic information and its compositional semantic effects only, then 
effects of semantic violations should precede violations of world knowledge and should invoke 
other brain areas. But the results of a combined EEG/MRI experiment show that the effects 
obtained for the world-knowledge violation are essentially identical in onset and peak latency 
to the ‘semantic violation’, and they are very similar in amplitude and topographic distribution 
to the semantic N400-effect as well. Thus Hagoort et. al (2004) claim to “provide 
evidence against a nonoverlapping two-step interpretation procedure in which first 
the meaning of a sentence is determined, and only then is its meaning verified in relation to 
our knowledge of the world.”.  They conclude rather that “the brain retrieves and integrates 
word meanings and world knowledge at the same time.”  (2004:440) 
However, (11) and (12) are not that different after all. There is no syntactic violation at 
play, and compositionally, or in terms of their minimal semantic content, both sentences make 
perfect sense. This is clear from the earlier sentences used to explain the difference between 
semantic violation and world knowledge violation as well. That a place cannot be divorced 
requires world knowledge (about what a place is) and is not specified by syntax, just like it 
requires world knowledge to know whether or not the present queen is divorced. The difference 
between these two cases is presumably that it is part of our knowledge of what a place (at least 
as this term is normally understood) is that it cannot be divorced. But it is not part of our 
knowledge of who the present Queen is that she is divorced or not. The latter case requires 
world knowledge about the marital status of the present Queen, and not just about who the 
Queen is. However, even the former case, where it appears to be a part of knowing what a place 
is that it cannot be divorced, there may be a context in which even this sentence has a coherent 
semantic interpretation: for instance in a story where places were animate and had marriages 
and divorces (however farfetched that sounds). Thus neither case is truly free of a contextual 
interpretation; i.e. the context can override what appears to be part of the meaning of the words 
themselves. 
It therefore appears against the authors that the fact that the two cases (of putative 
‘semantic violation’ and ‘world knowledge violation’) do not have distinct brain signatures 
does not in fact provide evidence against a theory that advocates distinctive semantic and 
contextual levels of interpretation, which Borg appears to support. Since there is no difference 
in the relevant regard between the two cases in the first place, the experimental demonstration 
that they do not have different brain signatures does not prove or disprove anything, leaving 
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Borg’s argument regarding a semantic core intact. This data does not justify merging two 
possible levels of processing: semantic and contextual, thereby not making an argument against 
an approach such as Borg’s.  
There is, however, other research which suggests that there is no level of processing 
which is non-contextual. We will now outline this work and discuss its implications for Borg’s 
work. Nieuwland & Van Berkum (2006) concede that what was claimed above to be a semantic 
violation is rather a world knowledge violation: “One type of world knowledge that is 
occasionally ‘violated’ in a discourse such as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is knowledge 
of the things that nonliving, inanimate entities can and cannot do in the real world.” (Nieuwland 
& Van Berkum 2006) They go on to question the assumption that the distinction between 
semantic violation and world knowledge violation was based on: namely that certain semantic 
features, like for instance the animacy-constraint (i.e. sentences such as “the favourite place of 
the present queen of England is divorced” do not have a semantic interpretation because ‘is-
divorced’ requires an animate argument) is primitive to word meanings and thus is processed 
prior to and independently of any computations that establish meaning in a wider context. 
Against this assumption they show rather that “contextual appropriateness not only can 
‘‘neutralize’’ animacy violations, but can even render the animacy-violating predicate more 
preferred than an animacy-obeying canonical predicate.” In particular, the following story was 
given to subjects: 
A woman saw a dancing peanut who had a big smile on his face. The peanut was singing 
about a girl he had just met. And judging from the song, the peanut was totally crazy 
about her. The woman thought it was really cute to see the peanut singing and dancing 
like that. The peanut was salted/in love, and by the sound of it, this was definitely 
mutual. He was seeing a little almond. 
In the context of this story, the predicate ‘salted’ as used for the peanut, which is 
otherwise a common predicate, turned out to be unexpected by the participants of the 
experiment, as shown by the N400 effect. Here again, however, it may be argued, as above, 
that whether in the context of a story or without that particular context, ‘The peanut was in 
love’ still has its compositional meaning.   
Borg may reply that the animacy feature or other semantic features are not primitive or 
meaning constitutive, even though some of them may or may not be lexically marked. What 
one means, minimally, when uttering the sentence ‘The peanut was in love’ is nothing but that 
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- the peanut was in love. A minimalist in general, whether a Chomskian internalist or a minimal 
semanticist, would agree that the compositional meaning of the sentence is what is minimally 
required, with or without the context. Nonetheless, this example is particularly relevant in our 
present context, as we are trying to see whether or not contextual elements enter into semantic 
processing: this experiment appears to support the view that there is no minimal level of 
semantic processing devoid of the effects of the context of discourse. What the neuroscience 
data suggest is that there is no level of processing devoid of contextual input. This may however 
still not affect Borg’s position with respect to a minimal compositional core of meaning: no 
matter what the context is, the truth conditions of ‘The peanut was in love’ are that some 
contextually specified peanut was in love. On the other hand, this very core is what she shares 
with internalism.  
4.2.4 Interim Conclusions  
We thus arrive at the following conclusion: Borg’s refutation of the ‘dual pragmatic’ version 
of contextualism, even if successful, can be viewed as consistent with internalism. Although 
we did find evidence for contextualism in so far as there may be no level of processing devoid 
of context, the fact that context enters into semantic processing does not affect the 
compositional core of meaning, the existence of which Borg adopts along with internalism. 
The evidence does not seem to support any separate level of semantic processing (though 
neither does it refute the possibility). What is left intact after considering the evidence from 
neuroscience is just that part of Borg’s view that she shares with Chomskian minimalism. 
Hence, the aspects that Borg’s minimalist theory does not share with internalism still require 
extra support. We therefore now need to consider the divergence of the two: namely the fact 
that despite those of her commitments that are consistent with internalism, she is in fact an 
externalist. We tackle this issue in section 5. Before, we will re-consider the modularist 
argument against contextualism, examining the Fodorian assumptions that lie behind this 
argument, as well as the externalist commitments that arise from these assumptions. 
4.3 Fodorian Motivations: Modularity, Atomism and Externalism 
4.3.1 Modularity 
One main argument against contextualism is, for Borg, that it is not consistent with a 
modularity of mind claim, and the latter is, she insists, independently desirable. To counter this 
claim, we could argue either that the mind is not modular, or that the mind is not modular in 
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the sense in which Fodor and Borg maintain, or that the modularity (either of Fodor’s kind or 
a modified version) is consistent with contextualism. An important part of accepting or 
rejecting modularity thus boils down to somewhat of a terminological issue: what we mean by 
modularity. To accept one kind of modularity as opposed to another may affect whether or not 
modularity is consistent with contextualism. To attempt to address this issue, we need to be 
clear regarding the various possible meanings of modularity. 
There is a relatively uncontroversial way of understanding modularity, but this is not 
the one that Borg or Fodor defend: the concept of a functional module.63 A computer is modular 
if the different parts (the desktop, keyboard, speakers, cpu etc.) can all be purchased separately 
and then put together, and applying this to the mind, functional decomposition is “the simple 
view that the mind is a machine with component parts” (Prinz 2006: 34) each of which performs 
a specific function. Under this conception of modularity, “the thesis of massive modularity 
would claim that the mind consists entirely of distinct components, each of which has some 
specific job to do in the functioning of the whole.” (Carruthers 2006:4) This however is not the 
modularity that Fodor had in mind. Fodor (1998) argued for a modularity of input systems, so 
importantly computational systems are excluded from the modular picture. Fodor (1983) listed 
the following as characteristics of input system modules: 
i) Domain-specific; i.e. “there are distinct psychological mechanisms – vertical  faculties 
– corresponding to distinct stimulus domains. “ (Fodor 1983: 48) e.g. vision operates 
over visual stimuli. 
ii) Mandatory operation; i.e. input systems are “constrained to apply whenever they can 
apply” (Fodor 1998: 53). For example “You can’t help hearing the utterance of a 
sentence (in a language you know) as an utterance of a sentence” (1983:52-53) 
iii) Limited central access: “Not only must you hear an utterance of a sentence as such, but, 
to a first approximation, you can hear it only that way.” (1983: 56) Intermediate levels 
of processing are relatively inaccessible  
iv) Fast processing 
v) Informationally encapsulated: information from other modules or cognitive domains is 
inaccessible to the individual modules and also other domains/modules cannot access 
the information from any individual module; in other words modules are immune to 
feedback either way, from other modules or to other  modules: e.g. the Muller-Lyre 
                                                          
63 Or rather, as Carruthers 2006 puts it: “a dissociable functional component” (Carruthers 2006: 1) 
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illusion (Figure 4 below) in the case of vision, where we perceive the two lines as 
unequal, even though we know that that is not the case. 
 
Figure 4: Muller-Lyre Illusion 
 
 
vi) Shallow output; e.g. “the language input system specifies, for any utterance in its 
domain, its linguistic and maybe its logical form. It is implicit in this proposal that it 
does no more than that – e.g., that it doesn’t recover speech act potential (except, 
perhaps, insofar as speech-act potential may be correlated with properties of form, as 
in English interrogative word order).” (1983: 90) 
vii) Associated with fixed neural architecture 
viii) Exhibit characteristic and specific breakdown patterns, e.g. agnosias and 
aphasias. 
ix) Ontogenetically exhibit characteristic pace and sequencing; i.e. to put it differently, 
modules are innate and develop in a predictable way. 
Borg argued that the semantic component of the language faculty is a module and 
exhibits each of the above features. So her argument from modularity, against contextualism, 
is that: the mind is modular, and in particular, the semantic component of the language faculty 
is modular. But Contextualism is inconsistent with modularity. Therefore, contextualism is 
false.64 Robins (2007) argues against this by attacking the premise that semantics is modular. 
Another way to counter this argument would be to argue that the mind is not really modular 
(see for instance Prinz 2006) or that the mind is modular but modularity is different from 
Fodor’s conception of it (e.g. Carruthers 2006). Instead of restricting ourselves to a limited 
input systems modularity, the mind is rather massively modular, with modularity extending to 
central systems as well. This could be a functional modularity of the kind noted above. Within 
this massively modular mind, we could admit of a modular semantics consistent with a form 
of contextualism. We will discuss this further later in this section, in the context of Carruthers 
                                                          
64 . Robbins (2007) claims further that Borg can use same argument for weak minimalism of the kind advocated 
by C&L.  
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(2006) and Sperber (1994). Robbins (2007) argues that semantics is not an encapsulated 
process, as to know the truth condition for “I’m going to the bank” we need to know both the 
identity of the speaker and whether the destination is a financial institution or a topographical 
feature (Robbins 2007: 308). However Borg’s minimal semantics can account for this, as we 
shall see in section 4.5. Robbins also claims that the breakdown patterns Borg refers to, such 
as Aspergers syndrome and Schizophrenia, which are supposed to leave syntax and semantics 
intact, with deficits in mind reading and linguistic pragmatics, do not infact provide evidence 
for the dissociation of semantics and pragmatics. This is because individuals with Aspergers 
perform well (or like people without Aspergers) on a range of standard mindreading tests 
(Bowler 1992) as well as tests for causal mechanical beliefs (Baron-Cohen et. Al. 1999, 2001); 
and people with Williams syndrome appear to have little or no difficulty understanding stories 
involving sarcasm and metaphor (Karmiloff-Smith et.al. 1995). Again however, Borg presents 
evidence in support of her claims, eg. Bellungi et.al. (1993). What is clear is that there are many 
inconsistencies across various studies and laboratories and “it is difficult to find cases where 
specific brain regions have truly specific functions.” (Prinz 2006: 24), which would cast in 
doubt upon i, vii and viii above. Prinz systematically casts doubt on each of the nine criteria 
listed above. 
For Borg’s argument against contextualism, from modularity, to work, semantics must 
be modular in this sense i.e. displaying criteria 1-9. If semantics is modular in this sense, then 
it is possible to have a minimal semantics which is context free, as the module would be 
encapsulated. And if this is the case then contextualism is false. So it appears that information 
encapsulation is the key feature in the argument against contextualism. There is however one 
way to understand encapsulation which would be amenable to a contextualist account. 
Carruthers (2006) distinguishes between a wide-scope and narrow-scope encapsulation. The 
former is the case when “the system is such that it can’t be affected by most of the information 
held in the mind in the course of its processing”, and the latter is the case when “concerning 
most of the information held in the mind, the system in question can’t be affected by that 
information in the course of its processing.” (Carruthers 2006: 16) Carruthers accepts the 
former case, where the system is such that it can only access limited information, as opposed 
to the narrow-scope encapsulation which divides all information available into information that 
can affect the system and information that can’t.  He claims, and I tend to agree, that the system 
would be a lot more frugal with the former case. There appears to be no reason to deny that 
any item of information could be such that the system could be affected by it vision couldn’t 
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be affected by acoustical information, say. And if all the information available to the mind was 
sent simultaneously as input to any system, the system would be overwhelmed. (Prinz 2006) 
But as Prinz notes, this terminological distinction doesn’t save encapsulation but rather “In 
recognizing the power of heuristic search, he tacitly concedes that the primary argument for 
encapsulation is unsuccessful.” (2006: 33)  
Borg’s argument against contextualism falls with the rejection of narrow-scope 
encapsulation as a premise in favour of wide-scope encapsulation, since acceptance of wide-
scope encapsulation is consistent with a functional-module conception of modularity 
(Carruthers 2006) which in turn is consistent with contextualism (Sperber 1994). In fact, “the 
idea that the mind consists of a large collection of functionally specialized mechanisms, or 
evolved modules (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992)” which is “sometimes 
called the massive modularity hypothesis (Carruthers, 2005; Samuels, 1998; Sperber, 1994)” 
(Frankenhuis and Ploeger 2007: 688) is an important assumption that underlies most research 
in evolutionary psychology65. Evolved modules are generally understood as: “neurocognitive 
mechanisms specialized for solving particular adaptive problems that recurrently faced our 
hominid ancestors over evolutionary time.” (Frankenhuis and Ploeger 2007: 688)  
Sperber (1994) argues that these adaptive modules are informationally encapsulated, 
but the output of one module can serve as input of another. Sperber modules have “structural 
relations to other mental devices” as well as relations to the environment. “The content of a 
concept is not an intrinsic but a relational property of the neural realizer of that concept, and is 
contingent upon the environment and the history (including the phylogenetic prehistory of that 
neural object. This extends straightforwardly to the case of domain-specific modules. A domain 
is semantically defined, that is, by a concept under which objects in the domain are supposed 
to fall. The domain of a module is therefore not a property of its internal structure (whether 
described in neuorological or in computational terms)” (Sperber 1994: 51) So Sperber modules 
are domain specific but the domain is defined by the concept which in turn is environmentally 
determined. Further, these modules can access information which has been processed by other 
modules, or the output of other modules. These modules can answer to what Sperber believes 
are the main arguments against massive modularity: (a) Integration of information: i.e. we can 
have many different kinds of percepts related to a single concept (e.g. see, hear, touch and smell 
                                                          
65 An approach ‘‘informed by the additional knowledge that evolutionary biology has to offer, in the expectation 
that understanding the process that designed the human mind will advance the discovery of its architecture’’ 
(Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow 1992: 3) 
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a dog); (b) cultural diversity: our concepts range over a multitude of domains whose content 
varies from culture to culture. Within Sperber’s theory, there is scope for integration of 
information, as modules can access information already processed by other modules. But more 
importantly integration takes place through the metarepresentational module, whose domain 
includes all representations available to any module66. This module can therefore combine 
various modes of information to yield a single concept. Cultural diversity is not a problem for 
Sperber as his modules are related to concepts which are environmentally determined. Thus 
Sperber, through the inclusion of a metarepresentational module, and by making outputs of one 
module available as input for another, is able to argue for (massive) modularity within a 
contextualist framework.  
In this section we saw that the argument from modularity levelled against contextualism 
has its drawbacks: one can either argue against the Fodorian modularity that is assumed in the 
modularity argument against contextualism (Prinz 2006, Robbins 200767), or argue for a 
different conception of modularity which is consistent with contextualism (Sperber 1994). For 
a defender of the argument against contextualism (Borg 2004,2012), one way to go would be 
to argue for the need for narrow-scope encapsulation or the idea that most of the available 
information is such that the system cannot be affected by it, and not just a wide-scope 
encapsulation which is acceptable to defenders of contextualism. Borg achieves this through 
dividing the information available into that which can affect the meaning of a word and that 
which cannot. Meanings of words are atomic and cannot be affected by most of the available 
information, although there is non-meaning constitutive information which is lexically marked. 
To see how she achieves this, we will first consider an underlying motivation for this view: 
Fodor’s representational theory of mind. 
                                                          
66 One could ask here whether the very postulation of this metarepresentational module amounts to a rejection of 
massive modularity. The answer depends upon the concept of massive modularity under consideration. If we are 
to follow Fodor’s understanding of modularity, then the features (iii)-(vi) from section 3.1 would directly conflict 
with the postulation of a metarepresentational module. However, having rejected Fodor’s version of Modularity, 
Sperber is able to make this postulation without contradiction. His modules are encapsulated though the output of 
one is available as input of others. So there is no theoretical contradiction in claiming that there could be a module, 
so encapsulated, which can access the outputs of many different modules, as inputs for its internal processing. 
67 Though Robbins 2007, as we noted above argues against Borg’s use of Fodorian modularity to characterize the 
semantic component of the language faculty. The particular arguments he mentions are answered by Borg, as we 
will see in section 5. 
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4.3.2 Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind  
Borg takes Fodor’s particular form of modularity of mind as a premise for her critique of 
contextualism. Modularity is a central part of his version of a representational theory of mind 
(RTM), which maintains that:  
a. Psychological explanation invokes laws about relations between mental states. 
b. Mental representations (and not ideas or images) are the primitive bearers of intentional 
content.  
c. Thinking is (and not all causal processes are) computation 
d. Meaning is information. 
e. What distinguishes coextensive concepts is in the head. 
There are a few points to note here: (a) importantly notes that relations between mental 
states are governed by law; in (c) Fodor isolates thinking, as opposed to other causal or 
cognitive processes, as being computational in character. Further (b) allows Fodor to maintain 
that mental representations are both abstract (given their role as bearers of content, and 
therefore as distinguished from the particular content) and particular (taking into account the 
particular content that they bear).  They are abstract, since they are in a sense placeholders for 
(potentially different) intentional content; in other words, to the extent that they are 
distinguished from the particular content, they are abstract. They are particular since at any 
given moment, they would have particular content. This relates and leads to (e) when we 
consider (b) in conjunction with the less controversial idea that coextensive concepts can be 
distinguished intentionally. So, being the bearers of intentional content, it appears that what 
distinguishes two coextensive concepts are these mental representations themselves. Thus, 
Fodor concludes that: modes of presentation (MOPs – which are supposed to distinguish 
coextensive concepts) are mental representations. Fodor’s MOPs, like Fregean MOPs, 
distinguish coextensive concepts; but unlike Fregean MOPs, they are not senses. They are also 
both abstract and mental, as noted above, and the “apparent tension is reconciled by taking 
MOPS‐qua‐things‐in‐the‐head to be the tokens of which MOPs-qua-abstract-objects are the 
types.” (1998:20) For Frege, senses were abstract and objective: abstract because “the sense of 
the sign” is that “wherein the mode of presentation is contained” (Frege 1993: 24); and 
objective because MOPs are objective ways of defining or designating the same referent.68  
                                                          
68 “Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the reference; it is the object 
of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and 
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By regarding MOPs as both abstract and mental, Fodor appears to be conflating the 
distinction between ‘ways of conceiving’ an object (an internal process) and ‘ways in which 
the object is presented to us’ (an external fact). There are certain important consequences of 
this conflation. Firstly, it conflates the mental and the physical, or claims about our minds and 
claims about physical objects (or the way that the object is presented to our mind). Secondly, 
if MOPs are mental particulars, it amounts to claiming that for a particular mode of 
presentation, there can be only one way of conceiving the object. There appears to be no 
particular reason why there must be only a single way of conceiving any particular mode of 
presentation.69 .  
Fodor comes to thinking about MOP’s as mental particulars through the following 
reasoning: in order to individuate concepts, MOPs must correspond one-to-one with concepts. 
The only way for them to do so is if they are mental. One way to sympathize with this view 
would be to understand the MOP in question as something like the meaning of a linguistic 
expression as generated in the mind on occasion of an act of linguistic comprehension and 
therefore as a mental particular. Here it does not make much sense to distinguish between the 
way of conceiving an expression and the way that it is presented as both here would refer to 
the meaning generated, the fact being that meaning is necessarily generated only in the mind. 
This pushes us towards an internalist conception of meaning.  
Fodor however, went further and claimed that MOPs are rather mental representations. 
With the notion of a mental representation comes the question what this representation is a 
representation of. The notion of a mental representation appears to inherently support a form 
of externalism: a representation is a representation of something external to itself. Let us try to 
grasp how he tries to maintain his attachment to externalism through exploring his claims about 
concepts.  
In Concepts (1998), Fodor manages to combine three distinct positions: atomism, 
realism and nativism. We will consider Fodor’s atomism and realism in the rest of this section. 
Nativism for Fodor is not of concepts but of mechanisms required for the acquisition of 
concepts, while realism is of object, and atomism applies to concepts in the way explained 
                                                          
by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. 
The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it 
is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to 
use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image.” (Frege 1993: 27) 
69 For instance, in Frege’s example mentioned in note 1 (Frege 1993:27), the same real image in the interior of the 
telescope can give rise to different retinal images. 
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below. To attribute atomicity to something is to assert that it cannot be decomposed into parts. 
Thus to say that concepts are atomic implies that they cannot be decomposed into other 
concepts, the acquisition of which would result in the acquisition of the concept. So according 
to Fodor’s form of informational atomism, there are no concepts the possession of which is 
metaphysically necessary to have the concept DOORKNOB. Rather, “what makes something 
the concept DOORKNOB is just: expressing the property that our kinds of minds lock to from 
experience with good examples of instantiated doorknobhood.” (Fodor 1998: 137) He clarifies 
that these “good examples” are the typical doorknobs or instances of the doorknob stereotype. 
Further, “with doorknob as with red, all there is to being it is how things tend to strike us” 
Further “if a property is constituted by the way that things that have it strike us (under certain 
circumstances), then being locked to the property requires only that things that have it do 
reliably strike us that way (under those circumstances).” (Fodor 1998: 141) 
Thus the physical object that is a doorknob has the property doorknobhood. This is 
understood as a single atomic property. Secondly, this property, doorknobhood, must be a real 
object, as it were, or exist in a real object, to which we can stand in a causal relationship. 
Thirdly, what constitutes doorknobhood is how objects that are doorknobs tend to strike us. So 
here, a real property is constituted by a mental representation. Lastly, acquiring the atomic 
concept DOORKNOB or being locked to the real but mind dependent property of 
doorknobhood requires only that the real object doorknob does reliably strike us as it is, i.e. as 
containing the (mind dependent) property. So what emerges here is that properties as well as 
concepts are for Fodor mind dependent. But he tries to merge this (internalist) mentalistic 
picture with realism about objects. His argument for this is of the following form: 
a. Doorknobs, or Tuesdays, are mind dependent. 
b. Therefore, if there are no minds, then there are no doorknobs. 
c. But there are minds. 
Now step (d) or the conclusion of this argument can only be: There may or may not be 
doorknobs or Tuesdays. To claim otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of negation of 
antecedent. However, Fodor claims that “doorknobs are real but mind dependent” (Fodor 1998: 
150). This clearly goes beyond the premises just outlined. In fact, if it was a premise then it 
would follow that there are minds. But the other way round does not hold. Thus realism cannot 
follow from his argument and therefore must be part of the premises or already assumed in the 
argument. For Fodor, “Doorknobs are constituted by their effects on our minds, and our minds 
are in the world.” (Fodor 1998: 149) And these premises lead him to the conclusion that 
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doorknobs are real. One way to construe this alleged reality of doorknobs would be to restrict 
it to the mental: i.e. to say that they are real and in the world, as the mind that constituted them 
is real and in this world, but they exist within the real mind. In other words they are as real as 
anything within a real physical object. To put it differently, the concept DOORKNOB would 
be in a sense as real as the object doorknob, as both are constituted by and depend for their 
existence on the mind. If this is the case, then there is no particular advantage in talking about 
mental as opposed to physical objects and any metaphysical reality whatsoever. We would here 
again be within internalist territory, and the externalist dimension of the representational 
picture under scrutiny proves to be no substantive addition to what the internalist can claim as 
well. 
Fodor’s conception of natural kind terms, on the other hand, is not conducive to an 
internalist explanation. “All the metaphysics of concepts possession requires, of our concept 
WATER or Homer’s, is being locked to water. If you are locked to water our way, you have 
the concept WATER as a natural kind concept; if you are locked to concept WATER Homer’s 
way, you have the concept WATER, but not as a natural kind concept... if you are locked to 
water either way, you have the concept WATER.” Fodor 1998: 157) Although all that is 
required to have the concept WATER is being locked to water, however, the way that we are 
locked to the concept determines whether or not we have the concept WATER as a natural 
kind: only if we are locked to the concept WATER our way, or through the scientific concept 
H2O, do we have the concept WATER as a natural kind concept. This suggests that anyone 
who does not have the concept H2O does not have the concept WATER as a natural kind, and 
then having the WATER concept would be like having other concepts which are not of natural 
kinds (and therefore mind dependent as we claimed above). But Fodor argues that there are no 
concepts whose possession is metaphysically necessary for having WATER as a natural kind 
concept. This, he claims, is because science discovers essences and doing science thereby links 
us to natural kinds as such. So in the case of Homer, where these essences were not yet 
discovered, though one was linked to water, the water he was linked to was not water as a 
natural kind substance. We therefore need the essences that science discovers, in order to form 
any link to it. Even if we grant him that in today’s world, our concept WATER is a natural kind 
concept, this means that WATER links us to a natural kind: H2O.  But the fact that water really 
exists as a natural kind is just presupposed in his argument70. Following Frege, however, one 
                                                          
70 Frege for instance argues that “when we say the Moon, we do not intend to speak of our idea of the Moon, nor 
are we satisfied with the sense alone, but we presuppose a reference... Now we can of course be mistaken in the 
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could argue that“in grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a reference.” (Frege 1993: 
24). But grasping WATER as a natural kind concept as Fodor does, already includes assurance 
of reference. This is because in grasping the concept as a natural kind concept, we are 
understanding our concept WATER not as being constituted by the effect of certain 
impressions on our mind, but rather by the relation to a natural kind: the physical substance 
water or H2O. So it is not the case of the argument presuming the reality of a physical 
substance, but the concept is in fact claimed to be constituted by the real physical substance. 
For Fodor, it is science that gives us the essences, the physical substances, and in acquiring 
concepts we form a relationship to these essences which science discovers.  
What is important for acquiring the concept WATER as a natural kind, is that there are 
these essences to which natural kind concepts are constitutively linked, even though the 
scientific descriptions of these essences may change(based on new discoveries).71 In other 
words, though it is necessary that water is H2O or 2 is a prime number, these are empirical 
facts, and not constitutive of the concept WATER or the number 2. We get a clearer sense of 
this idea in Fodor (1998: 74)72 where he claims that although it is necessary that water is H2O, 
this is a fact about the world. What is, however, constitutive of WATER is the substance water, 
given that it is a natural kind term. 
This is clearly not, for Fodor, merely the stipulation that WATER refers to water (which 
would be a deflationary statement) but rather, what it refers to is always identified by by an 
essence, or a scientific description in case of H2O, independently of whether these descriptions 
                                                          
presupposition, and such mistakes have indeed occurred. But... in order to justify mention of the reference of a 
sign it is enough, at first, to point out our intention in speaking or thinking. (We must then add the reservation: 
provided such reference exists.) (1993: 27-28) 
71 “The problem for informational semantics comes not from intuitions that the connection between being Tuesday 
and coming before Wednesday is necessary, but from intuitions that it’s constitutive in the sense that one can’t 
have one of the concepts unless one has the other. Compare water is H20 and two is prime. Presumably though 
both are necessary, neither is constitutive. Accordingly it’s possible to have the concept WATER but not the 
concept HYDROGEN, and its possible to have the concept TWO but not the concept PRIME. All of this is 
perfectly OK as far as informational semantics is concerned. It’s perfectly consistent to claim that concepts are 
individuated by the properties they denote, and that the properties are individuated by their necessary relations to 
one another, but to deny that knowing about the necessary relations among properties is a condition for having 
the concept”. (Fodor 1998: 74) 
72 “The problem for informational semantics comes not from intuitions that the connection between being Tuesday 
and coming before Wednesday is necessary, but from intuitions that it’s constitutive in the sense that one can’t 
have one of the concepts unless one has the other. Compare water is H20 and two is prime. Presumably though 
both are necessary, neither is constitutive. Accordingly it’s possible to have the concept WATER but not the 
concept HYDROGEN, and its possible to have the concept TWO but not the concept PRIME. All of this is 
perfectly OK as far as informational semantics is concerned. It’s perfectly consistent to claim that concepts are 
individuated by the properties they denote, and that the properties are individuated by their necessary relations to 
one another, but to deny that knowing about the necessary relations among properties is a condition for having 
the concept”. 
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are actually formulated or not. If we are not locked to the concept WATER via the 
(scientifically described) essence then we are not in possession of WATER as a natural kind 
concept. This at least compromises informational atomism, as the concept WATER is no longer 
atomic but is rather identified through scientific descriptions. The point is that, even viewed as 
a natural kind, the kind intended cannot be atomic if it is identified by an essence We have seen 
in this section that much of Fodor’s version of a representational theory of mind is capable of 
an internalist interpretation. We have found nothing in his arguments to preclude such an 
internalist interpretation, apart from the stipulation regarding natural kind terms being 
constituted by the natural substance, and we noted that his position on natural kind terms 
compromises his informational atomism. In the next section we shall see how Borg applies 
these Fodorian commitments to what she calls ‘Organisational’ lexical semantics. 
4.4 Borg’s Organisational Lexical Semantics 
Fodor, as we noted above, combines nativism, atomism and realism. We also saw that his 
argument for natural kind terms may be rejected without affecting the rest of his theory. So his 
attachment to realism may be considered mild, as the realism he endorses is a realism of other 
minds as opposed to objects (barring natural kind terms). Words for him refer to concepts rather 
than objects and these concepts are atomic in nature. So word meanings are not a collection of 
properties/ uses, or even one typical property or use (as in Horwich 1998 for instance). Rather 
meanings are concepts which are atomic. So there is no particular property which makes the 
concept DOG, nor even a bundle of features (for instance +ANIMATE, +MAMMAL, +FOUR 
LEGGED etc.). DOG is conceptualized and understood as a single atomic concept. So there 
are no particular properties nor any bundle of properties, which are necessary. 
In arguing against lexical semantics, Fodor and Lepore (2002) insist that accounts 
positing lexical complexity fail the compositionality constraint that they impose on any 
semantic theory. If ‘dog’ is analysed into features, one of which is, say, +TYPICAL PET, then 
that cannot contribute to expressions like ‘wild dog’.]. In other words, if the meaning of ‘dog’ 
was understood as having +TYPICAL PET as a feature, it could not combine with ‘wild’ 
compositionally without contradiction. The point is that this feature does not enter into the 
compositional determination of complex meanings.  
Borg, it seems, agrees with the criticisms of lexical semantics but points out that they 
only apply to a lexical complexity argument that views words as constituted by features or 
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properties. For Borg, meanings are atomic, but she also wants to allow for some form of lexical 
complexity.  The way to allow for lexical complexity as well as atomicity without contradiction 
is, Borg insists, through “weakening the appeal to lexical complexity still further, taking the 
additional information required to carry the internal burden on semantics to be constitutive of 
neither concept content nor concept possession. Perhaps (following Fodor’s 1998: 65 
suggestion above) we could simply allow that the lexicon contains additional information 
above and beyond a mere list of word-denotation pairs but maintain that this additional 
information doesn’t constitute the meaning of a word nor does it impose any conditions on the 
possession of that word’s meaning, instead it imposes constraints on our competence with the 
word.” (Borg 2012:193) 
What Borg is suggesting is again a form of competence-performance distinction, 
though it is interesting that she calls the performance side of it competence. This usage is valid 
within her assumptions as simply possessing the atomic concept does not allow us even the 
ability to use the concept. The traditional competence/ performance distinction, as for instance 
for Chomsky, was however the distinction between ‘knowledge of language’ and ‘use of 
language’ (Chomsky 1965). What we seem to need minimally, in order to perform/use the 
concept, is the kind of syntactic information Borg puts within the extended lexical information 
not included in knowing/understanding/having the concept, though needed for full competence. 
So for her knowing the concept is distinguished from knowing the language, in that it appears 
that one may have concepts in isolation from knowing the language. She claims that word 
meanings or concepts should be explained referentially, but there are non-meaning-constitutive 
features which are lexically specified. Although these do not constitute the meaning, this 
information is contained within the “organization of the lexicon”. Thus the name 
organizational lexical semantics.  
“So, for instance, a noun like ‘dog’ could be marked as, say, +AGENT, + ANIMATE, 
but these properties of the expression do not constitute part of the word’s meaning, 
instead indicating the kind of expression the word is by revealing the categories into 
which it falls.” (Borg 2012:194) 
It needs to be made clearer which word varieties have atomic meanings: is it the root 
word or each form that has the atomic meaning? Given the direction of the theory, Borg could 
allow only the root word as having the atomic meaning, which is then shared by other forms 
of the word, though in each form it is combined with different non-constitutive features which 
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are lexically specified. So for instance: she may claim that develop and development share a 
core meaning, although lexically they fall under different categories, that of verb and noun 
respectively. This would avoid the problem of creating multiple meanings for related words. 
So the idea is that “simple words have simple meanings whilst allowing that the 
framework into which they slot is itself a complex, cross-categorising system and thus that 
additional lexical complexity emerges at this point (external to the meaning of a word)…, [T]he 
additional information emerges as part of the organisational structure of the lexicon, telling us 
something about the meaning of words but where this information is in addition to, and 
extraneous to, the meaning of a particular linguistic item.” (Borg 2010: 68) 
So effectively she is making a distinction between 
i. knowing the meaning: having the atomic referential concept,  
ii. knowing the meaning as related to knowing the language: the logical form, or where 
the word should be syntactically placed,  
iii. and knowing the language: having the ability to form novel sentences, produce and 
understand an infinite number of sentences, and do so systematically. 
A way to argue against this position would be to show that the three-fold distinction 
doesn’t exist: It is possible that any one or all of these steps are a false move, or that all three 
are inextricably linked, or (i) and (ii) merge, or (ii) and (iii) merge. It is for instance plausible 
to argue that (ii) and (iii) are both a part of syntax and (ii) does not provide semantic features 
which affect syntax as Borg argues. There is thus no semantic level information which is part 
of the process, as for instance in Hinzen (2007). On the other hand, one could also conflate (i) 
and (ii) and argue either that a concept is itself complex or that referential information is also 
lexically marked. Borg herself raises a similar objection as follows:  
“This objection emerges in two ways: first, why think the syntactic behaviour witnessed 
requires semantic level explanation at all (as Fodor and Lepore note, perhaps the 
recognition that ‘devour’ but not ‘eat’ requires an object is a purely syntactic realisation, 
with no semantic underpinning at all)? And, second, how do we know which elements 
of world knowledge deserve representation at the lexical level – why should the fact 
that kicking involves a manner of motion be lexically represented but not, presumably, 
the fact that being kicked is often painful?” (Borg 2012: 197) 
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Her answer to the first is essentially that we should not here resort to ‘syntactic 
eccentricities’ as this syntactic behaviour needs explanation that accounts for semantic 
similarities and differences. For the second she answers that there may not be a systematic way 
of determining why certain features are lexically marked other than the idea that “It is the 
realization of these features within the lexicon which explains how and why they come to have 
an impact on the syntactic behaviour of expressions.” (Borg 2012:199) So the only possible 
way to determine which features should be lexically marked is through their effect on syntactic 
behaviour of the expression; in other words, the features that have syntactic effects are the ones 
that should be lexically marked. This explanation however, does not help us to identify those 
features which are lexically marked from those that are not, and the problem remains.  
Even if we are able to identify these features via the syntactic difference they make, it 
remains unclear why we would understand them as constituting information which is non-
syntactic. If these are features that make a syntactic difference, why is it that we cannot simply 
say that these constitute syntactic features are lexically marked? Thus, one could, as noted 
above, still argue that there is no semantic level of information involved.  
We saw in this section that Borg attempts to argue for both atomism and a form of 
lexical complexity, and the way she purports to overcome the contradiction is through 
distinguishing between the meaning of a word, which is atomic, and the non-meaning-
constitutive organizational information which is lexically specified. We also noted that it is 
possible to argue against this by pointing out that there is no semantic level of information here. 
If there is semantic information which is lexically marked, and is not such that it has syntactic 
effects, then there would be no way of identifying it, within Borg’s framework.. Borg remarks 
that features which are syntactically relevant are the ones which are lexically marked. Even if 
we are able to identify these features (though no systematic way of such identification is 
available), it would not preclude the argument that there is no semantic level of information 
which is lexically marked. So reconciling Fodorian atomism with lexical complexity again 
leaves room for an internalist interpretation. Borg’s externalism however is also the result of 
extending Fodor’s realism from natural kind terms to all concepts, so that they are not just 
mental representations but also really attach to objects of reference. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will consider Borg’s externalist referential commitments, after first considering the 
underlying assumption of minimal semantics: propositionalism. 
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4.5 Extending Fodor’s Commitment Beyond Natural Kind Terms: Defense 
of a Referential, Propositional Account Against Internalism 
We have in the preceding sections dealt with point (A) from the introduction: arguments for 
and against contextualism, noting how minimalism can be defended from contextualist attacks. 
We pointed out that Borg’s minimal account can survive even in the face of much neurological 
evidence for contextualism. We will in the rest of the chapter consider (B), (C) and (D) from 
the introduction: a defense of a propositional account of semantic content, which involves the 
claim that this content is referential, and consider internalist arguments against it. In this section 
we shall consider these points and how they are related to each other and the preceding 
discussion of (A). 
Propositionalism forms a key assumption in minimalism, as it should be evident 
through the discussion in this chapter, and therefore it can be argued that minimalism depends 
on the truth of propositionalism. Propositionalism constitutes the “the idea that every well-
formed declarative sentence expresses a complete proposition relative to a context of 
utterance.” (Borg 2012: 73) This forms the underlying assumption in both the minimalist 
positions we have considered: Borg and C&L. C&L however do not provide any explicit 
defense of propositionalism, although the assumption of propositionalism is explicit in their 
works (2005a, b). They argue for instance that an utterance of ‘Rudolf is a reindeer’ is “true 
just in case Rudolf is a reindeer, and expresses the proposition that Rudolf is a reindeer” 
(2005a: 3). C&L, however, and importantly, point out in a footnote that “Semantic 
Minimalism, as understood in this book, need not take a stand on whether semantic content is 
a proposition, or truth conditions, or what have you. Throughout the book we try to remain 
neutral by couching the issues both in terms of truth conditions and in terms of propositions.” 
(2005a:3, footnote 3) So C&L try to distance themselves from the metaphysical status of 
semantic content.  
They do however recognize that their theory could raise metaphysical questions: for 
instance – what is the minimal proposition that A is red, or what state of affairs does it pick 
out, or what do its instances have in common. C&L insist however that the answer to these 
questions is just that A is red (2005: 158). They argue that these questions are themselves 
metaphysical and non-linguistic, and therefore do not have anything to do with semantics. What 
makes something an instance of red or of dancing is not a question that either arises or is 
answered by contextualism about red or dancing. (2005: 161) To put it differently, whether one 
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endorses propositionalism or contextualism, questions of metaphysics arise irrespectively, and 
need metaphysical and not semantic answers. C&L argue further that in case someone is not 
happy with the response that what instances of red things have in common is that they are red 
simpliciter, they must logically question “the very idea of two or more things sharing properties 
or engaging in the same activities.” (2005: 163) C&L are, in their own words are “trying to 
push all these worries onto the metaphysicians. Whatever story in the end they settle on about 
what makes something red, that’s what it takes to satisfy the semantic truth conditions of ‘A is 
red.’” (2005: 164) 
Consider here the discussion in Travis (2006) regarding the determination of truth 
conditions for ‘Pia dances’, mentioned in section 2.1 above. Consider the utterance ‘Pia 
dances’. Travis (2006) argues that understanding the truth conditions of this sentence requires 
much more information than is provided by the proposition that Pia dances. We need rather to 
know what scenario would cause the speaker/hearer to apply the predicate ‘dances’ to Pia: does 
she need to be skilled, or simply eager etc., and this information is not contained in the 
proposition expressed by the uttered sentence. So the uttered sentence does not give us any 
determinate proposition, i.e. a proposition that has determinate truth-conditions. Borg (2004) 
argues against this kind of argument that this appeal to indeterminate truth conditions is just 
another case of speaker meaning as opposed to sentence meaning, and this sort of truth 
evaluation is a pragmatic matter (2004:256). Minimal propositions give us truth conditions, but 
these truth conditions need not be of the kind that enables us to pick out the world in which the 
sentence is true. For Borg: “‘London buses are red’ means that London buses are red. It is not 
expected to tell us why ‘red’ means red and not blue, nor is it required to guarantee that every 
subject who grasps this semantic information knows what is required to make something a bus, 
nor must they be able to tell, for every object they encounter, whether or not it is a bus” (Borg 
2009: 39). This explanation brings us to point (C) above: an explanation of the referential nature 
of semantic content. It appears from this example that Borg-type truth conditions do not require 
us to be able to pick out either the world in which the utterance is true, or the object of reference, 
despite the fact that they are said to involve a referential relation. The way this relation is 
established is explained as follows: “There is a discrete language faculty, containing specialised 
bodies of knowledge and operations on that knowledge, dealing with phonetics, orthographics, 
syntax and semantics. This vast body of knowledge would make use of the common currency 
of thought (i.e. language of thought expressions) but in a constrained, or encapsulated way. So, 
for instance, the lexical information that ‘cat’ means CAT (where the capitalised item here 
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indicates an expression in the language of thought, which I will take to be a concept) would be 
a proper part of the language faculty, and, since it seems right to think that the content of this 
concept or language of thought expression is determined by its connection to certain objects, 
or a certain property, in the world, word-world relations will (somewhat derivatively) be a 
proper part of the language faculty”. (Borg, 2004: 84) 
Thus, firstly, the language faculty consists of various interacting modules. We already 
discussed the Fodorian modularity she takes for granted (section 4.3), and the potential 
problems with it. We have also pointed out in section 4.3.2 that much of Fodor’s representation 
theory of mind is conducive to an internalist explanation. Derivatively, and as it appears in this 
quotation, much of Borg’s picture is also open to an internalist explanation: in particular, no 
elements of the external world need to be referred to in order to characterize the language 
faculty as such. Secondly, the syntax interacts with the conceptual system, and this whole is a 
part of the language faculty. This again is a picture akin to internalism. Thirdly, the content of 
a concept is determined by its connection to certain objects or properties. Thus the language-
world relation is also a part of the language faculty, as per Borg 2004 above. Moreover, as we 
already noted in 4.3.1, concepts are for Fodor mental particulars, and are internalistically 
determined: They are constituted not by the object or property they refer to (except the case of 
natural kind terms), but rather by the effect that certain experiences (of instantiations of 
properties) have on our mind.  
Before we proceed, it may be useful to rehearse the conception of internalism and 
externalism as developed in chapter 1.  Chomsky as we noted in chapter 1 distinguishes I-
language from E-language, and maintains that linguistic theory is a study of “what we may call 
‘I-language’, where ‘I’ is to suggest ‘intentional’ and ‘internalized’. The I-language is what the 
grammar purports to describe: a system represented in the mind/brain… and is in this sense 
internalized; a system that is intensional in that it may be regarded as a specific function 
considered in intension – that is a specific characterization of a function – which assigns a 
status to a vast range of physical events” (Chomsky 1997: 10). E-language, on the other hand, 
is what philosophers have traditionally understood ‘language’ to refer to: “’E’ is intended to 
suggest extensional’ and ‘externalized’. The definition is ‘extensional’ in that it takes language 
to be a set of objects of some kind, and it is ‘externalized’ in the sense that language, so defined, 
is external to the mind/brain” (Chomsky 1997: 7). Thus Chomskian internalism is distinguished 
from externalism about language through a restriction in the domain of inquiry: Chomsky 
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wants to restrict himself to studying brain/mind-internal structures, what he calls elsewhere 
(2000) the language organ or the faculty of language, as opposed to a conception of language 
which is external to the mind/brain. Borg’s domain of inquiry is clearly what Chomsky (1997) 
calls E-language. As we noted in preceding discussion, for Borg, words are related (through 
concepts) to objects in the world. She argues that internalism claims either of the following:  
(a) There are no words and objects. 
(b) These do exist, but as mind-dependent entities. 
However, internalism does not make claims about the existence or non-existence of words 
or external objects. It is a methodological decision and program for analysis in the empirical 
cognitive domain, not a metaphysical claim. It consists in the decision to investigate the 
empirical properties of mental states without reference to the external environment, or that what 
is mind internal is not individuated by what is external to the mind. Thus (a) would not be 
endorsed by internalists in the first place. Borg argues against (b) that it ‘conflates questions of 
concept content with questions of how we identify objects as falling under those concepts’. 
However, as just noted, internalism does not seek to address the issue of existence of objects 
at all (whether they fall under a certain concept or not). Rather it is a methodology for studying 
what is mind-internal without any attempts of reducing all that is external to mind internal 
entities. In fact it does not take any metaphysical position on whether or not there are external 
things at all. Importantly, moreover, Borg’s argument against (b) appears to be in conflict with 
the Fodorean position which Borg (2004) endorses, as Fodor himself claimed that most 
concepts other than natural kind concepts exist as mind-dependent, as noted in the above 
section.  
To elaborate on her argument against (b) above: Borg argues that the reason why we 
must admit that word meanings are mind-independent is that there is an element of 
‘correctness’ in the use of language (as mentioned above). “So when someone learns that 
‘contract’ means mutual agreement rather than written agreement, they take themselves to be 
corrected about the meaning of the term, yet this behaviour only makes sense given the 
externalist perspective that what matters for word meaning can lie outside the individual.” 
(Borg 2009: 46) Here Borg appears to endorse a non-atomistic decompositionalist position on 
lexical content in order to ground her externalism. However, if words are atoms, as she argues, 
then the word in question automatically cannot mean either of these things. Notwithstanding 
the internal inconsistency within this argument, it may still work against internalism. But 
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internalism does not deny that word meanings are learnt. The child must acquire the lexicon of 
a particular language through, and in agreement with other speakers of the language, in order 
to use it in that community of speakers. We will now consider Borg’s defense of 
propositionalism and whether there can be an internalist argument against it. 
Borg (2012) defends propositionalism against what she considers the prime candidate 
in recent work for motivating a rejection of propositionalism:  the phenomenon of “the apparent 
existence of well-formed sentences which apparently fail to express complete propositions 
prior to rich contextual input.” e.g.  “Jill went to a local bar [local to whom?]” and “The café 
is on the right [relative to what?]” (2012: 75) So her defense of propositionalism is the same as 
her argument against contextualism, and for minimal content, which we have already detailed 
in the preceding sections. She does not deal directly with the metaphysical issues involved with 
the assumption of propositionalism. Borg does however divorce metaphysical issues from 
epistemological issues (2001) claiming that in the case of singular terms, there is a distinction 
between what it is to be a singular term and how we can tell whether an expression is a singular 
term. Following C&L we can perhaps simply transfer these issues to the metaphysician, and 
claim that it is not a semantic issue. 
There are however other problems which arise, apart from the metaphysical, context 
shifting and incompleteness problems already mentioned73. An internalist would argue that 
there are many sentences we cannot grammatically utter in language. Consider the following:  
(13) The clown entertained the children 
(14) The clown laughed the children. (cf. Hinzen 2007) 
Though we can grammatically utter (13), (14) is an ill formed expression. There is a 
sense in which (14) could be understood as having a meaning: the clown made the children 
laugh. However, language and not the world constrains that possibility. Similarly, the 
following sentences (16) and (18) are ill formed, though they may be understood as having the 
meanings (15) and (17) respectively. 
(15) He put the books on the shelf. 
(16) He booked on the shelf. 
                                                          
73 See section 4.2.1 
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(17) A cow had a calf. 
(18) It cowed a calf. (Fodor and Lepore 1999) 
In a logically possible language, (16) might have the meaning (15), and (18) might have 
the meaning (17). Though it is not in principle impossible to interpret (16) and (18), and it may 
be possible to imagine a possible world where they could be true. However, “Grammar forbids 
assigning them the interpretations indicated.” (Hinzen 2007:145-146) As Hale and Keyser 
(1993) argue "[i]t is well known that a subject… cannot incorporate into the verb that heads its 
predicate" (1993: 60). So subject lowering is illicit and therefore (16) and (18) cannot have the 
meaning (15) and (17). Fodor and Lepore (1999) insist that what is precluded is the derivation, 
for instance of (18), from ‘A cow had a calf’, and not the primitive meaning of ‘cowed’ being 
‘cow had’: “By definition, impossible-word arguments purport to explain intuitions of the form 
"there couldn't be a word w that means 'e"' by showing that ‘e' couldn't be a derivational source 
for w. But, on the face of it, that doesn't show that there couldn't be a word that means 'e'; the 
most it could show is that if there is a word that means 'e', then it must be primitive… Assuming 
that 'a cow had' is a well-formed meaning, HK's sort of account does not explain why there 
could not be a primitive lexical item cowed that means 'a cow had'.” (Fodor and Lepore 1999: 
449) So the claim is: to say that (18) cannot be derived from (17) is not to say that ‘cowed’ 
could not exist as a primitive word meaning ‘a cow had’. But this does not show why 
impossible words are impossible; Borg (2012) agrees with this argument and notes that her 
kind of lexical complexity is not the one under attack. We discussed in section 4 how Borg 
integrates Fodorian atomism and lexical complexity and saw also that this integration leaves 
room for an internalist interpretation. Now we may point out that it is precisely this integration 
that she appeals to in order to counter internalist arguments. Borg is able to argue that, 
“impossible words are impossible since they would require the lexicalization of structures 
which are in some way illegal” (Borg 2012: 180) or rather that “there might be a prohibition 
on words whose meaning would require categorisation in a way not permitted by the language” 
(Borg 2012: 201).  
Borg also uses this thicker lexical meaning which admits of some classification in the 
form of non-meaning constitutive features, to explain other internalist challenges to a 
referential semantics. These challenges arise for instance through the following examples from 
Pietroski which seem require more than the syntax and simple denotational content of lexical 
items: 
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(19) John is too clever to catch a fish 
(20) John is too clever to catch 
(21) John is eager to please 
(22) John is easy to please. 
Despite the surface similarities, these sentences require very different treatment. 
Although in (19) and (21) John is the agent, this is not the case in (20) and (21). Pietroski 
(2005) points out that non-ambiguity also needs to be explained: we need to explain the 
negative fact of why, for instance, (22) can’t mean that ‘It is easy for John to please us’. Further: 
‘eager’ and ‘easy’ differ semantically in an important sense, which cannot be explained simply 
by saying that ‘eager’ means EAGER and easy means EASY. Borg (2012) argues that such 
facts can be explained by her introduction of semantic features to the lexicon. But as we already 
saw in section 4.4, this moves opens her theory to an internalist interpretation rather that 
providing a solution to internalist challenges. 
In this section we have considered ((B), (C) and (D) from the introduction: a defense 
of a propositional account of semantic content, considered the referential nature of this content, 
and a defense from internalist arguments against it. We saw that while for C&L 
propositionalism is an undefended assumption, for Borg it is inextricably linked to her 
argument against contextualism. Both Borg and C&L however, distance themselves from 
metaphysical claims: C&L through distinguishing metaphysical from semantic issues, and 
Borg through distinguishing metaphysical from epistemological issues. The latter move also 
leads Borg to maintain that although her account is a referential one, we may neither be able to 
pick out the world in which an utterance is true, nor the object of reference74. So reference 
remains in a sense (and ironically so) a theoretical claim. Furthermore, Borg’s arguments 
against internalist challenges rests on her integration of lexical complexity and atomism75, 
which can in turn be interpreted internalistically. What remains however, is Borg’s contention 
that semantics without reference to the world is simply not semantics. 
Borg clarifies however that “what minimalism is committed to is the idea that semantic 
contents are the kinds of things which can be true or false and to get this result what is needed 
is just some kind of commitment to weak externalism, construed simply, as Rey 2005 suggests, 
as the view that ascriptions of some content depend in one way or another on relations a 
                                                          
74 See section 2.2 for a preliminary account of how reference is accounted for in Borg (2004, 2012) 
75 See section 4 for details of this integration. 
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computational system bears to things outside itself [not in one way or another, I would say, but 
on a way that is exactly specified by grammar (for example, causal relations are not enough)]. 
That is to say, minimalism assumes a lexical semantics which contains some kind of symbol-
world connection. What I’ll be arguing for, then, is more a denial of internalism than presenting 
the case for a specific kind of externalism.” (Borg 2012:144, footnote 2) 
So here it appears that she is arguing for an indeterminate kind of externalism, while at 
the same time, importantly distancing herself from internalism. But in case she merely wants 
to stress the need for a referentialist account, it does not seem necessary to argue against 
internalism per se: for there are internalist strategies which can capture reference to some 
degree (Hinzen 2007 for instance)76. We may note here however, that in the weakened claim 
above, she sets herself the lesser task of arguing against internalism, and not at the same time 
defending externalism. Thus we may grant her an indeterminate symbol-world relation which 
common sense takes for granted. But in our discussions above we noted that it is precisely her 
argument against internalism which are not convincing. And much of her position including 
the Fodorian assumptions can be interpreted internalistically. Thus there appears to be no 
reason why a minimal semanticist cannot be an internalist. Borg’s externalism does not inform 
any of her arguments or explanations, and remains a stipulation, although a central one. 
Consider the sentence “Bill is ready”. For Borg (2012: 202) “’ready’ always means 
ready, the content of this expression is exhausted by the property in the world to which it refers. 
However, the term ‘ready’ gets characterised within our lexicon as belonging to a set of two-
place adjectives, a set of terms which requires both a subject and an object.” Thus, following 
her externalist referential stance, the meaning of ‘ready’ is simply denotational and refers to a 
property in the world. Being a property, it necessarily requires a subject, but not an object. The 
apparent incompleteness is addressed by the organisation of the lexicon: ‘ready’ is lexically 
marked as a two-place adjective which requires both a subject and an object. The reason why 
taking two arguments is not part of the constitutive (as opposed to organisational lexical) 
meaning is, Borg insist, because meanings are denotational. 
Besides this stipulation, there appears to be no reason why taking two arguments should 
not be a part of the meaning of ‘ready’ as opposed to forming a part of the organisation of the 
lexicon. In fact, we intuitively recognise ready as needing both a subject and a particular object. 
                                                          
76 Infact, Hinzen (2007) argues that if you want to capture what is humanly specific about reference (which is 
almost all of it), then the externalist elements simply do not enter in any explanatory role. 
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As Collins 2013 points out “Bill is not ready has the natural reading where whatever it is that 
Bill is not ready to do is construed as wide-scoping over negation, that is, one is saying that 
Bill isn’t ready to do some particular thing, not that Bill isn’t ready to do anything at all. Thus, 
it seems as if bare ready is not incomplete, but obligatorily existentially definite as regards its 
complement position” (2013: 154) Borg seems to recognise this and argues that “information 
associated with the term itself tells us that the logical form of sentences containing ‘ready’ must 
always have the form __ready__" (Borg 2012:202 emphasis added) But she explains this 
understanding of ‘ready’ through “information associated with the term” as opposed to the 
meaning of the term. This lexical information, Borg claims, contributes to the meaning of 
‘ready’ in terms of how it behaves syntactically for example, but it does not constitute the 
meaning, which is denotational. However, if Borg’s minimal propositions are sensitive to the 
kind of organisation that syntax provides, one argument against this could be that syntax 
provides too much structure (Collins 200777), much of it unnecessary and unhelpful towards 
providing the truth conditions for the sentence (e.g. structures generated by movement and 
copying78). On the other hand, given that (perceived) incompleteness is a criterion for Borg to 
introduce lexical complexity, ‘ready’ and ‘tall’ for instance would not fall in this category, as 
these are not understood as incomplete, but rather as requiring two arguments: i.e. someone is 
ready for/to do something, and someone is tall with relation to a class. In other words, Borg 
does not provide enough/clear grounds for introduction of lexical complexity for certain terms. 
She argues that the introduction depends on the syntactic effects of purported incompleteness. 
However, as we just noted, these terms are not perceived as incomplete, and if syntactic 
behaviour is what we must go by, then there is too much information that syntax provides, and 
for all terms, which would need to by lexically marked. That ‘ready’ means ready does not 
seem to have any explanatory role in this argument. We note here that explaining and 
externalist stance may not be what Borg was after to begin with, as externalism and denotation 
forms one of her axioms. However, what interested us in this work was a possibility that an 
externalist referential account, involving minimal propositions, could answer to our original 
intuitions requiring both an internalist and externalist explanation. Borg, as we now see neither 
provides such explanation nor perhaps aims to provide it. We were seeking an explanation for 
what was to begin with, and remains, a stipulation, or rather an axiom within her work. We 
therefore cannot retain anything from this position.  
                                                          
77 Here he argues against the understanding of propositions as that what syntax offers. 
78 See for instance Collins 2007 for more detail. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
We set out in this chapter to seek a minimal referential semantic theory. We began with two 
main contenders: Borg (2004, 2012) and C&L (2005a,b) and noted that in order to defend their 
positions they would need to argue against contextualist and internalist79 challenges, argue for 
propositional/truth conditional semantics, and explain referential relations. In section 4.2 we 
noted the minimalists argue that the truth-conditionally relevant contextual elements find their 
source in syntax (hidden variables for Stanley 2000 or the class of demonstratives for C&L 
2005a,b) or can be interpreted in syntactic terms (Borg 2004). For instance, ‘you’ is understood 
as the contextually invariant form: ‘the addressee of the sentence’. We saw also, that neither 
the contextualist arguments nor the empirical evidence discussed affect the minimal 
compositional core of meaning. In section 4.3 we considered one of Borg’s main arguments 
against contextualism, namely that modularity is desirable as a theory of mind, and that 
contextualism cannot accommodate modularity; therefore, contextualism must be discarded. 
We saw however, that this argument is flawed in various ways. We saw furthermore that much 
of the Fodorian position Borg assumes is amenable to an internalist explanation. In section 4 
we argued that Borg extends Fodor’s commitments through extending his realism of natural 
kind concepts to all concepts, retaining his atomism while introducing a form of lexical 
complexity. This integration of atomism and lexical complexity, however, shifts Borg’s 
position more into internalist territory. In section 5 we noted that Borg’s defense against 
internalist challenges rests on her integration of atomism and lexical complexity, and this is 
itself conducive to internalism. Thus we can conclude that, in case we can have a minimal 
semantics, there is no reason why it must be externalist, or in other words, our discussion so 
far points to the possibility of an internalist minimal semantics.  
There appears to be no argumental necessity for endorsing externalism which arises 
from our discussion of minimal semantics. So we may accept all of the following claims we 
discussed as belonging to a minimal semantic position: there is a minimal semantic level of 
interpretation prior to contextual interference. At this minimal level, we may not be able to 
identify the object of reference, though through the notion of character, we have a bridge 
between the linguistic and other cognitive domains which help attach a concept to the 
descriptive understanding of for instance ‘addressee of the sentence’.  Hence, through the 
interaction of cognitive domains we are able to pick out the object of reference. But through 
                                                          
79 Task specific to Borg’s version of Semantic minimalism. 
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all these steps we remain within mind-internal descriptions. The addition that allows the theory 
to retain its externalist character is the idea that the content of a concept is, as Borg maintains, 
the object itself. However, nothing within the structure of the theory necessitates this addition. 
Thus, if we take reference not merely as a primitive (as Borg does), but assume that we need 
to explain its human-specific features, all the explaining factors are internalist ones. As we 
noted, Borg’s externalism does not inform any of her arguments or explanations, and remains 
a stipulation, although a central one.  
4.7 Consequences Towards Our Original Intuitions 
We saw in this chapter that Borg’s theory did not turn out to account for both externalism and 
an argument against contextualism. This leaves open at least one of the two following 
possibilities: either externalism is not needed for arguing against contextualism, and we could 
thereby follow the line of internalists; or alternatively, a full blown externalist position could 
account for the intuition that an element of use creeps into what constitutes a proposition. 
However, both of these alternatives answer to only one of our two Wittgensteinian intuitions 
(we started out seeking a theory which accounts for both a content internal understanding of 
meaning, as well as the aboutness of language). Another option available to us here is to 
reinterpret the internalist/externalist divide. This is what we will attempt in the next chapter. 
We will attempt to formulate an account that could potentially answer to both of our initial 
intuitions, and be in line with our re-interpretation of Wittgenstein: that an element of use is 
already inherent in what constitutes a proposition. Thus, although we cannot retain anything 
from Borg’s position, it does point to the kind of alternative we are seeking to answer our 
original intuitions.
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Chapter 5: A Unified Theory and its Application 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The debate between internalism and externalism arises, as we noted in chapter 1, with respect 
to varied domains of inquiry. In the philosophy of mind and language, the debate arises with 
respect to the individuation of linguistic meaning, mental content, and propositional attitudes 
(Goldberg 2007) We have been concerned particularly with content internalism and 
externalism in this thesis.80 As Lohndal and Narita (2009) aptly point out: “the core claim of 
internalists who, like Chomsky, seek a naturalistic theory of language is that the proper object 
of a serious linguistic science should be organism-internal aspects of human language (namely 
I-language). Internalists never deny that there are phenomena broadly related to language (in 
particular to language use) that are beyond the narrow confines of the architecture of the human 
mental grammar (I-language). Such phenomena would surely include prescriptive pressures 
from the linguistic community, speakers’ intentionality for communicative success, and all 
sorts of other E-language phenomena […] What internalists doubt is rather the feasibility 
and/or legitimacy of providing a serious science of any mind-external phenomena such as 
these.”81 (Lohndal and Narita 2009: 326) 
This doubt is what I seek to address in this chapter. Davidson, through his unified 
theory, gives us what appears to be a serious scientific way of approaching the mind external 
phenomena, though we would here be in the realm of the social sciences.82 He combines a 
theory of truth, traditionally understood as an externalist enterprise, with decision theory, the 
domain of which is, at least partially, the mind internal beliefs and desires. I have, so far, 
attempted to reconcile two dominant ideas found in Wittgenstein’s works: first, what I have 
called the internalist strand in Wittgenstein83, and the second, the externalist element: that when 
we talk or use language, we refer to objects, events, places external to language itself. 
                                                          
80 For  details refer to section 1.3  
81 For a discussion on the difference between I-language and E-language, refer to section 1.4 
82 Though if one considers it more scientific to reduce talk of beliefs, desires and other mental phenomena, to 
something physical, Davidson’s anomalous monism insists that there are no law-like correlations between 
phenomena classified as mental and phenomena classified as physical, though mental entities are identical, taken 
one at a time, with physical entities. (Davidson 1995: 120-21) 
83 exemplified, for instance, by his claim that “[The] content of the sentence is in the sentence”(BBB 167) 
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Davidson’s unified theory thus particularly appeals to this enterprise. Through this chapter we 
will see whether we can adopt a Davidsonian decision theoretic approach, towards reducing or 
reinterpreting the internalist/externalist divide. 
5.2 A Substantive Account of Truth as a Theory of Meaning 
Davidson’s seminal paper ‘Truth and Meaning’ (1967) has been widely discussed and reviewed 
over the past 45 years. What is particularly relevant for our purposes is that Davidson rejected 
the possibility that each word has some entity as its meaning. He suggested, among other 
problems, that this would lead to infinite regress while explaining how meanings of sentences 
are generated from these word meanings. Importantly, for Davidson, the sentence is the unit of 
meaning. And knowing the meaning of the sentence does not simply consist of knowing the 
meanings of words combined with the appropriate syntax, “for knowledge of the structural 
characteristics that make for meaningfulness in a sentence, plus knowledge of the meanings of 
the ultimate parts, does not add up to knowledge of what the sentence means.”84 (Davidson 
1967: 21) But he also rejected the idea that the meaning of a sentence is what it refers to, as 
this would entail that all sentences with the same truth value would be synonymous.  
What he starts with seeking is “a theory that has as consequences all sentences of the 
form ‘s means m’ where ‘s’ is replaced by a structural description of a sentence and ‘m’ is 
replaced by a singular term that refers to the meaning of that sentence” (1967:20) He then 
replaces ‘s means m’ with ‘s means that p’, where the latter is without the problematic singular 
term which is supposed to refer to meaning, and p stands for a sentence. What he wants from 
the theory, or what, according to Davidson, would make the theory adequate, would be that we 
have for every sentence (s) a sentence (p) which somehow gives the meaning of s.85 It is clear 
that p can easily be replaced with the sentence s itself. But the predicate ‘means that’ is a non-
extensional predicate. So he replaces that with an extensional predicate to get the following:  
(T): s is T if and only if p86 (1967:23)  
                                                          
84 This problem arose, for Davidson, in the case of belief sentences, where word meanings do not help towards 
giving us the truth conditions of these sentences. 
85 “The theory will have done its work if it provides, for every sentence s in the language under study, a matching 
sentence (to replace ‘p’) that, in some way yet to be made clear, ‘gives the meaning’ of s. One obvious candidate 
for matching sentence is just s itself, if the object language is contained in the metalanguage; otherwise a 
translation of s in the metalanguage.” (Davidson 1967: 23) 
86 Where ‘s’ is replaced by the description of a sentence s, ‘T’ is an extensional predicate, if and only if is the 
logical connective and ‘p’ is replaced by the sentence s. 
 128 
For (T) to be significant for a theory of meaning, the following conditions should be 
met: (i) it must not appeal to any more semantic notions, (ii) it should “place enough restrictions 
on the predicate ‘is T’ to entail all sentences got from schema T when ‘s’ is replaced by a 
structural description of a sentence of L and ‘p’ by that sentence.”87 (1967:23) The reason why 
(T) would work for a theory of meaning is that any predicates which satisfy the above 
conditions, have the same extension. Now, Davidson contends that from the above we discover 
that “the sentences to which the predicate ‘is T’ applies will be just the true sentences of L, for 
the conditions we have placed on satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence Tarski’s 
Convention T that tests the adequacy of a formal semantic definition of truth.” (1967:23) 
So the strategy is, to put it briefly, that we start with trying to find the meaning of a 
sentence, but realize that ‘means that’ is not extensional88; so we shift to an extensional 
predicate and impose certain conditions on it, for it to best generate meanings; and then we 
realize that these conditions lead us to Tarski’s Convention T89, and the predicate that satisfies 
these conditions is precisely Tarski’s truth predicate. So we move from seeking a predicate that 
would generate meanings, to arriving at the truth predicate.  
It is important for our purposes that Davidson’s condition (T) above (1967:23) deals 
with sentences as a whole (and descriptions of sentences as a whole), and does not tell us, for 
instance, how the meanings of sentences depends on the meanings of its parts. Given the 
observation (1967:21) above, Davidson contends that word meanings and compositionality are 
insufficient for meaning as they are insufficient for identifying truth conditions. We get truth-
conditions, which are clearly what Davidson wants from a theory of meaning, only from whole 
sentences. So a theory of meaning is also a theory of truth for Davidson90. Now, a theory of 
truth does, “in a minimal but important respect, do what we want [from a theory of semantics], 
that is, give the meanings of all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of an 
analysis of their structure.” (1970:55) It is therefore clear that the structure of the sentence is 
also important for Davidson, but this is only because we need a finite way of capturing 
potentially infinite true sentences. He thereby places the following demands on the theory: (i) 
it should “account for the meaning (or conditions of truth) of every sentence by analyzing it as 
                                                          
87 Where ‘L’ refers to a language. 
88 The assumption is, for Davidson, that we would prefer that our theory of meaning be extensional. 
89 Tarski’s Convention T: X is true if, and only if, p (with 'p' replaced by any sentence of the language to which 
the word "true" refers, and 'X' replaced by a name of this sentence)  
90 Though he insists that truth conditions and meanings cannot be equated: “at best we can say that by giving the 
truth conditions of a sentence we give its meaning” (1970: 56, footnote 3). 
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composed, in truth relevant ways, of elements drawn from a finite stock” (emphasis added); 
(ii) it should “provide a method for deciding, given an arbitrary sentence, what its meaning is” 
(Davidson 1970: 56)91 Tarski’s Convention T again satisfies these conditions. What is needed 
from the theory is to give a recursive account of truth92. Equipped with such as account, we 
would be in a position to say for any sentence what is required for it to be true, “and this 
amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to understanding the language.” 
(Davidson 1967:24) In 2.1 below, we’ll consider what this semantic conception of truth is for 
Davidson. 
5.2.1 Davidson on Deflationism and the Nature of Truth 
There are various forms of deflationism about truth (Horwich 1998, 2008; Field 1986,1994), 
but what is largely common to them is the claim that truth is not a substantive notion. Horwich, 
as we noted in chapter 3, deflated both compositionality and truth. Davidson (1990a,1996) has 
argued against Horwich and against deflationism, to establish his substantive conception of 
truth. Here, we will point out what motivated Davidson against deflationism and towards a 
substantive account of truth, in order to better understand the nature and kind of truth that 
Davidson’s theory is able to offer. This understanding would enable us to see whether 
Davidson’s truth theory can capture the aboutness of language. 
Deflationism about truth, and specifically the kind that considers Tarski’s definition93 
to be disquotational, can be understood in two ways: either as claiming that Tarski didn’t 
capture all aspects of truth, or that the concept of truth is not as deep as we thought. According 
to Davidson, the former is the case, because nothing in Tarski’s definition shows what these 
definitions have in common (Davidson 1990a). Deflationists believe that convention-T 
provides an adequate answer to the question ‘what [do] Tarski’s definitions have in common’, 
but Davidson insists that this is not the case, and he is therefore not a deflationist. This is 
because, he argues, in cases where the object language is contained in the meta-language the 
requirement within convention-T is “merely syntactical” i.e. “it tells us something about the 
predicates, but not much about the concept. In other cases (where the object language is not 
                                                          
91 There is a third condition he mentions here : “the statements of truth conditions for individual sentences entailed 
by the theory should, in some way yet to be made precise, draw upon the same concepts as the sentences whose 
truth conditions they state”, but we omit discussing it for our present purposes.   
92 i.e. “to show that the syntax of the language is formalizable in at least the sense that every true expression may 
be analyzed as formed from elements (the ‘vocabulary), a finite supply of which suffice for the language by the 
application of rules, a finite number of which suffice for the language.” (1970:57) 
93 Refer to note 10 above. 
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contained in the meta-language) its application depends on our prior understanding of the 
notion of translation, a concept far more obscure than that of truth. The central point is this: 
aside from our grasp of the concept of translation, convention-T gives us no idea how to tell in 
general when one of Tarski's truth predicates applies to a particular language. He does not 
define the concept of translation.” (1990a:296) An appeal to the undefined concept of 
translation already leaves out an important aspect of truth, and makes us unable to articulate 
what these definitions have in common. 
Another criticism against Tarski’s definitions is that they turn empirical or substantive 
truths into truths of logic.94 The solution could be to add that “Tarski’s predicate holds for all 
and only the true sentences of L” (Davidson 1990a: 292), where ‘true’ is the substantive 
undefined concept. But Davidson notes that the addition is not required: “we can just as well 
regard Tarski's truth predicate 's is trueL' as having the properties of our real-life predicate 's is 
true in L’, as long as those properties do not create inconsistencies.” (Davidson 1990a: 292) 
But, since the definition is no longer stipulative, we don’t know what ‘true’ means and whether 
it would lead to inconsistencies. Davidson insists, however, that this is closer to what Tarski 
himself intended, as he claimed that his definition “does not aim to specify the meaning of a 
familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual 
meaning of an old notion” (Tarski 1944: 341) 
Davidson, then, maintains that Tarski’s definition does not entail that the T-sentences 
are logical truths. They would be logical truths only if the truth-definitions are purely 
stipulative, or tell us everything there is to know about truth. And, whether the definitions are 
stipulative depends on the intention of the definer and can’t be determined by studying the 
system. He puts forth the following analogy in order to illuminate this point: “Suppose we offer 
as a definition of the predicate 'x is a solar planet' the following: x is a solar planet if and only 
if x is just one of the following: Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, 
Pluto. This entails the P-sentence 'Neptune is a solar planet'. Is this last a logical truth? One 
may as well say so if our definition is purely stipulative, otherwise not. The question whether 
it is purely stipulative is not one that can be answered by studying the formal system; it 
concerns the intentions of the person making the definition. If we were simply presented with 
the defining sentence, we could hardly fail to notice that, if we interpret the words in more or 
                                                          
94 For instance, according to Etchemendy: although T-sentences seem to convey substantive truths, “they carry no 
information about the semantic properties of [the] language, not even about the truth conditions of its sentences” 
(Davidson 1990a:290) because T-sentences are truths of logic. 
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less the usual way, it expresses a substantive truth.” (Davidson 1990a: 293-294) The point of 
contention is whether the P-sentence ‘Neptune is a solar planet’ can be logically derived from 
the definition, and is therefore a logical rather than an empirical truth. Davidson is arguing that 
whether it is a logical or empirical truth depends upon the intentions of the speaker: whether 
the speaker intended the definition to be purely stipulative or expressing a substantive truth. 
Davidson claims that all we need to do is work “within Tarski’s system while acknowledging 
that the truth predicate has further essential properties, as long as we make no use of the 
unspecified properties.” (1990a: 294) In this way, Davidson claims to give us a theory of truth, 
where “A theory of truth, in contrast to a stipulative definition of truth, is an empirical theory 
about the truth conditions of every sentence in some corpus of sentences.” We can therefore 
use Tarski-like truth conditions, for instance, “‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white” and 
still claim that such truth conditions do not say everything there is to say about truth. The word 
‘true’ used here is used to denote the intuitive substantive concept. 
So for Davidson, “it is truth rather than reference [or satisfaction] that is the basic 
primitive.” (1990a:299) This is because of “the key role of convention-T in determining that 
truth, as characterized by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth” 
(1990a:299) It is only in the implementation of convention-T for particular languages that we 
need the satisfaction predicate. And in fact he argues, in line with Quine’s inscrutability of 
reference, that we can substitute endless other relations for any given satisfaction relation 
“without altering the truth conditions of any sentence or the logical relations among sentences.” 
(Davidson 1997a:78) Thus Davidson considers the concept of truth as neither trivial nor 
shrouded in mysterious metaphysics. It is rather an intuitive concept which is readily available, 
unlike other semantic concepts like reference and satisfaction.95  
5.2.2 Objectivity and Holism 
If meanings are given by Tarski-like truth conditions, then the question arises, how is it that 
we can know that the conditions are satisfied at all, since even asking this question “would 
appear to require a confrontation between what we believe and reality; and the idea of such a 
confrontation is absurd” (Davidson 1983:137). Davidson’s point is that “nothing can count as 
a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (1983: 141) We might want to say that a 
                                                          
95 “[W]hat is open to observation is the use of sentences in context, and truth is the semantic concept we understand 
best. Reference and related semantic notions like satisfaction are, by comparison, theoretical concepts (as are the 
notions of singular term, predicate, sentential connective, and the rest).” (Davidson 1990a: 300) 
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sensation justifies the belief in that sensation; but this justification cannot apply to external 
objects. Davidson (1995a) follows Descartes96 in the belief that what one knows for certain is 
that thought exists, but unlike Descartes, he does not cast doubt upon everything that we think 
we know97. So the world is, more or less, the way we think it is; or in other words most of our 
beliefs about the world are in fact correct.98 
A shared, objective reality is thus a starting point, and not a reasoned consequence. The 
very existence of thought attests to (though it does not explain) the existence of an objective 
reality, since one cannot have a belief (the most basic form of thought) without understanding 
that a belief may be false. “Awareness of the possibility of surprise, the entertainment of 
expectations – these are essential concomitants of belief” (1995a:7) He argues that surprise 
“requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I did believe and what I come to believe. 
Such awareness, however, is a belief about a belief: if I am surprised then among other things 
I come to believe that my original belief was false.”(1980: 104) Thus surprise comes with the 
realization that our earlier belief was false. So when we are in a position to be surprised, we 
are in a position to evaluate our own beliefs and change them based on new information 
regarding objective reality. But surprise cannot explain objective truth, as we already need the 
concept of objective truth in order to be surprised. The point is that recognizing the chance that 
we may be wrong is to recognize that beliefs can be tested. And “the notion of a proposition 
being true or false independent of one’s beliefs or interests” is the notion of objectivity. Thus, 
“to have the concept of truth is to have the concept of objectivity.” (1995a:10) None of this 
derives the existence of an objective reality. 
It is not just the concept of truth whose possession entails another concept (objectivity), 
rather, for Davidson, it is not possible for a creature to entertain a thought on its own: “the 
identity of a given thought depends in part on its relations to other thoughts.” (1995a:11) To 
have any single belief, is to have a multitude of other true beliefs on which it depends. For 
instance, “my belief, if it is to be about a snake, whether it is a true belief or a false one, depends 
on a background of true beliefs about the nature of snakes, of animals, of physical objects of 
                                                          
96 Descartes rather began with doubting everything, and deduced from this that what I cannot doubt is the fact that 
I doubt, i.e. that I think. 
97 “I should begin, then, as I think we clearly must, in medias res, assuming that we have a roughly correct view 
of our surroundings and of the existence of other people with minds of their own… Of course we are apt to be 
wrong about many things, but the possibility of error depends on a generous supply of truths” (Davidson 1995a:5) 
98 “It is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality of beliefs, something outside this totality which we 
can use to compare with our beliefs. The answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing most 
of our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence.” (Davidson 1983: 146) 
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the world.” Thus to have any belief, we need a host of true beliefs; though, “with respect to 
most of our beliefs, any particular one may be false.” (1995a:16) What saves truth from being 
‘radically non-epistemic’99 is that “belief, through its ties with meaning, is intrinsically 
veridical.”(Davidson 1983: 156) The idea is that although any particular belief may be false, 
they cannot all collectively be false. This is because belief and meaning are interconnected.100 
So Davidsonian Holism entails that “to have a concept, to entertain propositions, to be able to 
form judgements, to have command of the concept of truth. If a creature has one of these 
attributes, it has them all.” (1995a: 9)  
In Davidson (1983) he calls his theory of truth a coherence theory in order to stress that 
the concepts of meaning, truth and belief are interrelated: “each of these concepts requires the 
others, but none is subordinate to, much less definable in terms of, the others.”(1983: 156) In 
1987 Davidson added some clarifications as afterthoughts to this paper. Calling his theory a 
coherence theory, he clarified, was a way of making the negative point “that ‘all that counts as 
evidence or justification for a belief must come from the same totality of beliefs to which it 
belongs’.” (1987:155) But this does not lead Davidson, unlike others who hold this view, to 
the conclusion that reality and truth are constructs of thought.101  
Davidson however is not arguing for realism of the correspondence theory variety. He 
agrees with C. I. Lewis that a correspondence theory of truth faces the objection that there is 
nothing for true sentences to correspond to, “that if sentences correspond to anything at all, it 
must be the universe as a whole; thus all true sentences correspond to the same thing.”(1988: 
183) Neither does he want to advocate the kind of coherence theory that ties truth directly to 
what is believed and is therefore subjective. But to reject it, he insists, “is not to say there is no 
connection whatever between belief and truth.” (1988: 185) Rather “there are inescapable and 
obvious ties among the concepts of truth, belief and meaning. If a sentence s of mine means 
that p, and I believe that p, then I believe that s is true. What gives my belief its content, and 
my sentence its meaning, is my knowledge of what is required for the belief or the sentence to 
                                                          
99 Here being radically non-epistemic “implies that all our best-researched and -established thoughts and theories 
may be false”. (Davidson 1983:140) 
 
100 See sections 5.2.3 and 5.3 for more details on this connection. 
101 Another reason he identifies, to not stress coherence is that coherence is nothing but consistency, and although 
it is “in favor of a set of beliefs that they are consistent, but there is no chance that a person’s beliefs will not tend 
to be consistent, since beliefs are individuated in part by their logical properties; what is not largely consistent 
with many other beliefs, cannot be identified as a belief.”(Davidson 1983: 155) 
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be true.” (1988: 188-9) Thus meaning comes from knowledge of the truth conditions of the 
sentence or belief.  
For Davidson “All attempts to characterize truth that go beyond giving empirical 
content to a structure of the sort Tarski taught us how to describe are empty, false or confused. 
We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted assertability… To the 
extent that realism and antirealism depend on one or another of these views of truth we should 
refuse to endorse either.” (1988: 190) It is by giving empirical content to the Tarskian structure 
that he makes sure that his semantic conception of truth is substantive and not deflationary. We 
still need to explain how, given the observation (1987:155) above, we are able to go beyond 
the realm of beliefs and reach an objective reality. We take this up in 5.2.3 below.  
5.2.3 Triangulation 
“Our sense of objectivity” is, according to Davidson, a consequence of a sort of triangulation, 
which among other things requires two creatures. “Each interacts with an object, but what gives 
each the concept of the way things are objectively is the baseline formed between the creatures 
by language.” (1980:105) Triangulation is “a prelinguistic, precognitive situation which seems 
to me to constitute a necessary condition for thought and language, a condition that can exist 
independent of thought, and can therefore precede it.” (1997b: 128) Triangulation is a threefold 
interaction, which “involves two or more creatures simultaneously in interaction with each 
other and the world they share.” (1997b: 128) One line of the triangle goes from the speaker to 
the object, another from the interpreter to the object, and the third from the speaker to the 
interpreter. The intersection of the first two lines is what locates the object in a shared space. 
Once these correlations (the triangle) are set up, each creature is in a position to expect the 
external phenomena (a table for instance) when it perceives the associated response of the other 
(the utterance ‘table’). Error comes in when there is the occasional failure of expectation, i.e. 
the reactions do not correlate. The point isn’t that consensus defines the concept of truth, but 
that it creates the space for its application. If this is right then thought as well as language is 
necessarily social.  
Although necessary to thought, triangulation is not a sufficient condition: being pre-
linguistic, it can also exist in animals. What’s needed in addition, and what is essential to 
thought, is language: “Unless the baseline of the triangle, the line between the two agents is 
strengthened to the point where it can implement the communication of propositional contents, 
there is no way the agents can make use of the triangular situation to form judgements about 
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the world.” (1997b: 130) It is through using a language which we understand, that we can 
interpret others: “the sentences of a language we understand have a known structure which we 
can use to understand other speakers.” (1997b: 132) 
This brings us to a fundamental principle of Davidson’s work on triangulation: the 
principle of charity. In an interpretive situation, Davidson insists, following Quine, on the 
centrality of the Principle of Charity, which entails that we interpret others according to our 
own standards of rationality. The principle of charity “directs the interpreter to translate or 
interpret so as to read some of his own standards of truth into the pattern of sentences held true 
by the speaker.” (1983: 148) For successful interpretation within a triangular situation, the 
speaker and the interpreter must recognize the similarity of their responses, i.e. what they 
naturally group together as similar must be very much alike. In other words, “A condition for 
being a speaker is that there must be others enough like oneself.” (1992: 120) Thus triangulation 
demands that there must be at least two creatures interacting with one another, and further that 
these creatures must be greatly like each other. A single creature by itself is not enough: “there 
would be no saying what a speaker was thinking or talking about, no basis for claiming he 
could locate objects in an objective space and time, without interaction with a second person.” 
(1992: 121) 
Thus a lot of what we can know about truth, and objective reality, depends on our 
interaction with others. And much of this interaction depends on ascribing to others, our own 
standards of rationality. So, for Davidson, our understanding of truth is inextricably linked to 
our understanding of rational behavior. Davidson argued for a unified theory of thought, 
meaning and action, and a step towards achieving such unification was to put together a 
decision theory and a truth theory. As we noted in section 2.1, what is important for Davidson 
is the primitive (or intuitive) notion of truth applied to an interpretive context. But how are we 
then to confirm the truth of the T-sentences in such interpretive contexts? This is where 
decision theory becomes central to Davidson’s enterprise: “to the extent that an agent is rational 
he will take what he believes is the best bet available (he “maximizes expected utility”).” 
(1990a: 316) We will, in the following section, try to understand Davidson’s application of 
decision theory to sentences. 
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5.3 Decision Theory and its Place in Davidson’s Work 
Everything we do involves a choice. Choices pervade actions, inactions, and even our very 
existence. If the ability to make choices is so central to our being, it is important to try to find 
a way to explain our choices. Decision theory attempts to do just that. It rests on the idea that 
if your actions are reasoned and not random, and you are a rational agent, you would attempt 
to choose that which you think is the best possible outcome (i.e. you maximize expected 
utility). At first glance, this idea seems rather natural and intuitive, nothing controversial. For 
our purposes, it is in the details of how this is (potentially) applied to a truth theory, that the 
problems arise. 
Decision theory “shows how to extract both cardinal utilities and subjective 
probabilities from simple preferences”, and “subjective probabilities when taken as applied to 
sentences, are enough to yield a theory of meaning.” (Davidson 1995) Cardinal Utilities 
measure the value a person gives to something. Subjective probability represents “the 
observer’s degree (or strength) of belief that the system will adopt a certain state.” (French 
1988/1993: 222). The claim then is that an individual’s preference of one sentence over 
another, gives us both what a person prefers (or values more), as well as what they believe is 
(or will be) the case. Davidson (1995) argues that “conditional probabilities and entailments 
between sentences, by registering what the speaker takes to be evidence for his beliefs, provides 
the interpreter with what is needed to interpret more theoretical terms and sentences.” 
(1995:127) But he continues that we never have sufficient evidence, and we make all sorts of 
assumptions about the speaker’s beliefs and desires etc. The claim is that we use our own norms 
and standards of rationality in order to interpret others. This is the reason why a mere manual 
of translation (in line with Quine 1960) is not sufficient for interpretation, as we need a way to 
interpret such a manual, and in this interpretation, we use our own standards of rationality.102  
Before we go any further, I think it is important to note that the entire enterprise, i.e. 
the attempt to put together Decision theory and Truth theory is, for Davidson, a conceptual 
exercise: “The approach…is not…meant to throw any direct light on how in real life we come 
                                                          
102 Thus in Turing’s Test (1990b) Davidson argues that for the interpreter to know whether the object of the 
experiment is thinking (as opposed to whether it is a person or a machine), the object needs to be brought out in 
the open so that its interactions with the world can be observed. Merely by knowing that they are human we can 
legitimately infer that (like in our own case) there are causal connections between the person’s words and the 
world; or alternatively we can discover these connections through observing how the speaker interacts with the 
world. 
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to understand each other, nor on how we master our first concepts and our first language.” He 
admits that it is a “conceptual exercise aimed at revealing the dependencies among our basic 
propositional attitudes.” (1990a: 324-25) So applying decision theory to sentences is not meant 
to explain how we actually understand one another or learn to use language, but rather it 
potentially explains how truth, meaning, belief and desires are related. 
Towards this aim, Davidson begins with the conceptual acceptance of the principle of 
maximization of expected utility (as suggested in Davidson 1990a:316). Again, conceptually, 
this principle works on the idea that in making decisions, rational agents try to choose what 
they believe is the best available option (i.e. they try to maximize expected utility). This choice 
in turn depends upon the comparative values the agent puts on the expected outcomes (or how 
much he desires the outcomes, i.e. the cardinal utility) and the degree of belief that it will occur 
(or the expected probability). The problem in applying decision theory to truth theory is that 
we do not know how to tell what degree of belief a person has in some proposition or what the 
relative strengths of his preferences among propositions are.  
Ramsey’s solution to this problem involves finding a proposition which is as likely to 
be as true as it is false (for instance ‘The outcome of this coin toss will be heads’). This 
proposition is then used to construct a series of wagers, and choices among these show how 
the various options are valued. With these values (the desirability of the various options), it is 
then easy to calculate the degrees of belief. Davidson admits (1995b) that although this is 
theoretically possible, in reality we may never have sufficient evidence103, i.e. we make all 
sorts of assumptions about people and their beliefs and desires. The whole theory, he contends, 
is built on the norms of rationality, and as per the principle of charity, you use your own 
standards of rationality to interpret others. The Unified theory, he admits further, leaves no 
room for irrationality, neither does it say anything about “the forms of rationality that deal with 
incorporation of new information into a system of thought.” (133) The theory is holistic in the 
sense that “sentences are interpreted in terms of their relation to other sentences, beliefs in 
terms of their relation to other beliefs and so on.” (1995b: 130)  
Within this relational interdependent whole, we get our sense of objectivity through 
triangulation that requires two creatures and an object. “Each interacts with an object but what 
gives each the concept of the way things are objectively is the base line formed between the 
                                                          
103 “[T]here is no escape from the fact that we cannot check up on the… objective correctness of our own norms 
by checking with others, since to do this would be to make basic use of our own norms once more.” (1995b: 134) 
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creatures by language.” (1980: 105) Triangulation involves: “two or more creatures 
simultaneously in interaction with each other and the world they share.” (1997b: 128) But it is 
not only the presence of this triangular interaction which is important; it is also important that 
the interacting creatures are aware of this interaction: they recognize similarities of response to 
stimuli. For instance in the case of interpreting a child: “The child finds tables similar; we find 
tables similar; and we find the child’s responses to tables similar. Given these three patterns of 
response we can assign a location to the stimuli that elicit the child’s responses. The relevant 
stimuli are the objects or events we naturally find similar (tables) which are correlated with the 
responses of a child we find similar. It is a form of triangulation: one line goes from the child 
in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the direction of the table, and the third 
line goes between us and the child. Where the lines from child to table and us to table converge, 
‘the’ stimulus is located.’ (1992: 119) 
An extreme setting useful to comprehend Davidson’s notion of triangulation is a case 
of radical interpretation (1973). Imagine a situation where we are confronted with a need to 
interpret someone who does not understand our language. Davidson asks us to understand his 
radical interpretation in line with Quine’s radical translation (1960) where a linguist attempts 
to translate a completely foreign language by simply observing the community of speakers in 
their natural setting. Translation is, however, importantly different from interpretation, since 
the latter involves communication and a semantic connotation missing the former. 
In the case of radical interpretation, we will proceed in much the same way as we would 
with the case of interpreting a child above (1992). The principle of charity is crucial here: we 
grant that the foreigner naturally finds much the same things similar as we do (for instance the 
tables in the example above). Given that the foreigner finds tables similar and we find tables 
similar, we are able to find the foreigner’s responses to tables similar and thereby achieve 
interpretation. 
5.3.1 Critique of Davidson’s Decision-Theoretic Account 
Zilhao (2003) contends that “Davidson’s characterization of human agency is not compatible 
with his other requirement that truth should provide the essential link connecting environment, 
speech and action.”  He argues that Davidson’s account of human behavior as rational is based 
on an analysis of the behavior of a gambler. The fact that gambler-behavior can be 
characterized as geared towards the maximization of expected utility, does not warrant that all 
human behaviour can be so characterised; and therefore the principal of maximization of 
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expected utility cannot be taken to be the definition of rational agency. As a possible response 
to this criticism, note the following passage in The Structure and Content of Truth (Davidson 
1990a): “The approach… I have outlined is not… meant to throw any direct light on how in 
real life we come to understand each other, nor on how we master our first concepts and our 
first language. I have been engaged in a conceptual exercise aimed at revealing the 
dependencies among our basic propositional attitudes.” (1990a: 324-325) Thus what Davidson 
attempts to do is show that our basic propositional attitudes are connected, and one way to do 
this is through the framework he describes. He himself admits that his account is not meant to 
explain how people actually behave or understand each other in real life, or even how we 
acquire concepts or language.   
Zilhao (2003) argues further that beliefs and desires are not independently available, 
i.e. there is no way of identifying them without accepting the principal of maximization of 
expected utility.104 As a reply to this objection, one could argue on behalf of Davidson that 
precisely what he is attempting to do is give a theory about one possible way of identifying 
beliefs and desires via what is observable, that is, simple preferences. Beliefs and desires are 
not merely independently not available, but are rather not available for observation at all, 
therefore it is a useful tool to have a theory that identifies them, through what is available for 
observation, namely choices or simple preference (of the truth of one sentence over another). 
Another point raised by Zilhao (2003) is that one cannot admit of a decision theoretic 
definition of rational agency while maintaining that truth has a central role to play in the 
connection of language and the world. He argues that “one cannot have it both ways: to claim, 
in the hope of procuring a foundation for empirical semantics, that an essential connection of 
veridicality should hold between speech, environment and action, on the one hand; and to 
severe that connection in order to make the interpretational theory conceptually simple and 
mathematically tractable, on the other hand.”  (Zilhao 2003: 244) Again, on Davidson’s behalf, 
one could argue that it is this essential connection of veridicality, or the centrality of truth, as 
the basic primitive intuitive concept which is available to us prior to any analysis, that lies at 
the heart of the interpretational theory. 
                                                          
104 “The procedures set up within the theoretical framework of Bayesian decision theory in order to allow us to 
arrive at a positive identification of the agent’s beliefs and desires are pro-cedures that make sense only if one 
assumes from the outset that agents act according to the principle of maximization of expected utility.” (Zilhao 
2003: 234) 
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I do however sympathize with this objection, as well as the first objection regarding the 
possibility of generalization of gambling behavior, as it is surprisingly unclear from Davidson’s 
writings on the subject how the decision theoretic framework is to be applied in the case of 
sentences. He does not, for instance, explain the application with any actual study to serve as 
an example. The application is further shrouded in mystery since, at times, Davidson takes the 
decision theoretic framework to be a kind of analogy to his truth-theoretic claims. For instance, 
in The Folly of Defining Truth (1996) he suggests that: “We should think of a theory of truth 
for a speaker, in the same way we think of a theory of rational decision: both describe structures 
we can find with an allowable degree of fitting and fudging, in the behavior of more or less 
rational creatures gifted with speech. It is in the fitting and fudging that we give content to the 
undefined concepts of subjective probability and subjective values – belief and desire, as we 
briefly call them; and, by way of theories like Tarski’s, to the undefined concept of truth.” 
(Davidson 1996: 278)  
5.4 Reinterpreting Use 
It is also clear from our discussions in this chapter that, for Davidson, knowledge of the truth 
conditions of a sentence is related to understanding the sentence. Further, this notion of 
understanding and truth conditions leaves open the idea that truth conditions of a sentence (or 
the knowledge of truth conditions), is related to the way the sentence is used105. So there is the 
potential, within a Davidsonian framework, for a use-theoretic account of meaning as related 
to truth and understanding. Towards this end, we will, in the remainder of this chapter first try 
to understand what use can potentially contribute to meaning. 
5.4.1 Understanding Use 
What is use? How do we begin to analyze it? Clearly, the use of a word is its utterance at a 
certain moment in time. One could potentially argue, for instance that the use of a sentence is 
the instantiation of the sentence (in a particular context), and the meaning of each instantiation 
is the sentence itself (in the context of utterance). In other words, a sentence used is an uttered 
(or read or written) sentence within its context of utterance (or discourse). It is clear that in an 
                                                          
105 As exemplified by passages such as the following: “What is clear, I think, is that someone who knows under 
what conditions a sentence would be true understands that sentence, and if the sentence has a truth value (true, 
false or perhaps neither), then someone who does not know under what conditions it would be true doesn’t 
understand it. This simple claim doesn’t rule out an account of meaning which holds that sentences mean what 
they do because of how they are used; it may be that they are used as they are because of their truth conditions, 
and they have the truth conditions they do because of how they are used.” (Davidson 1999: 111) 
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instance of use, the analysis must take into account the context (we will shortly consider in 
greater detail what the context consists in). We may, as a preliminary step, now define use as 
follows: 
A use of x is an instantiation of x 
How do we distinguish meaning from use? It naturally follows from the above that meaning 
can be separated from use just in case, and just as much as, meaning can be distinguished from 
an instantiation. Meaning is commonly understood as something that can be abstracted from 
each use or instantiation, or that which is common to the various uses. Thus, what distinguishes 
meaning from use, to put it loosely, is that meaning is what remains intact even when the 
context of the actual utterance is removed, along with any additional information about the 
speaker, hearer, the object of reference etc.  
Apart from the context of utterance, the pragmatic context, we must also consider the 
syntactic context: what comes before and after the word, as well as the context of the discourse. 
Let us consider the following example: 
‘It is red’  
This is a fairly simple statement, and means that the object referred to by ‘it’ possesses the 
quality of ‘being red’, i.e. the colour red. Now let us consider the discourse within which it 
occurs: 
‘Look at the light! It is red!’ 
This helps us make our meaning more precise by adding that ‘it’ refers to light. 
However, ambiguity still remains by virtue of pragmatic considerations. The way to clarify the 
meaning would be to introduce the pragmatic factors: the speaker utters this while the hearer 
is driving a vehicle at top speed while approaching a red traffic signal, implying that the hearer 
should stop or slow down; or alternatively, the speaker utters this while walking on a beach 
during sunset, or entering a room lit with red lights etc. In these cases, the utterance could be 
followed by ‘stop!’, ‘how beautiful!’ and ‘how ugly!’ respectively. 
We can create any number of such examples. The point is that with each step, meaning 
gets more refined. Is each of the above at a different level of cognition, or, does each correspond 
with a different stage of the analysis or comprehension? In other words, is the processing of 
the pragmatic considerations successive or simultaneous, that is, does it occur at a later time? 
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What we gather from ‘the peanut was in love’ analysis (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006) 
considered in 4.2.3, is that the meaning of the whole is calculated simultaneously, i.e. taking 
into account the context of utterance, and the context is not factored in at a slightly later stage: 
“contextual appropriateness not only can ‘‘neutralize’’ animacy violations, but can even render 
the animacy-violating predicate more preferred than an animacy-obeying canonical predicate.” 
(Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006: 1107) In the context of the story of the dancing peanut, we 
are led to expect the predicate ‘in love’ and consider the animacy-obeying canonical predicate 
‘salted’ as a violation. This suggests that what matters as far as understanding the meaning is 
concerned is the entire relevant discourse within its utterance context.  
One way to understand this could be as follows. We have at our disposal certain features 
(phonological, syntactic, semantic) which account for the meaning of x. So we have i features 
(fi) in our system and these are universal, in the sense that they can account for the meaning of 
each word. The word x occurs within a discourse context C, which captures what comes before 
the word and after it: Ya_bZ, where a and b are phrases which form the remainder of the 
sentence of which the word x is a part (so for the word ‘ran’ in Mary ran the marathon ‘a’ 
would be the noun phrase ‘Mary’ and ‘b’ would be the determiner phrase ‘the marathon’). Y 
and Z are sentences forming the discourse. Each of the features have a certain weighting (W) 
depending on the context. So the meaning of x in context C is the following: 
1. 𝑀(𝑥/𝐶) = 𝑊01
𝐶 (𝑓1) +𝑊02
𝐶 (𝑓2) + ⋯  
2. Where C = Ya_bZ 
Now, there are statements which are analyzable (provable) only when taken in context, 
for instance the ‘The peanut was in love’ (there is no problem with the syntax, even to begin 
with. Here the problem was only semantic, and the context of the story which provides the 
animate feature to the peanut solves this problem.) But there are also statements which cannot 
be analyzed given our present system, for instance a particular instantiation of a new use. So 
this instantiation of a new use of x will not be analysable within our system (which includes 
the context of utterance, since this is a completely novel use), though it still maybe true.  This 
possiblytrue but not provable (or rather, analysable) statement (the instantiation of a novel use 
of a term) is what necessitates the concept of use and, if meaning is use, the non-reducibility 
of meaning to lexical features. This is because the syntax derives the meaning of x from its 
lexicon, in which each lexical item is a collection of features. In the case of the novel use U* 
this collection does not capture the meaning, and therefore it cannot be accounted for within 
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the syntax. However, we assume (?) that the relevant (?) statement is true. Understanding these 
statements means that we understand each instantiation of a word, each use of a word in its 
own right (to use Hinzen(2007)’s terminology, as an ‘atom’). So the use of x is an instantiation 
of x; each use gives the meaning (in abstraction); and the meaning of x is an abstraction of its 
own instantiations. 
Thus it is important to incorporate use as distinguished from meaning and the analysis 
into features as the latter does not account for novel uses. The ‘use’ and not the understood 
‘meaning’ becomes important only in case of a novel use. This is because in the case of a new 
use, although we know the context, we are not certain regarding the value or weighting to be 
given to some of the features. Thus we would be unable to perform the calculations in (1) in 
order to arrive at the meaning. But this novel use will eventually feed into the meaning (in the 
sense that we would recognize the weightage of the various features) and we will no longer 
need to refer to the novel meaning of the word in that particular instance.  Thus use remains a 
‘use’ only until there is abstraction. It appears that though every utterance is a use (or 
instantiation), the ‘use’ aspect lasts only an instant. The use is any and every particular 
instantiation; but any analysis of it would lead to meaning. 
When we speak thus of an appropriate use, we mean rather an instantiation which is in 
line with meaning. Horwich’s use theory is interesting in this regard, as his use-properties, in 
defining meaning in terms of use, retain the element which we just argued is lost in any analysis 
of use. Horwich’s use properties, which constitute meaning are in fact particular instantiations. 
These particular instantiations are special in that we intuitively accept these statements as true, 
and this intuitive acceptance elevates them to the status of meaning-constituting use-properties. 
So there need not be abstraction from the use or instantiation to arrive at the meaning, but the 
use itself constitutes the meaning, prior to analysis of the sentence. So it appears, as we pointed 
out in chapter 3 as well, there is a sense in which we would already know the meaning of the 
relevant term, which is what enables us to intuitively accept the use-property sentence. But our 
discussion in this section also suggests that the use-property sentence is accepted without being 
analysed for meaning. That is, it is accepted as a whole, prior to analysis. There is no way of 
specifying the kind of meaning that these use-properties lead to except actually using the 
sentence. Thus Horwich’s use-properties are unique in that they actually result in understanding 
meaning in terms of use in the sense of use suggested in this section. Below, in section 5.4.3, 
we will develop further how we use and interpret this notion of use-properties towards 
answering our original intuitions. 
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5.4.2 Pietroski’s ‘most’ Experiments: A Davidsonian Application of Decision Theory 
A possible application of a Davidsonian-like framework, through the analysis of choice 
behavior, are the experiments related to the meaning of ‘most’, carried out by Pietroski, Lidz, 
Hunter and Halberda (2009). In these experiments, the subjects were asked to answer whether 
or not they thought the statement (A) ‘most of the dots are blue’ was true, given various 
combinations of two, and later more than two colours of dots. In the first set of experiments 
involving dots of two colors (yellow and blue) the analysis of the result indicated that subjects 
did not understand the meaning of ‘most’ in terms of one-to-one correspondence of the two 
colours of dots: by, for instance, judging which of the two sets (blue dots and yellow dots) has 
at least one more. Rather they appear to have approximated the cardinalities of the two sets 
using ANS (approximate number system)106. In a two colour experiment, it is not possible to 
determine what speakers understand as the meaning of most, whether and how it is different 
from more for instance. So in the next set of experiments (Lidz et al 2011), more number of 
colours were introduced, to see whether for instance the subjects understood the meaning of 
(A) to be A1 or A2 as follows 
(A1)   >(|DOT ∩ BLUE|, |DOT − BLUE|)107 
(A2)   >(|DOT ∩ BLUE|, |DOT| − |DOT ∩ BLUE|) 
A1 contends that A requires that the number of blue dots (|DOT ∩ BLUE|) is greater 
than the number of non-blue dots (|DOT − BLUE|). A2 says that A requires that the number of 
blue dots (|DOT ∩ BLUE|) is greater than the result of subtracting blue dots (|DOT ∩ BLUE|) 
from the total number of dots (|DOT|). Thus A1 requires one to determine the cardinality of 
both the blue dots and the not blue dots, while A2 selects only the blue dots. Given the 
observation from Halberda et al (2006) “that at rapid presentation rates, the visual system can 
accurately track a maximum of 3 sets” (Lidz et al 2009: 24) it was predicted that in A1 accuracy 
should decline as number of colours increase, and in A2 the number of colours should have no 
impact. The results were consistent with A2 and reflect the use of ANS: The performance 
                                                          
106 The authors note, interestingly, that ANS is available to other animals as well, and not limited to humans. 
 
107 Where ‘||’ signify cardinality and ‘∩’ is for intersection of two sets. So, ‘> (|DOT ∩ BLUE|, |DOT − BLUE|)’ 
means that the cardinality of the intersection of the set of dots and the set of blue things, is greater than the 
cardinality of the subtraction of the set of blue things from the set of dots. 
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declines as a function of ratio, with better performance on easier ratios (weber ratio). The 
performance is unaffected by the number of colours. 
What these experiments do is provide a way to distinguish between and choose from 
truth conditionally equivalent semantic representation (like A1 and A2) through constraints 
imposed by interfacing cognitive systems like the visual and number systems. For our purpose, 
we note that these experiments provide a way to gage the meaning of a sentence (albeit one 
importantly containing a quantification term) from the preference behavior of participants, 
given two possible use-contexts (the visual representations). So here the observable 
phenomenon - the choice - is between contexts and not sentences as in the case of Davidson. 
But what Pietroski is aiming at is also the meaning of words (in this case ‘most’) and not the 
meaning of sentences. The different use contexts offer different truth conditions for the relevant 
term, given that the sentence is kept constant.108 Thus the preference of one use-context over 
another, gives us the truth condition of the relevant term.  
The reason why the above mentioned experiments become interesting for us, is that we 
can potentially imagine similar conditions for testing Horwich-like use-properties. Use-
properties, we may recall, were based on our underived acceptance of a certain sentence 
containing the word in question. For example: “‘red’s meaning stems from our underived 
propensity to accept ‘That is red’ in response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked 
by observing a clearly red surface.” (Horwich 2004:351). So given a clearly red surface we see, 
we intuitively accept the sentence ‘that is red’ in response. Thus we could potentially create an 
experiment in order to test these intuitions. For instance, if we consider that the meaning of red 
is a particular shade of colour, then we can create an experiment around that on the lines of the 
meaning of most experiments. We could show subjects a spectrum of colour cards with the 
hues of orange yellow red and brown, and ask them to pick which colour card they think best 
fits the sentence ‘That is red’. Such experiments inform our intuitions regarding use-properties, 
by showing that these use-properties are testable empirical assertions.  
 
                                                          
108 If the choice was over sentences, keeping the context of use constant, then the truth conditions would pertain 
to the meaning of one sentence over the other. 
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5.4.3 Re-interpreting Use-properties 
Use, as we saw denotes an instantiation, an utterance of a sentence (or word) in a context. For 
Horwich words are assigned use-properties109 as their meaning, and sentence meanings are 
trivially obtained through compositionality; i.e. the individual word meanings (use properties) 
are inserted into a compositional schema to obtain the meaning of the sentence. I argued in 
chapter 3 that a substantive account of compositionality is needed in order to derive meanings 
of words from use properties. Either we need such an account, or use properties lose their 
special status, as all we need to say is that in using terms, we already need to have an implicit 
knowledge of their meaning. In fact, even in case we admit a substantive account of 
compositionality, such an account could be given in each particular use of the term, again 
rendering use-properties superfluous.  
For our purposes here, we want to retain Horwich-like use properties, while discarding 
the rest of Horwich’s account, along with his deflated accounts of compositionality and truth. 
The idea we preserve is that use properties connect what we intuitively accept as true with the 
meaning of the word. This general idea is connected to or even exemplified in the experiments 
conducted by Pietroski et al (2009) and Lidz et al (2011). This connection has interesting 
consequences for a Davidsonian unified theory as we shall see now. 
The experiments discussed in the previous section  suggest a possible way in which the 
meaning of ‘most’ arises from the truth conditions of the sentence, and it provides a way in 
which this can be tested. This, we suggested briefly in this chapter, is a possible application of 
Davidson’s decision theoretic procedure. In the experiments, the truth conditions and thereby 
the meaning of ‘most’ is determined by analyzing people’s preferences. Since the aim is to 
arrive at the meaning of a word, the context of discourse110 is kept constant while the use-
context (or the external situation)111 is varied. Davidson , on the other hand, aimed at reaching 
the meaning of a sentence, by figuring out which sentence fit the external truth condition better, 
based on the simple preference of one sentence over another, given a context of use. 
                                                          
109 For example: “’bachelor’’s meaning is engendered by our underived acceptance of the sentence, ‘The bachelors 
are the unmarried men’” and “‘red’s meaning stems from our underived propensity to accept ‘That is red’ in 
response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked by observing a clearly red surface.” (Horwich 
2004:351). See chapter 3, section 3.2 for details. 
110 That is, in this case, the sentence (‘Most of the dots are blue’ for instance). 
111 The cases of blue and other coloured dots. 
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There are a number of important points regarding the kind of use-properties we get from 
the above, which we want to carry over into a reinterpretation of a use theory. Firstly, as it 
appears in the above formulation, meaning is not atomic, i.e. our knowledge of meanings of 
words is not isolated from our understanding of sentences. That we understand and accept a 
certain sentence gives us the meaning (of a word). Similarly for Davidson, meaning arises at 
the level of sentences. Words have meanings in the context of the sentence in which they occur. 
Secondly, meaning is essentially connected with propositional attitudes, which, if we are to 
agree with Davidson, are mainly beliefs and desires. Our intuitive acceptance (or preference) 
of one sentence over another gives us both the degree of belief as well as desire.112  
In chapter 3 we noted that one of the problems with Horwich’s conception of use-
properties was that there appeared to be no systematic way of picking which sentence 
constitutes the use-property. With the kind of experiments mentioned in Pietroski et al (2009) 
and Lidz et al (2011) we now potentially have a systematic way to make this decision. We 
could for instance choose two sentences which we ourselves may be inclined to intuitively 
accept as the meaning of the word (in line with Davidson’s use of the principle of charity) and 
then test to see whether others would prefer one over the other, keeping the context of use (or 
the external situation) constant. Such experiments would not only give us the meaning of the 
word, as in the case of Pietroski’s experiments, but also the meaning of the sentence, or the 
conditions under which the sentence would be true, along with the subjective probability and 
expected utility of the sentence (applying a Davidsonian decision theory). Thus we now have 
a way of connecting the Davidsonian framework with a use-theoretic understanding of 
meaning. As we also saw in 5.4.1 above, using Horwich-like use-properties would also ensure 
that we understand meaning simply in terms of use itself, and the instantiation or use, is not 
lost to abstraction. Davidson himself was open to the idea that truth conditions of a sentence is 
related to the way the sentence is used, as is evident by passages such as the following: “What 
is clear, I think, is that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be true 
understands that sentence, and if the sentence has a truth value (true, false or perhaps neither), 
then someone who does not know under what conditions it would be true doesn’t understand 
it. This simple claim doesn’t rule out an account of meaning which holds that sentences mean 
what they do because of how they are used; it may be that they are used as they are because of 
their truth conditions, and they have the truth conditions they do because of how they are used.” 
(Davidson 1999: 111) So for Davidson, knowledge of truth conditions of a sentence constitutes 
                                                          
112 Refer to chap section 5.3 above. 
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understanding the sentence, and what I have tried to do in 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 is show how 
this knowledge of truth conditions could be related to use, through using Horwich’s use-
properties and testing them through Pietroski-like experiments under the framework of 
Davidsonian decision theory. 
How does any of this help us achieve what we set out to do: to reconcile internal content 
and external significance? What we achieve from this experimental approach is a relation 
between meaning and our propositional attitudes. If truth is in this way related to what we 
believe and what we desire, it appears that locating ourselves as situated in this world which 
we share with others is central to any external significance that we attach to them. To put it 
differently, much background precedes the establishment of any external significance (to any 
symbol, linguistic or otherwise). We need to assume to begin with that while providing this 
external significance, we are ourselves located in a world that we share with other beings much 
like ourselves, i.e. our rationality is for all purposes the same as that of other normal human 
beings. Thus, given our adaptation of Davidsonian triangulation and decision theory, what is 
content internal to our mind/brain, i.e. our propositional attitudes, is what determines and is 
inextricably linked to external significance or truth. What is crucial here, as in Davidson, is that 
we understand ourselves as located in a shared world, which we share with others like 
ourselves. 
5.5 Wittgenstein and Davidson on the Impossibility of Private Language 
The necessity of a world shared with others was felt even in Wittgenstein’s PI, where he argued 
there can be no private language or one that only the speaker can know and understand. The 
reason for this is basically that without a way to verify meanings of words, without objective 
criteria for identifying them, even the speaker would not be able to identify them. 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument, as set forth in §244–271 of the Investigations, is 
well known and extensively discussed since it appeared. Given that I have nothing particular 
to add to the argument, I have not rehashed it in this work. But it is important for us, that 
language (and not just language use), for Wittgenstein was not something that can occur in 
isolation, and requires a community of speakers and hearers, and rules and conventions of use. 
I would just like to briefly sketch the argument so as to bring together the conclusion of this 
work.  
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A private language, for Wittgenstein, is one where “The individual words… refer to 
what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another 
person cannot understand the language.’ (PI §243) For example: We can imagine a person A 
growing up alone on an island. There would be here no human being to communicate with. 
However if he got hurt, he may groan in pain, and he may laugh while watching a dog go round 
and round while attempting to catch his tail. He may even tame a dog or a horse, and may utter 
certain particular sounds when he wants them to go away or sit down etc. To carry our example 
further, if someone from the mainland comes to this island and befriends A, who, for the sake 
of our example, tries to communicate with him through his own usages of sounds, 
demonstrating what he means by telling the dog to sit down first, or uttering the sound and then 
sitting down, and doing this repeatedly till the person sits down. However, when the person 
sits, he has, for himself, translated the sound to mean ‘sit down’. There is successful 
communication, and the language is thus no longer private. Even when A was previously telling 
the dog to sit down etc, there was communication, what he had to say was not incommunicable. 
Wittgenstein argues, through the example of private sensations such as ‘pain’ that it would be 
a mistake to think that only the person feeling the pain can understand what the word means 
when he utters it. To put it briefly, he argues that to have a private language for our immediate 
sensations, i.e. a language which is unintelligible to anyone but us, is impossible. This is 
because such a language would be unintelligible to us as well, without any objective criterion 
for identifying which of its words refers to which sensation. If on the other hand, such objective 
criteria exist, then the language will no longer be private as others would also be able to 
understand it.  
As another example: A person writes a diary and comes up with a new word to describe 
how she felt on the first day of the job, as she thought no known words could express it. Now 
she may use the same word again, every time she felt that way. One day her friend reads her 
diary and asks her what the word means. Now she explains the situation to her friend when she 
felt that feeling, and said ‘its something between fear and nervousness, excitement and elation, 
importance and insignificance...’ here we cannot be certain that B’s friend completely got her 
import, but we can be sure that she understood what the ordinary language words mean, and 
through imagination she could succeed in combining them. Further, in order to make sure she 
remembers the exact meaning of the word, B writes down the situation in which she felt it, and 
also the explanation she gave her friend. Now there is an objective criterion to check whether 
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her usage in later situations is correct. However, once it is written, it is no longer private; the 
rules of its usage can be read and understood by others. 
In fact, I agree with Kripke (1982) although not with his skeptical conclusions, that the 
crux of the private language argument appears earlier in the Investigations than most believe, 
i.e. in PI §202: “ ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey 
a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one is obeying a 
rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” I do not think that this leads to the skeptical 
conclusion that there is no such thing as ‘obeying a rule’.113 A practice involves repetition of 
performance. So a rule needs to be obeyed more than once for an action to qualify as obeying 
a rule. In the case of a new rule, it must be accepted as a rule by more than one person, i.e. it 
needs to be initiated into a ‘way of life’ of a community. The idea is that if one obeys a rule 
known only to oneself, then there would be no way to judge whether we are correctly following 
it. For objectivity, we need to consult other people.  
Davidson argued further that our sense of objectivity itself is derived from this 
triangular relation formed by our simultaneous interaction with other people and the world. In 
other words, with Davidson’s Triangulation (see section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), we see that 
objectivity, or at least our sense of it, involves at least two people (a speaker and hearer) 
simultaneously in interaction with each other and the world. We have a similar necessity within 
Wittgenstein, via the rejection of a private language. Both stress on communication within a 
community of speakers, in order for there to be objectivity. However, I do not want to harp on 
this similarity here, and point it out only to buttress the implication for my argument that 
sharing our world with others is deeply connected to understanding language.  
Before we conclude, I would like to point out an alternative way in which Internalism 
and Externalism has been reconciled in recent times. This is the position of Un-Cartesian 
Linguistics. I only just briefly mention it here so as to point to an alternative to the Cartesian 
view I have been assuming.  
5.6 Cartesian and Un-Cartesian Linguistics 
Commonly, a variety of domains are thought to be forms of expression- art, music, dance, 
theatre; and language are among them. In what way do these qualify as forms of expression? 
                                                          
113 I have in no measure exhausted all there is to say about Rule Following. But my purpose here was simply to 
give a general gist of the argument in order to indicate how it relates to the direction of this thesis. 
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To speak of forms of expression, entails that there is something, importantly distinct from these 
various forms, and we use these forms to express it; i.e. the modes of expression must be 
distinct from the object of expression. One often hears of the various emotions expressed by 
these forms, or even questions and commentaries on social or political structures. Thus it seems 
that we can express through these varied media, our emotions, beliefs, fears, hopes etc., i.e. our 
thoughts. Being mind-internal, these various structures need a medium of expression in order 
to be shared, given that we are social beings and live in this shared world. Thus intuitively, it 
appears that language is, like art and music, a mode of expression of our thoughts (which are 
thereby distinct from language). 
What does it entail to call language a form of expression? It would mean, at least, that 
we use language (or other modes of expression above) to express something other than itself. 
One may get the feeling, time and again, of being unable to express oneself. I often feel that 
there are thoughts in my mind, and I’m unable to find the right words for their expression. This 
intuitive distance between language and thought has dominated much dialogue in philosophy 
of language. Chomsky (1966), for instance, contended that human language is “an instrument 
for the free expression of thought”. (Chomsky 1966: 65)   
Though Chomsky argued that Cartesian mind-body dualism was no longer a problem, 
as the distinction between mind and body can no longer be formulated, he was however 
Cartesian in at least two important senses. Firsty for Descartes, as for Chomsky (1966) 
grammar is specifically human. No animals have propositional thought such as in humans, 
though animals may be said to have thought to some degree. In our immediate environment we 
may have noticed the pattern in the behavior of our pets. People who have pets can sometimes 
even distinguish between the barking noises that indicate (or even communicate) to them what 
exactly they want. A large range of research indicates that non-human animals communicate 
with each other using signals of a variety of sorts (Hauser et al. 2002). But as noted in 1.2 
animal communication is not like human language as it lacks generative capacity and is not 
stimulus independent.114  Thus language (grammar) is unique to humans. 
Consider the research on primates, e.g. Savage-Rumbaugh’s work on bonobos. The 
acquired vocabulary of these animals can apparently consist of about 300 to 500 distinct 
symbols, and they can even use these in appropriate contexts. (Hauser et al 2007:6-7) This 
                                                          
114 Chomsky’s (1959) criticism of Skinner stresses that human language, unlike animal communication, cannot 
be explained in terms of stimulus-response. 
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would be greatly significant if these animals are able to combine this limited vocabulary to 
form an unbounded array of expressions. This however does not seem to be the case, “their 
lexicon never takes off as it does in very young children... rarely do animals combine two or 
more symbols, and when they do, the system appears highly constrained.”( Hauser et al 2007: 
7) 
Further, Boysen and Matsuzawa’s work on Chimpanzees indicates that though their 
ability to ‘map the number of objects onto a single Arabic numeral’ is impressive, however, 
‘they require thousands of training trials and often years to acquire the integer list up to nine’. 
(Hauser et al 2002:1577) Human children, having acquired the numbers 1,2 and 3 go on to 
acquire all the numbers, as they have grasped the idea of the successive function. This however, 
is not the case with chimpanzees. Their acquiring of the integers is similar to the acquiring of 
any other symbol with its referential properties: “The system apparently never takes on the 
open-ended generative property of human language. (Hauser et al 2002:1577) 
The point here is that there is evidence to suggest that Descartes and Chomsky were 
right in that human language is unique to the species. We have also intuitively followed the 
further Cartesian argument that language and thought are distinct, and language expresses 
thought. This is, as noted above, also in line with Chomsky. Chomskian Biolinguistics also 
understands language on analogy with a biological organ, or an independent faculty which 
interfaces with other systems like the conceptual-intentional system and the sensory-motor 
system, which lie outside the core faculty of language of FLN (see figure 1).  
An alternative to this Cartisian position is the Un-Cartisian approach (Hinzen 2006, 
2007, 2012, Hinzen and Sheehan 2013) which contends rather that language constitutes 
thought, and is therefore not distinguishable from it. Hinzen emphasizes that human mode of 
thought is inherently grammatical. According to Hinzen 2012 given that a human mode of 
thought is intrinsically grammatical, there is the possibility that “the theory of grammar may 
upgrade to an actual theory of thought” (2012: 643) Thought, in Wittgenstein, as well as 
traditional semantics, was meant to have external significance: it is propositional, where a 
proposition is one which can be judged to either agree or disagree with reality. By making 
thought inherently grammatical, Hinzen effectively abolishes the divide between syntax and 
semantics: he promotes the view that semantics, which traditionally analyses propositional 
thought in order to derive linguistic  meaning, needs to realize the significance of syntax, and 
the domains need to merge. Hinzen and Sheehan 2013 argue that syntax gives us our mode of 
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reference to the world, i.e. the way we understand and classify the world is grammatical. Thus 
grammar gives us an ontology and is not merely the vehical for an expression of thoughts. For 
example, consider the following:  
1. Mary smiles. 
2. Mary’s smile is beautiful. 
These sentences may be uttered given the same external situation. They also contain the same 
root word smile. But the (1) picks out a state of affairs while (2) picks out an object or property. 
Our mode of reference (to the same reality) is linguistically distinct, and this, the Un-Cartesians 
claim makes an ontological difference. The idea is that grammar enables us to refer to the world 
in very specific ways; our mode of reference is grammatical, and grammar makes available 
specific ontological categories: “[G]rammar narrowly constrains the ways in which words can 
be used to refer, making available a small number of discrete options in which this can happen, 
ranging from purely predicative nominals to quantificational, to referential, to deictic, and 
finally, to personal ones” (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 211) 
I have here only briefly mentioned this vast and fruitful enterprise so as to indicate that 
there are alternatives to what I have generally accepted as an axiom: that language and thought 
are distinct. That grammar narrowly constrains the ways in which words can be used to refer 
is I believe quite acceptable. Grammar constrains the way language is used, and thereby also 
the way we use words to refer and insofar as thought is linguistic, how we think about and 
grasp the world around us.  
The task I took up in this thesis was to find a way to reconcile internal content and 
external significance. The Un-Cartesian position could be one way to go towards this aim. By 
understanding language as constitutive of thought, the Un-Cartesians abolish the 
syntax/semantics divide (as noted above). The claim is that syntax, traditionally understood as 
constituting internal significance, and semantics, traditionally understood as the domain of 
external significance, merge in the Un-Cartesian position, and they are therefore able to 
reconcile internal content and external significance.  
My problem with this is that, I do not believe that abolishing this distinction leads to 
much explanatory benefit. To say that grammar constrains truth and reference, does not amount 
to an explanation of how we achieve truth and reference, but is rather a description of the actual 
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phenomena.115 The Un-Cartesian may reply that grammar gives you truth and reference and it 
constitutes external significance when it joins forces with the lexicon. I sympathise with the 
idea that our mode of reference is grammatical, but I do not think it has the philosophical 
significance that Hinzen (2012) assumes.    
5.7 Conclusion  
We saw that for Davidson, it is a sentence that is the unit of meaning (unlike for instance, 
Horwich 1998) as truth conditions pertain to whole sentences. The reason why parts of a 
sentence become relevant is essentially that one wants a semantic theory to generate potentially 
infinite meanings from finite resources. The predicate that is able to do this job, turns out, for 
Davidson, to be Tarski’s truth predicate. The conception of truth, for Davidson is our intuitive 
concept of truth, which is substantive and not deflationary. Further, it is only in the presence 
of another creature much like ourselves, that we are able to locate objective reality. But this 
does not mean that reality is a mental construct. It is rather that we begin with a shared world, 
filled with other people who possess the same standards of rationality as ourselves. All this is 
implied in the principle of charity, which is essential to achieve interpretation. Truth, meaning, 
desire and beliefs are all interconnected for Davidson, strung together by the principle of 
charity. We can use Decision theory, or an analysis of simple preferences, to extract subjective 
probabilities as well as cardinal utilities and the former, when applied to sentences gives us 
meanings. We mentioned the experiments regarding the meaning of ‘most’ by way of a possible 
application of Davidsonian decision theoretic framework.  
It is also clear from our discussions in this chapter that, for Davidson, knowledge of the 
truth conditions of a sentence is related to understanding the sentence. Further, this notion of 
understanding and truth conditions leaves open the idea that truth conditions of a sentence (or 
the knowledge of truth conditions), is related to the way the sentence is used. So there is the 
potential, within a Davidsonian framework, for a use-theoretic account of meaning as related 
to truth and understanding. The reason why Pietroski’s ‘most’-experiments are particularly 
interesting in this regard is that they provide a bridge between Horwich-like use-properties and 
a Davidsonian unified understanding. I believe this method is more explanatory than the Un-
Cartesian position discussed. 
                                                          
115 Un-Cartesians believe that such a description of the phenomena of reference and truth, is, as much of an 
explanation that is possible. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
 
Traditionally, much of philosophical as well as scientific enquiry arises from concerns 
regarding the nature of things or the relations between things. It is then perhaps natural to 
wonder how philosophy can contribute to a naturalized discussion of things and relations. Let 
us for instance consider the field of language acquisition. How we acquire language has been 
a topic of interest to Philosophers since the Vedic period in ancient India. We can however, 
quite easily get data from linguists working in language acquisition, which tells us, for instance, 
that the way children learn language is uniform across the species. Babies a few days old can 
discriminate between their mother tongue and a foreign language from a different class; around 
two weeks, they distinguish between voices and unvoiced consonants, and at about 4 or 5 
months they can distinguish their own language from a foreign language in the same rhythmic 
class.  From 18-24 months, children have telegraphic speech (two word utterances) and fully 
grammatical utterance appear uniformly by 4 years of age.116 That there is an innate mechanism 
that develops within poverty of stimulus conditions is evident, for example, from the case of 
three deaf children who constructed a sign language secretly, against their parent’s wishes, and 
this language was found to be similar to spoken language of children of the same age. (Goldin-
Meadow and Fieldman 1977, Glietman and Newport 1995) 
The point is that there is a lot a linguist can tell us about language acquisition and the 
nature of the language organ or faculty. We can also get information regarding the relation of 
vision or perception with the acquisition of, as well as the use of language, through for instance 
brain imaging techniques. What then could be the significance of a philosophy of language 
with all this knowledge at our disposal? It would, I think, be useful to ask whether any questions 
remain unanswered through a natural scientific enquiry into language acquisition or even 
linguistics. The question remains, what does it mean to know that a particular part of the brain 
lights up when we see a particular image, for instance. Or what can we know about reference 
if we know what kind of a linguistic structure is required to achieve reference? 
 I believe a philosophical addition to the naturalistic discussion would be in terms of 
noticing connections. Traditionally, philosophy has questioned the fundamentals of any field, 
                                                          
116 See for example Stromswold (2000) for a survey of such research into language acquisition. 
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what do the axioms of any field mean in terms of a deeper understanding of the elements and 
relations involved. Philosophy is I believe particularly instructive in helping to understand the 
depth or importance of previously known connections. And this is, I hope, what I have done 
through this work. Not many would doubt (except for extreme Cartesians) that we live in a 
world that we share with others. But that this particular fact is deeply connected to our use and 
understanding of language is a separate and less obvious claim, and one I hope I have at least 
pointed towards.   
To briefly trace the progression of the thesis: we started out seeking to understand the 
intentionality of language; how is it that we are able to reach out to the world through language. 
That we have an internal Faculty of Language which facilitates this reaching out, was not (as 
we also pointed out above) the answer we were looking for. Biolinguistics specifies the internal 
structure that language uses, but the question remains, how does language reach out to the 
world. The answer we thought was both obvious and important: language reaches out to the 
world through its use. We tried to develop this idea through an (re)interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, where we understood the determinate relation of the Tractatus as grammar of the 
later Wittgesnstein. Here grammar in the broad sense already involved an element of use, and 
thus use was part of what constitutes a proposition (i.e. the determinate relation). Further 
through an analysis of Horwich, we attempted to see whether it is possible to systematize a use 
theory of meaning. We found that Horwich’s account could use strengthening that would either 
take away from the use-theoretic aspect of his account, or his account would be rendered 
inconsistent. We then moved on to externalist referential semantics, specifically to minimal 
semantics, and focused on Borg, as she appears at first glance to have a theory which 
incorporates both internalist as well as externalist elements. We found however, that there is 
nothing within the theory that necessitates Borg’s externalism. She does not attempt to explain 
reference but rather just stipulates that words have external significance; that the word ‘dog’ 
gets its content from dogs. For a theory that was able to scientifically explain content ascription, 
we turned to Davidson. Davidson’s decision theoretic account of what he called triangulation 
presented itself as a candidate to better explain how we ascribe a particular content to a 
particular word or sentence. This framework, we argued, was exemplified in Pietroski’s 
“Meaning of ‘Most’” experiments. We contended that Horwich’s use-properties could form 
the test statements for Pietroski-like experiments, which would yield a possible way to relate 
meaning to what we consider true. And this result is only achieved with the important 
assumption that we live in a world which we share with others much like ourselves.  
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In the introduction we noted two related problems: first was the problem of 
intentionality: how is it that we are able to reach out to the world through language. The obvious 
answer, we thought, was through use. The second problem was scientific enquiry: whether or 
not it is possible to scientifically study the object of externalist inquiry, the use of language for 
instance.  The kind of theory I try to point towards, both incorporates how we are able to reach 
out to the world through language; i.e. explains use, and also aims to do so scientifically: 
through experiments which indicate how use determines meaning.  Beyond this argument, I 
hope that this work was also able to at least point towards the fact that: what enables us to use 
language to reach the world is that we ourselves are situated in this world which we share with 
others much like ourselves. To put it differently, it is language use within a community of users, 
which serves as a background for understanding language. 
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